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Abstract 
Between 1914 and 1939, the role of film in fostering international peace and understanding was a 
mainstream discussion within all facets of film production and exhibition. Of course, utopian 
ideals have always surrounded film and new technologies. As a result of the unprecedented 
violence that characterized World War I, however, the enthusiasm for cinema’s ability to prevent 
another global catastrophe proved exceptional. Idealist filmmakers in the United States and 
Europe not only reflected on their liberal ideology, but also developed a loose infrastructure to 
support their lofty ambitions. Though many historians have long dismissed the peace efforts of 
the interwar period as little more than naïve activism, this study argues that cinema made 
tangible contributions to international business, law, education, and organization. These 
ambitions have received little scholarly attention to date. Though there is a large body of work 
that examines film’s critical role in war efforts, few scholars have tackled its significance to 
peace movements. Consequently, this dissertation traces the development of “peacekeeping 
cinema,” an international initiative that encouraged the making of motion pictures as a means to 
generate empathy between divergent societies. The ability to see the lived experiences of “other” 
peoples, supporters insisted, would help remediate the effects of World War I and prevent global 
conflict. By surveying the peacekeeping activities of diverse filmmakers and organizations, this 
dissertation articulates how communities in the United States and Europe interpreted peace and it 
attempts to shed new light on the relationship between film and diplomacy. 
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Introduction 
On October 23, 1923, Will Hays—the head of the recently created Motion Picture Producers and 
Distributors of America (MPPDA)—returned to his office in Washington, D.C. after a six-week 
tour of England and its film industry. As a guest of Ambassador George Harvey, Hays mingled 
freely with politicians, filmmakers, and studio executives. He visited London theaters and 
conversed regularly with avid moviegoers. The highlight of the trip, according to Hays, involved 
arranging an early screening of the soon-to-be blockbuster Little Old New York (1923) for a 
small audience that had included the Duke of Marlborough. It is tempting to treat the event as 
little more than a casual holiday. However, Hays’ seemingly insignificant jaunt around England 
actually revealed a critical development in the perceived utility of motion pictures. In his official 
report to his staff, Hays reflected on his deep conviction about “the importance of motion 
pictures as an instrument of international amity.”1 Describing the trip as something akin to a 
eureka moment, Hays insisted that “the international understanding of the peoples of the world 
… will be brought about by the right kind of American motion pictures.”2  
As president of the MPPDA, Hays’ official task centered on cleaning up and purifying 
the image of the motion picture industry after the highly-publicized Virginia Rappe-Fatty 
Arbuckle scandal. The alleged rape and murder of model-actress Virginia Rappe by silent film 
comedian Roscoe “Fatty” Arbuckle—who a jury later acquitted of any wrongdoing—enforced 
Hollywood’s growing reputation as a cesspool of sin, excess, and sexual perversion, creating 
concern for the federal government. Responsible for “establishing and maintaining the highest 
possible moral standard in the motion picture industry,” Hays, a devout Presbyterian and 
																																								 																				
1	Will	H.	Hays,	The	Memoirs	of	Will	H.	Hays	(Garden	City,	New	York:	Doubleday	and	Company,	1955),	369.	
2	“Will	Hays	Returns	from	Trip	Abroad,”	Motion	Picture	News,	October	27,	1923,	1979.	
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committed Republican, was forced to perform a careful balancing act between the interests of 
business, politics, and art.3 Today, Hays’ name is virtually synonymous with the controversial 
Motion Picture Production Code, a series of content guidelines that Hollywood filmmakers and 
studios were pressured to follow in the years between 1930 and 1968 in order to avoid 
government intervention. However, attaching Hays solely to censorship activities, as most 
scholars have done, belies his role in articulating the widely cherished belief in motion pictures’ 
ability to foster international peace and understanding both during and after World War I. 
In the early 1920s, Hays was busy laying the foundation for what one of his colleagues 
dubbed the “Pax Cinemana,” or Cinematic Peace. Hays adopted this play on the notion of the 
Pax Romana (Roman Peace)—a designation used to characterize the centuries of peaceful and 
prosperous Roman imperial rule beginning with the reign of Caesar Augustus—somewhat in 
jest.4 Nevertheless, the term embodied far more than clever wordplay. It represented Hays’ desire 
to unite the American motion picture industry and steer it toward his vision of global 
peacekeeping. Throughout the 1920s, Hays routinely cited cinema’s ability to end war and 
international tension. “The organized movie industry in America,” he told a cheering audience 
aboard a transatlantic passenger liner in 1928, “will use the movies for promotion of 
international sympathy in an earnest endeavor to create world peace.”5  
Of course, the historical record is littered with countless examples of naïve and 
manipulative political and economic leaders carelessly using vague notions of world peace to 
further personal agendas. It has become a cliché and forces scholars to question the sincerity of 
Hays’ comments. Still, Hays was not known for exaggeration or sarcasm. Supporters and critics 
																																								 																				
3	“Ultimatum	by	Hays	to	Purify	Movies,”	The	New	York	Times,	June	5,	1922,	15.	
4	Will	H.	Hays,	The	Memoirs	of	Will	H.	Hays	(Garden	City,	New	York:	Doubleday	and	Company,	1955),	340.	
5	“Hays	Sees	Movies	as	World	Peace	Aid,”	Prescott	Evening	Courier,	May	11,	1928,	5.	
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both noted that he was “uniquely an American” due to his unwavering honesty and forthright 
demeanor.6 What made Hays’ comments significant were their genuineness. He believed 
legitimately in the peacekeeping power of motion pictures. Hays was nostalgic for the decade 
before World War I, a fleeting period he admitted he had taken for granted, a time when he 
"honestly believed that war as a world factor was a thing of the past.”7 He knew that motion 
pictures could not turn back the clock, but they could, he figured, make a warless world a reality. 
It is essential to note, however, that Hays’ lofty ideas were not novel and were in fact firmly in 
sync with the wider treatment of motion pictures after the horrors of World War I. Influential 
politicians as diverse as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Winston Churchill, the Grand 
Duke of Russia Alexander Mikhailovich, and the King of Siam Prajadhipok, had all endorsed 
“the screen as an incentive to world peace.”8 
By 1918, the importance of motion pictures in international relations had become a point 
of discussion within all facets of film production and exhibition. Hailing from professional, 
amateur, governmental, activist, and philanthropic circles, thousands of filmmakers came to see 
motion pictures as the best tool to promote cooperation between diverse nations and societies. 
An array of important yet overlooked primary source materials, including but not limited to the 
Journal of the Society of Motion Picture Engineers, International Review of Educational 
Cinematography, Moving Picture World, The Educational Screen, and Modern Screen, reveals 
much about how commentators expressed the peacekeeping potential of motion pictures. In fact, 
the following graph demonstrates how often world peace was discussed or referenced in these 
industry-leading publications between 1900 and 1941. 
																																								 																				
6	“Will	H.	Hays—An	Appreciation,”	Motion	Picture	Daily,	March	9,	1954,	1-4.	
7	Will	H.	Hays,	The	Memoirs	of	Will	H.	Hays	(Garden	City,	New	York:	Doubleday	and	Company,	1955),	63.	
8	See:	“You	are	Cordially	Invited,”	Screenland,	June,	1930,	130.	“Here	and	There,”	International	Review	of	
Educational	Cinematography,	January,	1930,	103.	
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Figure 1. 
 
Before 1911, world peace was never mentioned in the extant literature. However, because of 
World War I, articles discussing or referencing motion pictures and world peace flourished, with 
approximately fifty-nine articles published throughout the war. Though that number ebbed and 
flowed after 1919, one can see a gradual increase until the number of publications peaked in 
1935, with approximately forty-one articles. When World War II broke out in Europe in 1939, 
the number of articles quickly plummeted, diminishing to just seven in 1941. All in all, there 
were nearly four-hundred articles published between 1919 and 1939 that discussed or referenced 
motion pictures and world peace. These figures provide a sense of how prominently the politics 
of peacekeeping were embedded in discussions of motion pictures.9  
																																								 																				
9	The	data	above	was	created	using	Project	Arclight,	a	research	platform	developed	at	the	University	of	Wisconsin,	
Madison	and	Concordia	University	to	study	trends	evident	in	over	two	million	pages	of	film	and	media-related	
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Of course, vague utopian ideals have always surrounded new technologies. However, 
after World War I, many Americans enthusiastically embraced cinema’s ability to prevent 
another global catastrophe. Filmmakers and activists in the United States and Europe did not 
merely reflect on their liberal ideology, they actually developed a loose infrastructure to support 
their lofty ambitions. This dissertation examines not only the emergence and expansion of the 
idea that cinema could aid peace efforts, but also the actual attempts to make a warless world 
real. This study moves beyond the restrictions of intellectual history and explores those 
individuals and institutions that put musings into action. It traces the interrelated artistic, 
business, and political forces that drove thousands of filmmakers and activists to embrace cinema 
as an instrument of justice and global peacekeeping between 1914 and 1939. In short, it provides 
a history of the Pax Cinemana.  
Advocates of the Pax Cinemana, also known as “peacekeeping filmmakers,” did not 
promote cinema solely for entertainment purposes. They figured it was meant to do something, 
specifically cultivate international understanding and diplomatic harmony. It is important to note 
that the designation “peacekeeping filmmaker” cannot be found in the historical evidence. There 
were many who identified as both filmmakers and proponents of peace, but had never adopted 
the title formally; it is an original moniker that this dissertation applies to a diverse and even 
contradictory body of filmmakers who had aligned their craft with diplomatic ambitions. They 
operated under the assumption that the ability to see the lived experiences of “other” peoples 
would prevent another global conflict. Hays was one of many individuals within the film 
																																								 																				
publications.	The	publications	consist	of	trade	journals,	fan	magazines,	and	newspapers	scanned	by	the	Library	of	
Congress	and	Media	History	Digital	Library.	
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industry who equated seeing with understanding and exclaimed regularly that “when men 
understand each other, they do not hate, and when they do not hate, they do not make wars.”10  
The peacekeeping cinema of the interwar years has received remarkably little scholarly 
attention. Though many scholars have examined film’s critical role in war efforts, few have 
tackled film’s significance during peacetime. This work contributes to an emerging body of 
scholarship that defines and explains slippery notions of “peace,” “peacekeeping,” and 
“peacetime.” These concepts, under-theorized in historical literature, are too often taken at face 
value. Orthodox surveys of the twentieth century tend to detail violent acts of war and revolution 
in exhausting detail; however, periods of relative peace rarely receive the same critical 
assessment. The fact that historians have pegged the years between 1918 and 1939 as the 
“interwar period” makes this explicitly clear.  
Heeding the nuanced interpretations of peace put forth in the works of David Cortright, 
Cecilia Lynch, Martin Ceadel, and Charles Chatfield, this study articulates how societies in the 
United States and Europe conceived of peace between 1914 and 1939. It explores the eclectic 
and often contradictory responses to a series of pertinent questions: What is peace? Who is 
responsible for implementing and maintaining peace? What is the role of international bodies 
and organizations? Is American world hegemony a safeguard or threat to peace? After World 
War I, policymakers and the public wrestled with these questions routinely. Because an 
international consensus for “peace” was never reached, this study characterizes it not as a fixed 
concept, but rather as an ongoing struggle between various states and publics. Peace did not 
entail the absence of conflict; it was a conflict that required continuous analysis and discussion. 
																																								 																				
10	“The	Road	Back—Does	it	Lead	to	Peace?”	Cinema	Progress,	August	1937,	3.		
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What was certain, however, was that motion pictures would play an integral part. The 
relationship between cinema and the process of peace is at the heart of this study. 
The Pax Cinemana was an informal initiative steered by three interrelated, yet not 
entirely synonymous, philosophical traditions that resurfaced with gusto after World War I, 
idealism, pacifism, and internationalism. The war had shaken but not overturned the geo-political 
status quo, and most belligerent nations in the war, including the United States, Great Britain, 
France, and Germany, believed that the liberal democratic order would prevail. As a result, many 
State Departments, mostly those of Allied Powers, embraced idealist policymaking throughout 
the 1920s and 1930s. Idealism was bipartisan and referred to a handful of general assumptions 
regarding the relationship between states. First, it assumed that humans are altruistic beings 
steered by a common good. Theoretically, the common good extended beyond national 
boundaries and encouraged concern for the welfare of others, regardless of race, class, and 
national origin. Idealism embraced the role of morality in statecraft and insisted that war was 
never inevitable. In fact, idealism posited that war stemmed not from evil individuals or nations, 
but rather from xenophobic institutions and policies that catered solely to domestic interests. In 
order to end war, idealists insisted, belligerent states needed to strengthen international 
organizations collectively. 
One effective way to measure the influence of idealism between the world wars is to 
examine the rise and activity of the multitude of international organizations that emerged in 
tandem with the League of Nations. No enterprise represented the institutionalization of idealism 
better than the League, a groundbreaking intergovernmental body that assumed a new world 
order was emerging as a reaction to the unprecedented violence of World War I. The collective 
brainchild of American President Woodrow Wilson, British diplomat Robert Cecil, and South 
	 8	
African Prime Minister Jan Smuts, the League represented one of the seminal achievements of 
the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. As the League grew throughout the 1920s, it directly and 
indirectly encouraged the spread of both types of international organization: international 
governmental organizations (IGOs) and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs).  
Global peace, idealists assumed, would stem from the mutual cooperation between the 
world’s IGOs and INGOs, thus creating greater interdependence between states and eliminating 
the drive for war. IGOs referred to organizations composed of sovereign states or official 
government actors. IGOs were held together by a treaty or charter that detailed the bylaws and 
goals that the member states had agreed to uphold. Throughout the early twentieth century, 
dozens of IGOs emerged, most of which were formal appendages or affiliates of the League of 
Nations. INGOs, on the other hand, were far more diverse and were commonly defined as any 
international organization that was not established by an agreement among governments. This 
vague definition is a testament to the fact that INGOs represented an extremely diverse spectrum 
of groups from business and labor organizations to social clubs. Some of the more notable 
INGOs include the Red Cross and the International Olympic Committee, while some of the 
lesser known include the Tug of War International Federation and the International Euchre 
Association.  
The number of international organizations had steadily grown throughout the late 
nineteenth century, and by 1900, there were over 200 active organizations, most of which 
revolved around the ambitions of imperial powers.11 Originally, they had three primary 
functions: standardize units of measurement; standardize telegraph and postal rates; and prevent 
																																								 																				
11	John	Boli	and	George	M.	Thomas,	Constructing	World	Culture:	International	Nongovernmental	Organizations	
Since	1875	(Stanford,	CA:	Stanford	University	Press,	1999),	14. 
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the spread of disease.12 Despite nationalist tensions, policymakers of the imperial powers 
realized that some degree of transnational dialogue was essential to stability and self-
preservation. World War I crippled the activities of nearly every existing IGO and INGO and 
halted the emergence of new ones. And yet, by 1920, after the formation of the League of 
Nations, they experienced a considerable comeback with numbers totaling over 800 by the end 
of the decade. 13 In most cases, their creators laced their organizations with lofty ideals about 
world peace and the common good. Evidently, idealism contributed to a revival of an 
international ethic that emerged in the late nineteenth century only to be temporarily interrupted 
by global warfare. In the following years, approximately fifty international organizations 
originated annually until the Great Depression limited their formation to about thirty foundings 
per year.14 But, it is important to note that the slow growth of international organizations 
throughout the 1930s was primarily economic and did not represent an ideological shift from 
international thinking.  
The history of the Pax Cinemana speaks pointedly to these patterns and trends. Of the 
approximately 1,000 international organizations that emerged throughout the interwar period, at 
least twelve of them had formally adopted motion pictures and global peacekeeping as their 
central initiative. Notable examples include the International Educational Cinematographic 
Institute (IECI), the International Committee for the Diffusion of Arts and Literature through the 
Cinema (CIDALC), and the International Union of Amateur Film Makers (UNICA). Though this 
might appear like a modest sum, it is important to note that approximately 700 other international 
organizations also committed to securing the postwar peace had adopted motion pictures in some 
																																								 																				
12 Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary 
World (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2002), 10. 
13 Boli and Thomas, 14. 
14 Boli and Thomas, 23.  
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capacity to help aid their efforts. The majority of these organizations revolved around 
educational and legal pursuits and stressed the need to cultivate international understanding. 
Apparently, the idealist vision to institutionalize an agenda for peace manifested itself in many of 
the international organizations that flourished after the war. Furthermore, the United States 
represented one of the primary regions for IGO and INGO development, proving that United 
States citizens were eager to partake in international bodies for global peace, despite the fact that 
United States Congressional representatives refrained from supporting the United States’ 
membership in the League of Nations.  
From a theoretical and philosophical standpoint, many Americans wholeheartedly 
embraced idealism. Even the League of Nations’ harshest critics agreed with its central aims. 
However, they questioned the League’s ability to implement its lofty ambitions in an affordable, 
practical manner. They feared that the United States’ membership in the League might prove 
costly and undermine the more immediate interests of the nation. Nevertheless, the United States 
played a critical role in rejuvenating and boosting a preexisting enthusiasm for international 
organization. This is significant because, typically, between the wars, historians portray the 
Unites States as an isolated nation still repulsed by World War I and then also mired in the 
turmoil of the Great Depression. Americans insisted on avoiding entanglements in what 
international observers widely considered European conflicts. This interpretation of the past 
holds much explanatory power but it does not fully elucidate the complexity of America’s 
position on the world stage after World War I.  
Contrary to most scholarship that focuses on isolationism, this study illustrates that 
thousands of influential Americans had not become jaded and instead actively refused to 
abandon the pursuit of a universal peace. World War I only disrupted the proliferation of 
	 11	
idealism, and its severity actually contributed to idealism’s renaissance. The idealist filmmakers 
who comprised the Pax Cinemana by and large wanted to protect and promote global democracy 
and capitalism—not tear it down, as would later communist and fascist movements. As a result, 
they were based predominantly in Allied nations, like the United States, and usually had white, 
middle to upper-class backgrounds. They were both religious and secular pacifists who shared a 
cosmopolitan vision for the post war world. Their ambitions echoed the prediction that President 
Woodrow Wilson—the most influential idealist of the twentieth century—had made to 
Americans in 1917: "The tragic events of the thirty months of vital turmoil through which we 
have just passed have made us citizens of the world. There can be no turning back.”15 
Peacekeeping filmmakers accepted the increasingly globalized nature of modern life and applied 
their craft to the cultivation of pacifism and internationalism.  
The activities of peacekeeping filmmakers did not emerge in a vacuum and took seriously 
time-honored interpretations of progress. Echoing the ambitions of the peace advocacy groups 
that thrived in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, peacekeeping filmmakers 
denounced the assumption that continuous warfare was an inevitable facet of modern life. They 
heeded the pacifist traditions that sprang up as a reaction to Euro-America’s earlier imperial and 
colonial expansion. Like the reemergence of idealism in statecraft after World War I, pacifism 
also drew inspiration from its turn-of-the-century roots. In 1900, there were several hundred 
major peace advocacy organizations working throughout the world. Many of these held large-
scale assemblies that attracted representatives from dozens of states. The Universal Peace 
Congress, for example, championed idealism as a mainstream strand of political thought and 
helped introduce the ideology of pacifism into modern policymaking. Pacifism, as it was 
																																								 																				
15	Woodrow	Wilson,	“Second	Inaugural	Address,”	5	March	1917.	Available	at:	Millercenter.org	(accessed	December	
11,	2015).			
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understood, was hardly passive or theoretical; adherents stressed a high level of civic 
engagement and provided pragmatic platforms for preventing war. Pacifists were the architects 
of The Hague Peace Conference of 1899 and 1908, which laid a precedent for the establishment 
of international law, legislation, and education throughout the interwar period. New transnational 
bodies, like the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the Institute of International Education, 
stressed the existence of and the need to enforce universal “human rights,” a designation that did 
not fit easily within preexisting legal discourse.  
Pacifists designed an array of initiatives aimed at curbing the tension created through 
global capitalism and imperialism. Peacekeeping filmmakers were pacifists; they promoted the 
strengthening of international law and organizations, the opening of national borders, and the 
spread of liberal democracy. Many, but certainly not all, were based in the United States and 
Western Europe and had reasonably affluent origins. By 1930, pacifist filmmakers had become 
ubiquitous within all international bodies championing human rights, including the League of 
Nations. In mainstream discussions over the benefits of internationalism, pacifists played a key 
role.16  
Though this dissertation is predominantly a work of American history, it also seeks to 
contribute to the growing body of scholarship concerning the complexity of internationalism, 
particularly liberal internationalism. The works of Glenda Sluga, Patricia Clavin, Akira Iriye, and 
Daniel Laqua, for example, demonstrate how the internationalist turn after World War I marked 
a revival of sentiments and activities from the late nineteenth century.17 However, their work also 
																																								 																				
16	Though	most	pacifists	of	the	era	identified	as	“internationalists,”	not	all	internationalists	identified	as	“pacifists.”		
17	See:	Glenda	Sluga	and	Patricia	Clavin,	ed.,	Internationalisms:	A	Twentieth-Century	History	(Cambridge,	UK:	
Cambridge	University	Press,	2016);	Glenda	Sluga,	Internationalism	in	the	Age	of	Nationalism	(Philadelphia,	PA:	
University	of	Pennsylvania	Press,	2013);	Akira	Iriye,	Cultural	Internationalism	and	World	Order	(Baltimore,	MA:	
Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	1997);	Daniel	Laqua,	ed.,	Internationalism	Reconfigured:	Transnational	Ideas	and	
Movements	Between	the	World	Wars	(New	York,	NY:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2011).	
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reveals how advocates for internationalism never came to represent a uniform body committed to 
a cohesive ideology. Instead, this recent body of research proves internationalism reflected a 
diverse array of conflicting capitalist, communist, fascist, and feminist visions for the postwar 
order. In two groundbreaking books, an edited collection (Internationalisms: A Twentieth-
Century History) and a monograph (Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism), Glenda Sluga 
traces the history of internationalism in all of its competing incarnations. She illustrates 
effectively that internationalism and nationalism were not opposites, but rather complementary 
forces that operated under the same basic assumptions about human nature. Understanding how 
nationalist sentiment was implicit in liberal internationalism sheds light on how peacekeeping 
filmmakers interpreted their responsibility to nation states.   
The relationship between cinema and the nation was thus undoubtedly varied. 
Throughout the interwar years, the nation was accepted widely as the apex of human 
organization. Nations were considered “natural” communities and consequently the rightful 
political unit for each and every culture in the world. However, increased global integration after 
World War I challenged the permanence of the nation-state. In the pursuit of international 
understanding, many peacekeeping filmmakers promoted the “global village” while 
simultaneously reaffirming what it meant to be American, German, French, English, or Japanese. 
The politics of “picturing” nations and the world as cohesive units mirror the observations made 
by Sluga. Operating under the assumption that peace would stem from a greater familiarity 
between nations, peacekeeping filmmakers in the United States and Europe both contributed to 
the cultural expression of nation-building agendas and challenged the hegemony of the nation-
state by promoting visual conceptions of a monolithic “global culture.” The tension between the 
two reveals an irony that is explored throughout this dissertation: the same utopian 
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interpretations of internationalism and technology that many filmmakers assumed were essential 
to peacekeeping would also play a role in sparking the Second World War. In this sense, the Pax 
Cinemana was a mostly transatlantic phenomenon comprised of contesting international ideas, 
which both legitimated and undermined national allegiances in the United States and Europe. For 
peacekeeping filmmakers, the cinema was the principal theater—figuratively and literally—to 
negotiate with internationalist thought. Although contemporary critics might consider their 
ambitions naive and impractical in light of more recent global conflicts and the role that motion 
pictures played in promoting them, dismissing their goals and achievements enforces the 
misconception that motion pictures were little more than trivial amusements or propaganda tools 
in the period under study. 
Historians have typically depicted film during the interwar years as “escapist.” 
Celebrated historian Alan Brinkley, for example, argued that cinemas provided poor and 
downtrodden people a way to dissociate from the drudgery of their daily lives. Stressing the 
financial hardships of the Great Depression, Brinkley credits popular films, such as King Kong 
(1933) and Treasure Island (1934), as a means to forget lived reality and enter a temporary 
dream world where beautiful starlets preen in front of exotic backdrops. Brinkley, like many 
other historians, attributed the box office success of these and other films to their sedating 
qualities. Such explanations hold merit but they also undermine the intelligence of audiences and 
social commentaries that deeper readings of these films have revealed. Though Hollywood and 
other professional film industries continued to release reflexive films for apolitical audiences, 
thousands of others looked to cinema as a creative and practical source for justice and global 
peacekeeping. 
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Though this study provides some necessary theoretical dimensions to peace and 
peacekeeping, it does not operate under the assumption that peace is the opposite of war, or that 
peace is “normal” and war is “exceptional.”18 As World War I shattered the traditional barrier 
between the civilian and military fronts, it also complicated temporal understandings of warfare. 
Though historians conventionally cite November 11, 1918 as the end of World War I, the 
psychological, economic, and cultural impacts proved ongoing, making it difficult to periodize 
the conflict neatly. Moreover, the unequal peace established at Versailles placed responsibility 
for the war almost entirely on Germany, a decision that encouraged future Nazification and thus 
World War II. As a result, even though this study focuses specifically on the years from 1914 to 
1939, a period when filmmakers used their skills to contribute actively to the peacekeeping 
effort, it is intended to serve as a complement to the large body of literature that explores film’s 
contribution to orthodox readings of World War I.  
 “War films,” or films that overtly depict armed conflict, are at the center of most 
scholarship that examines the relationship between cinema and World War I. Many important 
works, such as Paul Virilio’s War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception and Leslie Midkiff 
Debauche’s Reel Patriotism: The Movies and World War I, demonstrate effectively how motion 
picture and military technologies co-evolved.19 Through a deep textual reading of war films, like 
The Battle of the Somme (1916) and Anna Makes Artillery Shells (1917), these authors, 
particularly Virilio, demonstrate how films enforced the nation-building agenda of the 
government. The ubiquitous nationalism of the war forced filmmakers around the world to 
articulate what made their works uniquely “American,” “British,” “German,” “French, 
																																								 																				
18	Like	“nationalism”	and	“internationalism,”	“war”	and	“peace”	were	also	interconnected	phenomenon	rather	
than	inherent	counterparts.				
19	Michael	Paris’	The	First	World	War	and	Popular	Cinema	(New	Brunswick:	NJ,	Rutgers	University	Press,	1999)	is	
another	important	text.	
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“Russian,” or “Japanese.” The portrayal of the nation-state was exceptionally important to the 
peacekeeping filmmakers who seldom questioned its permanence as a means of political and 
cultural organization. Even when the dangers of nationalism had been fully realized, few people 
challenged the nation-state’s status as the fundamental order for humanity. Fair and accurate 
depictions of the “nation,” most supporters assumed, would be the first step in healing 
international diplomacy.  
The healing process of the 1920s and 1930s generated a series of new war films that 
aligned conveniently with ambitions of peacekeeping filmmakers. For example, The Big Parade 
(1925) and All Quiet on the Western Front (1930) contain themes of ambivalence and pacifism.20 
These blockbuster films of the interwar period countered the propaganda films produced during 
World War I and played a key role in the outreach activities of many influential anti-war groups. 
Instead of championing the glory of combat, these films depicted the horrors of the trenches and 
the psychological toll of total warfare. The war films of the interwar period echoed the pacifist 
political interests of the American, French, British, and German federal governments. These 
works promoted universal conceptions of “humanity”—a political buzzword in the 1920s and 
1930s—and the need to build a family of nations. Instead of vilifying opposing forces, these 
films cultivated a spirit of fraternalism by depicting all soldiers, regardless of nationality, as 
fully-realized individuals with a common goal: to return safely to domestic life.  
Though The Big Parade (1925) and All Quiet on the Western Front (1930) actively 
contributed to the spread of pacifist ideas in foreign relations, most studio films never directly 
attempted to shape policymaking. They were theatrical pictures that embraced pacifist themes 
primarily for profit. The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse (1921) and Westfront 1918 (1930), 
																																								 																				
20	Other	films	in	this	category	include:	J’accuse!	(1919),	Westfront	1918	(1930),	and	La	Grande	Illusion	(1937).	
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for example, were simply about the horrors of World War I and did little more than raise 
awareness of their psychological impact. In fact, these films formed part of a canon of works that 
has cemented the interwar period’s image as an “Age of Anxiety.” Nearly all of these anti-war 
films, particularly Hell on Earth (1931), embrace the innocence and transformation of young 
men from talented go-getters to confused and aimless soldiers. They articulated the widespread 
feeling of disillusionment that has long characterized popular understandings of the era. As a 
result, most of these anti-war studio films are not at the center of this study. The primary subjects 
are filmmakers and films that performed an immediate service in strengthening understandings 
of international citizenship. Peacekeeping filmmakers used their craft as a means to remedy post 
war pessimism, not validate it. Consequently, this study challenges conventional readings of the 
interwar years by highlighting the unfettered optimism of peace filmmakers and activists.     
 In order to challenge the popular conception of the interwar period, it is necessary to 
explain it more fully. The influential German historian Oswald Spengler perhaps best summed 
up the cynical climate of the postwar Western world in his seminal The Decline of the West. The 
severity of World War I, he argued, was indicative of the breakdown of Western values, 
attitudes, and institutions. For Spengler, all cultures and complex societies evolve like living 
organisms, moving between stages of birth, maturation, and death. The West, he insisted, was in 
its twilight years. Western hegemony and eventually Euro-America would disappear altogether 
in the coming years. Spengler likened Western civilization to the titular character in the German 
folk legend Faust, a man who sold his soul to the devil in exchange for infinite knowledge and 
power. By providing the character Faust with unprecedented magical abilities, the devil knew 
that an insatiable lust for pleasure would ultimately consume him. Similarly, the magical power 
of modern technology and industry, Spengler noted, allowed the West to colonize much of the 
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planet and exert an exceptional level of influence on world affairs. However, World War I 
demonstrated that the West had lost control of its newfound magic and was using it to destroy 
itself. The duality of technology is a reoccurring theme in this study: motion pictures could both 
aid the war effort and build a lasting peace. The Faustian interpretation of Western civilization 
resonated and contributed to the postwar pessimism that came to define an entire generation. 
 In 1926, when reflecting on the alleged cynicism growing among those who came of age 
during World War I, novelist Gertrude Stein famously said to Ernest Hemingway, “That’s what 
you all are … all of you young people who served in the war. You are a lost generation.” The 
“lost generation” catchphrase embodied a collection of enduring tropes that historians have used 
to describe the postwar demographic that had supposedly lost faith in traditional barometers of 
progress and success. Prior to the war, Enlightenment conceptions of history as a story of 
continuous advancement dominated Western thinking. However, the social and political reforms 
championed by Voltaire and his ilk no longer seemed to apply in a world of mustard gas and 
flamethrowers: contrary to conventional belief, history was not a steady march of progress.  
The futility of the war challenged the axiomatic belief that Western culture was founded 
on reason and rationality, cementing Sigmund Freud and Albert Einstein as the era’s preeminent 
thinkers. Freud’s ideas resonated with millions of Americans who wondered if the ambitions that 
defined several centuries of policymaking had amounted to anything more than mutual butchery. 
Such questions cultivated a new intellectual climate that trivialized the optimistic and time-
honored ideas of the Romanticist and Victorian eras. Freud reduced the universal morality of 
humankind to animal instincts steered by subconscious sexual desires. Humans, he insisted, were 
hardly intelligent beings working towards a common good, they were finicky creatures 
motivated unknowingly by the pursuit of personal gratification. Similarly, Albert Einstein 
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upturned the conception of the universe created during the Scientific Revolution: space and time, 
he theorized, were not fixed units, but were in fact part of interconnected phenomena that shift 
according to positions of observers. Einstein’s theory of relativity applied pointedly to the entire 
generation: everything that had been taken as self-evident was now “relative.”  
 There is an enormous body of literature that explores the existential dread that loomed 
throughout the interwar years. The works of Paul Fussell and Modris Eksteins are perhaps the 
most cited and widely read—they also had the greatest impact on this study.21 Through a deep 
literary analysis of the writings of Robert Graves, Ernest Hemingway, F. Scott Fitzgerald, and 
Franz Kafka, Fussell and Eksteins examine the reoccurring notions fatalism, skepticism, and 
irony that they claim define “modern” thinking. World War I, Eksteins argues, “was the 
psychological turning point for modernism as a whole.”22 The loss of innocence that 
characterized life in the trenches, they argue, soon permeated the rest of society. Echoing Karl 
Marx’s earlier assessment of modern life at the anniversary of the Chartist People’s Paper in 
London, Fussell and Eksteins reiterate, “In our days everything seems pregnant with its contrary. 
… All that is solid melts into air.”23  
This widespread acceptance of “truth” as subjective, perhaps, marks the birth of the 
modern psyche. The cynical and ironic mood that proliferated after World War I largely rendered 
traditional understandings of human history obsolete. Fussell and Eksteins’ observations hold 
much explanatory power and provide a useful framework for examining the politics of memory 
and representation. The “Age of Anxiety” moniker does indeed apply fittingly to the years 
																																								 																				
21	See:	The	Great	War	and	Modern	Memory	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1975)	and	The	Rites	of	Spring:	The	
Great	War	and	the	Birth	of	the	Modern	Age	(Boston,	MA:	Houghton	Mifflin	Company,	1989).	
22	Modris	Ekstein,	The	Rites	of	Spring:	The	Great	War	and	the	Birth	of	the	Modern	Age	(Boston,	MA:	Houghton	
Mifflin	Company,	1989),	4.	
23	Karl	Marx,	“Speech	at	the	Anniversary	of	the	People’s	Paper,”	in	Robert	C.	Tucker,	editor,	The	Marx	Engels	
Reader	(New	York,	NY:	Norton,	1978),	577-578.	
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between 1914 and 1939. Such designations, however, strip the period of nuance and ignore the 
peacekeeping efforts of the thousands of individuals who genuinely embraced or tried to 
embrace Woodrow Wilson’s prophecy that World War I was “the war to end all wars.” 
Peacekeeping filmmakers understood that peace was not so easily won.  
The large body of scholarship that treats the end of the World War I as a “modernist 
turn,” as Fussell and Eksteins do, reduces the complexity of the era to a simple break between 
“traditional” and “modern.” World War I did not, as historian Jay Winter argues, “neatly and 
surgically” leave behind the values and conventions of preceding centuries.24 Winter’s work 
traces the proliferation of Victorian and Romantic-era thinking in the interwar years, 
complicating understandings of “modernity.”25 Winter emphasizes the resurgence of utopian 
ideals and the influence of social movements that stressed the capacity of new technology and 
industry to bring about universal peace and international understanding. The Pax Cinemana was 
part of this utopian impulse, which brought motion pictures into formal statecraft. This marriage 
between motion pictures and diplomacy creates ample room to study the influence of cinema 
beyond the confines of the professional entertainment industry. 
Until recently, films from professional entertainment industries, primarily Hollywood, 
and avant-garde movements have long dominated academic readings of cinema. Amateur, 
educational, and governmental films have received almost no scholarly attention. For the first 
half of the twentieth century, history was primarily a literary enterprise that favored elites and 
nation-states as default modes of historical analysis. The cultural turn of the 1970s and 1980s 
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shattered the institutional, narrow-mindedness of historical inquiry by merging history with the 
social sciences and encouraging interdisciplinary histories constructed from the bottom-up. 
However, film history has largely neglected the bottom-up trend and has instead focused on 
Hollywood, various national cinemas, and the politicized avant-garde—an approach similar to 
older histories that favored nobility and supposed “great” men and women. Peacekeeping 
cinema, which hails from an array of educational, governmental, diplomatic, and amateur circles, 
represents the neglected underside of global film culture and, consequently, deserves a rightful 
place in the larger canon of motion pictures. 
This study benefitted from the works of a handful of scholars who have pushed the 
boundaries of film and media studies to include small-gauge and non-theatrical works. For 
example, the anthologies Useful Cinema, Learning with the Lights Off: Educational Film in the 
United States, and Films that Work: Industrial Film and the Productivity of Media, look beyond 
commercial cinema and examine critically the proliferation of motion pictures that informed all 
facets of everyday life. Since the 1890s, motion pictures increasingly moved into non-theatrical 
settings, like classrooms, corporate offices, factories, museums, community halls, libraries, and 
philanthropic institutions. By 1930, motion pictures had become a ubiquitous component of 
modern living. The saturation of motion pictures, these texts argue, cultivated a new kind of 
literacy that transformed how Euro-American societies learned and worked. Big businesses, like 
Shell and AT&T, adopted motion pictures as a tool to improve worker productivity while public 
school systems simultaneously integrated films into classroom curriculum.  
Visual images gradually usurped arenas that had been traditionally reserved for the 
written word. Often referred to as educational or instructional films, these works were designed 
to inform employees, citizens, or students about everything from workplace rules to current 
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events. By offering a deep textual reading of these previously neglected films, these anthologies 
demonstrate how societies interpreted the utility and function of motion pictures. Peacekeeping 
films were an integral strand of educational cinema. They were often, though not entirely, non-
theatrical and had the specific goal of advancing pacifism and international cooperation. This 
dissertation provides some clarity to the expanding discourse on educational cinema by moving 
away from broad surveys and honing in on only one facet of this dynamic genre.  
In order to analyze peacekeeping cinema effectively, this dissertation is broken into six 
chapters. The opening chapter provides a case for the periodization of this dissertation by 
explaining precisely why the enthusiasm for cinema’s ability to contribute to peace and 
international understanding was exceptional between 1914 and 1939. The following five chapters 
provide detailed case studies of the various professional, governmental, and amateur filmmaking 
bodies that comprised the peacekeeping cinema movement. Each of these chapters analyzes 
diverse and occasionally conflicting plans for achieving peace while showing that a distinct form 
of liberal idealism characterized all of them. The conclusion of this study traces the gradual 
dissolution of the peacekeeping cinema movement in the wake of World War II. The threat of 
fascism and Nazi aggression challenged the values and attitudes of idealist and pacifist 
filmmakers. As tensions mounted in Europe, many prominent filmmakers reluctantly lent their 
talents to the war effort. Once again, cinema proved itself to be an indispensable tool of combat. 
Though film would continue to play a prominent role in international diplomacy after World War 
II, the unfettered optimism and utopian rhetoric that had defined the peacekeeping cinema 
movement disappeared. However, despite the reality of another global conflagration, this 
dissertation suggests that the peacekeeping movement that emerged after World War I had 
lasting significance.
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Chapter One 
From Toys to Profitable Peacekeeping Tools: A Technological History of Motion Pictures 
On October 25, 1913, John Bradlet—editor of the popular journal Motion Picture News—wrote 
that war was one of the major problems facing the rapidly expanding film industry. “The public 
is sick of war subjects on the screen,” he lamented, “just as the public is sick of war between 
nations.”1 Unaware of the unprecedented violence that would soon engulf Europe and devastate 
its film industries, Bradlet predicted that cinema would become ubiquitous within institutions of 
international diplomacy, specifically the recently completely Peace Palace in The Hague, due to 
its ability to stimulate empathy between divergent peoples. For Bradlet, world peace might prove 
possible since the still fledgling cinema business allowed the masses to see that “war is a useless 
waste of valuable human lives.”2 Unlike most commentators of his era, Bradlet viewed motion 
pictures as the ideal teaching and learning tool. His predictions about film reflected the 
beginning of what would become the widespread reinterpretation of motion pictures and their 
potential.  
Since the late 1910s, commentators increasingly referred to motion pictures not as 
curious novelties but as the “new printing press” and even “better than books” in disseminating 
knowledge.3 Ralph Block, a producer for Paramount Studios, articulated the perceived spiritual 
magnitude of cinema when he argued that it had become “so peculiarly vital … that it is almost a 
‘mass’ religion.”4 Between the world wars, the American public for the first time began to take 
seriously the cinema’s ability to shape the status quo, which raises important questions: What 
																																								 																				
1	John	M.	Bradlet,	“Right	off	the	Reel,”	Motion	Picture	News,	October	25,	1913,	15.	
2	Bradlet,	17.			
3	“Movies	Are	New	Form	of	Printing,”	The	New	York	Times,	July	21,	1923,	2.		
4 Mina	Brownstein,	“Cross	Sections	of	our	Dreams,”	Movie	Makers,	April	1927,	7. 
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happened? Why did the discourse surrounding cinema shift so dramatically? How did motion 
pictures quickly change from a side-street charm to an indispensable form of media?  
To answer these and related questions, this chapter provides a technological history of 
motion pictures from the 1880s to the 1930s. However, it does not delve into the “black box” of 
motion picture technology. Instead it explores the symbolic role of motion pictures in American 
society and culture, and how Americans’ perception of that role changed according to 
technological developments in the motion picture industry, including the emergence of the 
Hollywood studio system and the advent of sound. The emergence of the studio system has 
generated an extensive body of scholarship. What is missing from these studies, however, is a 
detailed analysis of how the expansion of this system depended on the success of films with 
explicit anti-war messages, specifically The Big Parade (1925) and All Quiet on the Western 
Front (1930). Doing so helps explain why Bradlet would have felt compelled to make such 
claims. His lofty ideas did not emerge in a vacuum. They were on the avant-garde crest of a 
wave of technological advances that would lift motion pictures after World War I.  
Bradlet was infatuated not only with the potential power of motion pictures, but also their 
physical makeup. It is important to note that when considering the influence of popular cinema, 
motion pictures, which relied on cameras, projectors, and other machinery, were one of the most 
successful technical artifacts of the modern era. However, scholars rarely analyze film as a 
technological phenomenon. And yet, for Bradlet and other filmmakers, world peace hinged 
almost entirely on this still new innovation. He believed that motion pictures possessed inherent 
cosmopolitan ideals, which if properly nurtured could usher in an era of unequivocal global 
harmony and prosperity. In other words, he linked the fruition of his international vision with the 
march of technological breakthroughs. He and other supporters of the Pax Cinemana adopted 
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utopian perceptions of technology, which can be viewed and studied in numerous publications, 
like Motion Picture News and Motion Picture Daily. From a broader perspective, then, his 
treatment of motion pictures reflected the larger trends in a technological history explained so 
well by Thomas Hughes, a path-breaking scholar in the field who covered the experience of 
“technological enthusiasm.”5 
Hughes saw Americans’ appetite for new technologies as the driving socio-cultural force 
in shaping twentieth-century patterns of life. His work examines the advent and evolution of 
wide-scale technological systems in communication, transportation, production, and the military 
that came to define the United States’ national character and identity. Beginning in World War I, 
motion pictures played an essential role in the expansion of these technological systems. 
Inventors, industrial scientists, engineers, and system builders, who, according to Hughes, have 
been the true “makers” of the modern world, increasingly found use for motion pictures in their 
work. As a result, they became part of a popular technological culture instilled with a sense of 
limitless power and infinite potential that defined the modern American experience. The Pax 
Cinemana epitomized technological enthusiasm and its most outspoken supporters, like Bradlet, 
believed global understanding required American technological ingenuity and innovation.  
This opening chapter traces the utopian rhetoric that gradually surrounded motion 
pictures and the motion picture industry as they became integrated into the makeup of daily life. 
It explores the various ways that popular news outlets interpreted motion pictures in order to 
explain why filmmakers legitimately celebrated seemingly trivial devices as nothing short of 
saviors of humanity. Utopian ideals have always surrounded motion pictures, as they have 
surrounded most inventions around the turn of the century. It was not uncommon for “peep 
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show” promoters and attention-seeking journalists to sensationalize motion picture technologies. 
“The invention of these instruments,” one overzealous commentator stated in 1896, “may be said 
to constitute an epoch-making event in the world’s progress. … The invention constitutes a real 
division between the dark and the enlightened periods of the world’s growth.”6 Advertisements 
similarly celebrated everything from household appliances to cosmetics as unmitigated 
indications of progress. The motion picture was simply one of many modern trinkets that 
reportedly shaped modern times. And despite Bradlet’s lofty convictions, the public did not 
embrace his hollow rhetoric widely.  
Most reporters and diplomats before World War I had treated cinema as little more than a 
simple medium of entertainment. News outlets characterized the first motion picture devices, 
such as the phenakistoscope, praxinoscope, and zoetrope, as mere curiosities.7 These simple, 
hand-operated devices usually consisted of a slotted wheel or cylinder through which one could 
view the rapid succession of animated images. The illusion of movement appealed greatly to 
children who lovingly embraced what was usually little more than a brief sequence of an animal 
sketch in action. “Few toys,” one journalist noted, “were more popular in mid-Victorian 
nurseries.”8 As the primary sales demographic for these “toys,” children and their tastes steered 
the content of early motion pictures, which helped confirm their reputation as a fleeting fad of 
little consequence. However, as photographic technology advanced, a handful of independent 
inventors took an interest in the scientific implications of motion pictures. 
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Fully aware of the limits of hand-drawn moving pictures, Eadweard Muybridge, Thomas 
Edison, and Etienne-Jules Marey turned their attention to capturing live action scenes. By 
developing cameras with high-speed shutters, they were able to photograph multiple frames per 
second. Once processed, the images could be fastened to a wheel, which, when spun, created the 
illusion of movement. Operating under the same principle as a children’s flip book, devices like 
the Zoopraxiscope, Kinetoscope, and Mutoscope laid the foundation for cinematography and 
garnered the immediate attention of those interested in the scientific study of movement.  
The camera’s gaze initially catered to naturalists. Galloping horses, leaping cats, budding 
flowers, and the like all came under the inquisitive eye of those hoping to understand the nuances 
of animal and plant behavior. The images were of keen interest not only to zoologists and 
botanists but also to aviation engineers like the Wright Brothers, who credited Etienne-Jules 
Marey’s photographs of birds in flight with inspiring the design of their first aircraft. Moreover, 
surgeons and anatomy experts found use for motion pictures during procedures and clinical 
trials. The ability to exhibit complicated surgical operations created new avenues for teaching 
and training doctors.9 By 1910, motion pictures could be found in nearly every major research 
institution in the world. “The time has now arrived,” one reporter noted, “when the equipment of 
a hospital and scientific laboratory is as incomplete without a moving picture apparatus as it 
would be without clinical instruments and test tubes.”10 Motion pictures permitted a new window 
into the inner-workings of the natural world, which appealed greatly to esoteric scientists but 
little to the wider public. Reporters noted the practical and scholastic qualities of motion pictures, 
but rarely, if ever, analyzed them critically as something more than a spectacle that might have 
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additional benefits to science, academia, and the military. The ambivalent assessment of motion 
pictures partly reflected the uncertainty of their future. No one knew if they would remain 
popular. In the rapidly modernizing world, it was hard to foresee if film had any long-term 
benefits for everyday life. 
Despite the immediate contributions of motion pictures to science, public recreation 
patterns shifted repeatedly in the late-nineteenth century as time-honored Victorian values 
clashed with new forms of mass culture. Frances Doublier, a cameraman who worked with Louis 
and Auguste Lumiere in Lyons at the time, believed that the film craze had “run its course.”11 
Later, Louis Lumiere similarly admitted his surprise that motion pictures had “grown to the 
dimensions of a world-wide industry and art and a mighty power for international understanding 
and peace.”12 Even Thomas Edison, who had employed William Dickson to promote and 
manage the bulk of his Kinetoscope experiments, was uncertain of cinema’s staying power. 
Edison had never truly made motion pictures a priority until business rivals in Europe 
demonstrated their financial potential. He initially dismissed acquiring foreign patents on his 
Kinetoscope because he had not considered it worth the $150 price tag.13 Evidently, according to 
early accounts from Edison and the Lumiere brothers, the oft-cited inventors of cinema, motion 
pictures appeared better fit for Coney Island, the Atlantic City boardwalk, and Parisian cellars 
than The Hague.  
Despite their underwhelming enthusiasm for their own inventions, the independent 
inventors neglected to account for the immeasurable power of their own mythology, which 
ballooned considerably throughout the early 1900s. The public’s infatuation with independent 
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inventors brought film cameras into larger discussions over new technology. Between 1880 and 
World War I, independent inventors became national icons and their innovations fascinated 
millions. Celebrated as the embodiment of American know-how and pragmatism, they by and 
large resisted institutionalization and the constraints of big business. They preferred to work 
within their own home or workshop where they were free to experiment using trial-and-error 
methods. The media constructed an image of these inventors not as scientists working within the 
physical laws of nature, but as “magicians” who tapped into mysterious, supernatural powers. Of 
all the contributors to the advent of motion pictures none were as famous as Edison, the Wizard 
of Menlo Park. After Edison and Dickson’s pioneering breakthroughs with roll film, which 
George Eastman later perfected, motion pictures took on greater length and filmgoers 
increasingly revered their “magic.”  
The perceived magic of motion pictures stemmed from their attachment to the mystique 
of independent inventors and their acceptance as a distinct art. Once entertainers like George 
Melies and D.W. Griffith—both business affiliates of Edison and Dickson—adopted motion 
pictures, it became clear that cinema was not simply a perversion of traditional theater. Within 
their elaborate narratives and set pieces, Melies and Griffith experimented with editing, special 
effects, and camera movements, laying the foundation for what the motion picture industry 
called “film grammar.” They brought an unprecedented level of esteem and enthusiasm to what 
were no longer “toys.”14 Patrons of nickelodeons and early movie theaters quickly embraced 
these films as windows into other worlds. “With the moving picture,” one film aficionado 
exclaimed, “we can rub our own eyes and witness more tremendous miracles than Aladdin could 
have by rubbing his magic lamp.”15 Seemingly more fit for a science fiction novel than real life, 
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films were likened by some journalists to time machines. “The motion picture,” one newspaper 
reported, “puts Time in a can, freezes it.”16 Giving new meaning to the malleability of space and 
time, the editing process demonstrated uniquely the fundamentals of Albert Einstein’s theory of 
relativity. Space and time were not absolute and could be condensed, elongated, and shaped on a 
flatbed. Advertisements for production equipment of the era promised a well-made piece of 
equipment, as well as the mechanical wizardry of independent inventors. The onset of World 
War I, however, nearly extinguished the magic. 
The assassination of Franz Ferdinand in 1914 amplified overlapping European national 
aspirations and engaged the world in total warfare. In only four years, the war killed more than 
17 million people, or approximately two percent of the entire world’s population.17 Before the 
war, many commentators had viewed modern technology as a tool to create world peace and 
greater economic prosperity. However, as the war demonstrated, technological advancements 
were a double-edged sword. They gave rise to efficient systems of communication and 
transportation but also ushered in an era of unparalleled destruction. Flamethrowers, chemical 
bombs, tanks, and automatic firearms reflected the nightmarish underbelly of innovation, 
examples of scientific advancement gone awry. The weapons of war reflected the duality of 
technological progress. The violent character and course of the war demanded a rethinking of 
large-scale technological systems, of which motion pictures had become an integral part.  
Motion pictures supported every facet of the war effort. From all sides of the front, 
belligerents used millions of feet of 35mm film. At the time, it was the most photographed 
conflict in history and nearly every battle from Tanga to Ypres played itself out in front of the 
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gaze of a camera lens. On the battlefield, military leaders used motion pictures routinely for the 
purposes of documentation, strategic planning, and reconnaissance. Motion pictures could survey 
territory, provide a visual inventory of munitions and resources, and prep troops on infantry and 
aerial combat formations. Moreover, they entertained weary soldiers at home and abroad. 
According to the State Department, films were “one of the most powerful factors in keeping up 
the morale of the soldiers.”18 They were an integral part of the war machine.  
In fact, motion picture and military technologies evolved simultaneously. Tanks, 
automatic weapons, mortars, and fighter aircrafts relied on visual technologies developed within 
the motion picture industry. They were the outcome of the complementary relationship between 
big business and military, a marriage that defined the experience of total warfare. In the United 
States, France, Germany, and Russia, professional film studios like Pathe, Gaumont, and 
Paramount Pictures worked regularly with the armed forces to rally support for the war effort. 
Together, they engineered important simulation technologies that manipulated representations of 
space and time. The gaze of modern weaponry owes much to the gaze of a film camera. Because 
of the deeply symbiotic relationship between the war and cinema, film critic Stuart Klawans 
argues that “every picture we see is in some sense a World War I movie.”19 
The war front nurtured a space, albeit a deadly one, ripe for creative experimentation. 
Many of film’s formal elements, from editing to artificial lighting, developed as impromptu 
reactions to the conditions of the battlefield. For example, the chaotic and violent nature of the 
trenches forced Signal Corps cameramen to try “panning” shots, aerial photography, and the 
montage, techniques that would later revolutionize how audiences experienced and consumed 
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motion pictures. Advertisements for motion picture camera companies embraced the ubiquity of 
their product in the war as their chief selling point. “It was used in the mud and wet of the 
trenches on the firing line,” the company boasted, “in the observation balloons, in the military 
bases and camps, and everywhere the signal corps cameramen went.”20 Some of the bold new 
techniques created by Signal Corps cameramen helped inspire other filmmakers to articulate the 
look and feel of what the state would celebrate as a “national cinema”—a collection of films that 
enforce the nation-building agenda of the government. The ubiquitous nationalism of the war 
forced filmmakers around the world to articulate what made their works uniquely American, 
French, British, German, Australian, Russian, or Japanese. This appealed greatly to audiences on 
the domestic front. 
At home, motion pictures provided the public a new way to consume and negotiate with 
the war. Newsreels became ubiquitous throughout urban theaters and challenged the newspaper 
as the primary means for war correspondence. The prolific British production company Pathé 
News, for example, released weekly images of the war in its widely popular Animated Gazette 
series, garnering millions of viewers throughout the allied nations. Many reporters credited 
newsreels with bringing home the reality of the war in ways that the printed word simply could 
not. Motion pictures, one theatergoer noted, forced viewers to “become eyewitness to the great 
conflict.”21 Others dismissed the notion of audiences as mere bystanders and credited pioneer 
newsreel cinematographers with the ability to place the audience in the trenches directly “under 
the muzzles of the guns.”22 Many American trade journals even treated the viewing of newsreels 
as an essential patriotic duty.23 “Able-bodied Americans who stayed at home,” one endorsement 
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for newsreels exclaimed, “should attend an open-air movie and cheer the boys who went to the 
front.”24 Newsreel producers of course did not intend all motion pictures to function strictly as 
practical documentaries.  
Propaganda films roused nationalist sentiment, vilified opposing forces, and encouraged 
enlistment. An anecdote in Bioscope, a popular British motion picture journal, detailed the 
persuasive power of propaganda films when it described a correspondent’s experience inside a 
Parisian theater as he overheard a conversation between a young French man and his mother:  
As military picture followed military picture I watched the boy’s baby jaw set firm. His 
eyes sparkled, his mouth was tightly closed – the cinematograph was feeding his 
patriotism. Not a word did he utter until the end of the show. Then he turned to the left 
and said, “Mamam, I want to go too.” The women’s eyes instantly filled with tears. 
“Don’t”, she sobbed, “don’t go for my sake.” “I’m going to go for my country’s sake,” I 
heard him reply.25 
Studio-produced films such as If My Country Should Call (1916) and Hearts of the World (1918) 
stirred similar fervor within packed theaters and became cinema’s first “blockbusters” by 
shattering nearly all previous attendance records.26 
 The appeal of these films stemmed partly from their exciting portrayal of military 
technology. Hearts of the World, for example, depicts various battles along the Western Front in 
epic scale. Extreme wide shots reveal hundreds of soldiers crossing no man’s land with hordes of 
tanks barreling towards them. Streams of fire flash stylishly across the screen as soldiers 
brandishing flamethrowers set trees ablaze. Several scenes pulse intermittently with blinding 
white light to simulate the enormity of high explosives. Popular films provided the perfect 
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opportunity to show off the awesome power of American military might.27 However, once the 
smoke had settled and the soldiers returned to their homes in the winter of 1918, the widespread 
enthusiasm for hyper-nationalist films faded and shame set in.  
 World War I proved an unmitigated disaster for nearly all combatants. At its end, Europe 
was in ruins and the global economy had contracted sharply. Once American policymakers and 
reporters reflected on the horrendous human and financial cost of the war, motion pictures, like 
all major technologies that served the war effort, demanded reevaluation. When reflecting on the 
use of propaganda films, Arthur Ponsonby, an influential British politician and social activist, 
famously remarked, “There must have been more deliberate lying in the world from 1914 to 
1918 than in any other period in the world’s history.”28 In the decade following the war, 
Ponsonby worked with American diplomats to spearhead several initiatives that criticized visual 
propaganda as one of the immediate threats to liberal democracy. By actively promoting a fair 
and nuanced depiction of German, Turkish, and Austria-Hungarian actions and motives during 
the war, Ponsonby became a poster child for what historians later considered a pacifist turn in 
international relations.  
The unprecedented violence that characterized World War I triggered a paradigm shift in 
how most people viewed armed combat. It was impossible to reconcile traditional interpretations 
of valor and honor with the mutual butchery that had engulfed the Eastern and Western Fronts. 
The once firmly established line of demarcation between military and domestic life had become 
permanently blurred. Millions had died, but for what purpose? It truly was, as countless 
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historians have explained, a “victorless” conflict. Reacting to the immense violence of the war, a 
new generation of peace advocates emerged to support the activities of the newly created League 
of Nations, which operated under the misconception that the world could not endure another 
global conflict. As Woodrow Wilson famously stated, the bloody conflagration had been “the 
war to end all wars.”29 Sharing Bradlet’s earlier frustration, Wilson, like most Americans, was 
unambiguously “sick of war.” As a result, Bradlet’s prediction would prove correct; nearly every 
diplomatic body from The Hague to the League of Nations would embrace cinema as a means 
for preventing another world war. Just as nations could use films as a means to support the war 
effort, one commentator for the League of Nations film division surmised, they could use them 
to “ensure progressively the Prosperity and the wellbeing of Humanity.”30 Similarly, Cranston 
Brenton, chairman of the National Board of Review of Motion Pictures, was certain films would 
“have a large place in maintaining peace and preventing future wars through the fact that it 
brings to all nations, races, and creeds, the life of all other peoples” and thus alleviates the 
“gigantic misunderstandings” that triggered World War I.31  
The war ended the era of the independent inventor and brought motion pictures to the 
forefront of industry. Sponsored by massive firms, such as General Electric and DuPont, 
technological innovation became institutionalized within corporate laboratories throughout the 
1920s. Incremental improvements and adjustments to existing technologies replaced the need for 
the independent inventor’s much cherished and sought after “eureka moments.” Dependent upon 
new research and development programs, technological innovation had become evolutionary 
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rather than revolutionary. This transformation, as Thomas Hughes and other scholars have made 
clear, represented the emergence of system-builders as the dominant force in technological 
innovation. Technological systems typically refer to large-scale electrical, communication, 
transportation, production, and military networks that function as the foundation of modern 
society. They consist of both physical components—the actual ‘nuts-and-bolts’ that make the 
system operate—and social, political, and economic, components that shape and are shaped by 
the system itself. One of the most visible technological systems appeared in Southern California 
with the ascent of the “Big Five” and “Little Three” film studios.  
As large corporations gradually usurped the role of independent inventors, a handful of 
powerful studios consolidated control over the motion picture industry. The dozens of small 
independent production houses that had once served as the basis for American filmmaking 
became obsolete in the wake of what Hollywood insiders dubbed the “studio system.” Together 
the Big Five—Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM), Paramount, Warner Bros., 20th Century Fox, and 
RKO—and the Little Three—Universal, Columbia, and United Artists—gained control over the 
production, distribution, and exhibition of films. These vertically integrated firms were bicoastal 
business empires that collectively released hundreds of features every year. Their corporate 
offices were based in New York City and their studio lots, popularly known as “dream 
factories,” were based in Los Angeles. A handful of charismatic movie moguls, such as Louis 
Mayer, Carl Laemmle, and Adolph Zukor, managed each studio from the top-down. As they 
harnessed the magic of motion pictures, these studio heads garnered reputations not as artists but 
as powerful system-builders akin to Henry Ford or Andrew Carnegie. Though rarely treated as 
technological innovators, the studio heads perfected a style of management and organization that 
provided products to tens of millions of people every week.  
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The studio system helped foist the once fledgling toy business to the center of global 
commerce and establish motion pictures as one of the United States’ most lucrative industries, 
comparable to steel and agriculture.32 As a result, many Americans acknowledged the studios as 
one of the major sources responsible for the greater prosperity of the Roaring Twenties. 
Americans tend to forget that the 1920s, a period renowned for its affluence, began in a recession 
marked by over 100,000 bankruptcies. However, the Russian Revolution triggered a “Red Scare” 
that helped suppress the remedies offered by labor leaders, especially those who represented anti-
capitalist sentiments. With the aid of the Hollywood studios, monopoly firms such as AT&T, US 
Steel, and IBM worked tirelessly to portray themselves as major barriers to the spread of 
Bolshevism, gaining the approval of influential politicians from various parties. As the economy 
began to strengthen exponentially around the mid-1920s, corporate titans had done what they 
could to try and convince Americans that they alone created the prosperity characteristic of the 
decade. Millions of middle-class and working-class Americans began to see corporations and not 
governments as responsible for economic improvement and technological innovation. Leading 
pacifist and idealist organizations championed these corporations as powerful purveyors of their 
cause, which brought the studios into larger discussions over the nature of world peace. Those 
Americans who believed in the peacekeeping potential of motion pictures often championed the 
corporate power of Hollywood as a means to achieve their goals. 
Though Americans’ taste for entertainment shifted repeatedly and was nearly impossible 
to determine with any degree of certainty, the American film industry was exceptionally stable. 
This was largely the result of a unique blend of management and artistry, two forces that many 
consider to be fundamentally at odds. Though the studio system acknowledged film as an art 
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form, the primary goal was to sell movie tickets and ensure a profitable return on every release. 
To steer the talents of cast and crew effectively, management entered into nearly every facet of 
their professional and personal lives. At MGM, for example, Louis Mayer hired Irving Thalberg 
to oversee every step of the production process. Thalberg developed stories with his team of 
writers, created new lenses and lights for his cinematographers, drafted storyboards and shooting 
scripts for his directors, and crafted a public persona for his performers. Despite his young age, 
Thalberg saw himself as a parental figure responsible for maintaining high moral and ethical 
standards both on and off the set. According to one reporter who had studied his methods, even 
the MGM lion, the studio’s official symbol and mascot, “never roars without an O.K. from 
Irving Thalberg.”33  
The son of German Jewish immigrants, Thalberg grew up in a working-class 
neighborhood in Brooklyn. At the age of twenty he befriended Carl Laemmle, the president of 
Universal Studios, and became his personal assistant. Within only a year, he climbed the studio’s 
ranks and found himself managing the production of several feature films on a massive three-
hundred-and-sixty-acre lot. He had a knack for developing foreign talent and worked tirelessly to 
acquire some of the most influential directors and actors from abroad, most notably Austrian 
filmmaker Erich von Stroheim, Mexican actor Ramon Novarro, and Swedish actress Greta 
Garbo. Thalberg’s reputation grew rapidly and, when Louis Mayer partnered with Samuel 
Goldwyn and Marcus Loew to form MGM, he immediately sought out the talent and tenacity of 
the individual who industry leaders had nicknamed the “boy wonder.” Thalberg personified the 
promising allure of Hollywood. His rags-to-riches story echoed the central tenets of the 
American Dream and the American melting pot. He professed that anyone, anywhere could 
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“make it” if they worked hard and applied themselves. The film industry to Thalberg was the 
land of opportunity in miniature, a place where Europeans, Hispanics, and Anglo-Americans 
came together and benefited from one another’s talents. Because Hollywood employed 
individuals from all over the globe, many reporters insisted that it was inherently more 
international than other professional film industries and therefore the one best suited to serve as a 
peacekeeping force.  
While serving as the production supervisor at MGM, Thalberg pioneered the 
management style most affiliated with the studio system. He believed the studio’s lots, 
administrative buildings, and fleet of 1,500 formal employees had to be “scientifically 
balanced.”34 Based on the operations of Henry Ford’s automobile factories in Detroit, the studio 
was built in a grid formation to ensure the efficient mobilization of labor and technical resources. 
Every facet of production received its own department and distinct division of labor. Heeding 
many of the principles of Fredrick Taylor’s scientific management, Thalberg figured he could 
mass produce films without sacrificing artistic quality. Though his idea had its fair share of 
skeptics, few doubted Thalberg’s methods once they saw MGM’s first major release, The Big 
Parade (1925).  
Directed by the prolific King Vidor, The Big Parade chronicles the life of James 
Apperson, a lazy American teenager who has little interest in following in the footsteps of his 
father, a successful businessman. When the United States enters World War I in 1917, Apperson 
enlists in the Army in order to appease his patriotic parents. The naïve soldier develops ideas of 
becoming a hero and befriends two working-class New Yorkers before shipping off to France to 
fight the Germans on the Western Front. Once they arrive, they are met with mustard gas and 
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sniper fire. The harsh reality of life in the trenches shatters their illusions of grandeur and they 
quickly find themselves disenchanted with their surroundings. In the midst of catastrophic 
violence, Jim meets a young farmer and falls in love. As their relationship blossoms, James’ two 
friends are killed in action. By depicting the violence of war explicitly and without remorse, the 
film immediately garnered the approval of the public and various pacifist organizations.   
Bringing in over twenty million dollars in ticket sales, The Big Parade was by many 
accounts the highest-grossing film of the silent era. Though unlike its competitors, MGM did not 
own a massive theater chain in order to ensure its films would have an audience. Paramount, for 
example, bought out approximately five-hundred theaters and therefore had to constantly 
navigate the risks of the real estate market and set aside funding for building renovations and 
maintenance. This gave the studio executives considerable power over the exhibition of their 
films, but also tied them to economic forces outside of their control. Thalberg hated that idea and 
focused his energies instead on owning only approximately one-hundred high-end theaters in 
major urban areas, such as New York City. This created a demand for MGM films and gave their 
releases an unprecedented level of prestige. The Big Parade, Thalberg insisted, was sophisticated 
entertainment and fine art. 
This marketing strategy was effective and helped make John Gilbert, the film’s 
protagonist, a household name and bona fide star. As one of the architects of the “star system,” 
one of MGM’s primary forms of quality control, Thalberg helped Gilbert construct his public 
image as a chivalrous gentleman. By signing his performers to long-term contracts, Thalberg was 
able to sell his stars as products in and of themselves. He advised Gilbert on everything from his 
roles to his romantic interests. Thalberg and his cohorts catered to the burgeoning tabloid 
industry and framed every aspect of their performers’ lives as extensions of the MGM brand. By 
	 41	
the end of the 1920s, each studio had become affiliated with a specific genre or style of film. 
Audiences looked to MGM for epic dramas, Paramount for comedies, Warner Bros. for gangster 
and crime dramas, Fox for musicals, and Universal for horror and science fiction. The studio 
heads went to great lengths to ensure their stars were representing the studio’s signature style of 
filmmaking appropriately. The star system cannot be attributed to The Big Parade alone, of 
course. However, it did begin MGM’s reputation for having “more stars than the Heavens.” The 
enormous success of The Big Parade showed the world that the Hollywood business model 
worked. In effect, the studio system came into its own with a film that championed pacifism and 
the inherent follies of war. 
Researchers for the League of Nations had a keen interest in The Big Parade and wanted 
to measure its influence on viewers, particularly children. They were curious if watching anti-
war films actually made the public more peaceful and opposed to war. In an article published in 
the League of Nations’ journal Educational Survey, sociologist C.M. Wilson detailed her 
findings from studying the reactions of more than a thousand students from Bradford, Yorkshire 
to twenty-three different war films. Students were provided a survey in order to gauge their 
opinion of war after watching the films. European propaganda such as The Battle of the Somme 
(1916) generated enthusiastic replies from a handful of students. One even claimed it made him 
want to “blow the head off the men who make war with England.” However, the study also 
concluded that when the children were shown films stressing the horrors of war, “an 
overwhelming percentage are made peace advocates.”35 Though The Big Parade was one of only 
a few American films shown, it had the greatest impact on shaping the students’ outlook. 
According to one student participant, The Big Parade “made me think that war is the most 
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horrible way of making peace.”36 Despite the fact that over ninety percent of the students who 
had watched the film were now “opposed to war,” the researchers were alarmed when finding 
only eight percent demonstrated they had any idea that the League of Nations or any diplomatic 
alternatives to war even existed. “Films that would follow up the war pictures,” the research 
team surmised, “and make children aware of the peace machinery that has been set up since 1918 
is strongly needed.”37 
The Big Parade helped expand the market for anti-war films that provided a realistic 
view of combat, which made MGM’s rivals eager to cash in on the demand. Like an echo 
chamber, competing studios frequently mimicked the fashionable films of their contemporaries. 
Fox’s What Price Glory? (1926), Paramount’s Wings (1927), and First National’s The Patent 
Leather Kid (1927) followed in the wake of The Big Parade and garnered the approval of many 
pacifist organizations since they all provided an honest portrayal of the opposing side. These 
films do not vilify Germans or Turks, the enemies most prevalent in earlier American war films, 
and instead treat them as complex and rational individuals. Carl Milliken, former governor of 
Maine and secretary of the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America, called movie 
theaters the “school of tolerance” and applauded the release of films which “hold up a mirror to 
every phase of human activity with accuracy and vivid realism.”38 Films like The Big Parade, he 
argued, “help us form clearer judgments of the ceaseless work of nations [so] no longer is it true 
that half of the world ignores what the other half is doing.”39 As an official spokesman for the 
American film industry, Milliken was surely attempting to bolster the profile of the major studios 
while they were working tirelessly to export their products overseas. Because Hollywood 
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represented such a racially and ethnically diverse workforce, however, Milliken genuinely 
believed it was the century’s preeminent vehicle for fostering international understanding. And 
understanding, he insisted repeatedly, “is the basis for world peace.”40 
Many prominent filmmakers and actors embraced ideas similar to Milliken’s and 
denounced the common perception of Hollywood as a global brain drain intentionally depriving 
foreign nations of their domestic talent. Although, one could certainly argue that was precisely 
what the studio system was designed to do. After signing a contract with Universal, German 
leading man Conrad Veidt, best known for his performance in the influential Cabinet of Dr. 
Caligari (1920), called the studio system a “source of reciprocity between filmmakers of Europe 
and America.” He believed it was cultivating an international spirit and educating audiences 
about the customs of other nations. “Each has something to give to the other,” Veidt professed, 
“America its enthusiasm and optimism; Europe its originality and fine character portrayal.”41 
Veidt’s comments, however, were not in sync with the larger actions of the German film 
industry. Anti-Hollywood sentiment flourished in Germany after the war because many German 
producers saw the major American studios as imperialist monopolies trying to saturate European 
theaters with American films. Veidt and other supporters of the studio system disagreed with this 
negative assessment. Veidt was part of a growing body of filmmakers and performers who 
considered the major studios’ desire to appeal to European and other foreign audiences as a 
means to international friendship. The Hollywood dream factories, he figured, would naturally 
have to diversify their products in order to meet the sophisticated tastes of European 
theatergoers, which would result in higher quality films about a greater number of nations and 
peoples. 
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Like nearly all other observers who championed Hollywood cinema as a tool for 
international understanding, Veidt always stressed how it was a silent medium. Herein rested its 
peacekeeping power. The art of pantomime was universal. Adolph Zukor, the founder and 
president of Paramount, considered silent films “an international language such as the world had 
never known.”42 John Freuler, the president of Mutual Film, similarly promoted his works as part 
of a “great service in the ultimate consummation of a world brotherhood.”43 Those who worked 
directly under these powerful movie moguls, such as film producer Benjamin Hampton, parroted 
these remarks routinely, calling studio silent films an expression of “anti-war sentiments that can 
prevent war.”44 After World War I, almost all studio executives used such utopian language 
when discussing their films. Even formal educators, such as the governing body of the journal 
Visual Education, praised silent cinema as “a world humanizer” that allowed people to see one 
another, not as “Germans” or “Americans,” but as fellow human beings.45 Because silent films 
did not have any spoken dialogue, they were easily accessible to almost any audience. This made 
it easy for the studios to promote their products as a unifying force.  
The only confusion came from the occasional mistranslation of an intertitle, a block of 
text that producers inserted into the action of a scene to reveal a complex plot. Most films of the 
Silent Era, however, only contained a handful of intertitles, which made it easy and inexpensive 
for studios to secure accurate translations for their foreign releases. Some trade publications, like 
Motion Picture News, acknowledged silent film as “a common language” in and of itself, but 
called for the production of films that transcended the need for any intertitles. If one can 
																																								 																				
42	Paramount	Pictures	Corporation,	The	Story	of	the	Famous	Players-Lasky	Corporation	(New	York	City:	Famous	
Players-Lasky	Corporation,	1919),	5.	
43	John	Freuler,	“Freuler	on	the	Film	as	an	Institution,”	Exhibitors	Herald,	April	27,	1918,	21.	
44	“Publicity	Men	Future	Leaders	of	Producing	Field,	Says	Hampton,”	Exhibitors	Herald,	June	18,	1921,	52.	
45	Catherine	Ely,	“The	Screen:	A	World	Humanizer,”	Visual	Education,	February	1921,	17-20.	
	 45	
appreciate a great painting without a written explanation, why must filmmakers confine 
themselves to the use of words? “It is regarded as a triumph of the motion picture artist,” they 
argued, “that he can make a picture which does not require subtitling.”46 It was not uncommon 
for film critics to measure a film’s artistic worth in relation to its dependence upon printed 
words. For example, critics credited the global popularity of film comedian Charlie Chaplin to 
his ability to “make himself independent of words, speaking to millions in the language of pure 
movement.”47 
Discussions over the universality of silent cinema dovetailed with the rise of the 
“Esperanto movement.” The self-described idealist Ludwik Lejzer Zamenhof, an independent 
inventor and ophthalmologist from Russian-occupied Poland, developed Esperanto in the late-
nineteenth century as a means for all peoples to communicate more effectively. Esperanto, which 
translates literally to “the one who hopes,” combines a Latin alphabet with simple, exception-
free grammatical rules. There is no masculine and feminine classification of nouns and verbs do 
not require conjugation. Moreover, because it is agglutinative, it is remarkably easy to learn. 
Speakers form words by simply adding prefixes and suffixes to one of several hundred stem 
words. As a constructed language, the goal of Esperanto was to serve as a worldwide second 
language.  
Growing up in a Jewish neighborhood in the ethnically diverse Bialystok, Zamenhof 
recognized a language barrier between himself and the Polish, Russian, and German 
communities nearby. He believed this language barrier forced each ethnic enclave to treat one 
another with suspicion and occasional hostility. If all people shared a common tongue, he 
reasoned, it would make it easier to embrace neighbors as equals. However, instead of learning 
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to speak Polish, Russian, and German fluently, which he believed was too difficult and 
expensive for most, a new, more accessible language was needed. Operating under the 
assumption that language was the most important cultural force on the planet, Zamenhof 
preached, “Were there but an international language—a language unequivocally accepted by 
everyone—all nations would be united in common brotherhood.”48  
The Esperanto movement expanded gradually in the first decade of the twentieth century 
and peaked in popularity in the late 1920s. During this Golden Age of Esperanto, millions of 
individuals in Europe, Asia, and the Americas had learned the simplified language and 
championed it as a path to a warless world. Publishing companies took note and began releasing 
on average one book printed in Esperanto every other day.49 The tremendous surge in Esperanto 
programs after World War I reflected the increasingly global nature of modern life and the 
heightened status of liberal idealism and pacifism in matters of diplomacy. The League of 
Nations, for example, was particularly interested in the utility of Esperanto and nearly adopted it 
as its official auxiliary language in 1922.50 However, fearing the language might diminish the 
role of French in League affairs, Gabriel Hanotaux, France’s official delegate to the League, 
vetoed the proposition. President of Universal Studios Carl Laemmle agreed with Hanotaux’s 
decision and similarly dismissed Esperanto as “ill-fated and ridiculously impractical.” Instead of 
everyone learning a new language, which, according to Laemmle, was counterproductive since 
modern systems of transportation and communication made the world “too small for so many 
languages,” the League of Nations should encourage all public schools to adopt only one, 
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preferably English or Spanish, for its students to learn alongside their native tongue. In a letter he 
had penned for League officials, Laemmle detailed the benefits a universal second language 
would have on diplomacy and commerce. “World peace is not the only reason for a world 
language,” Laemmle wrote, “world prosperity is another [as] the business of the world would be 
speeded up immeasurably.”51 Conveniently, a world language would also make it easier for 
Laemmle to sell his company’s films.  
The Hollywood studio system benefitted from the Esperanto trend as many advocates 
figured it would promote its cause. To meet demand, studios like Universal and Paramount 
occasionally released silent films with Esperanto intertitles. The World Esperanto Association, 
the largest international organization of its kind, encouraged this practice and tried to convince 
studio executives to make it the industry standard. Because Esperanto’s grammar and vocabulary 
mirrored Hollywood’s cosmopolitan workforce, many assumed they were a perfect pair.52 Much 
like the industry itself, it too was an amalgamation of English, Hebrew, German, and Spanish 
elements. The parallels between Esperanto and Hollywood received both praise and criticism. 
Many trade journals, like The Photodramatist, wondered why Esperanto was needed at all since 
silent cinema had already “outstripped the printing press, the public rostrum, and the daily paper” 
as a communication technology. Since there were far more moviegoers than Esperanto-speakers 
in the world, they figured film was better at meeting Zamenhof’s initial goal of bringing nations 
closer together. By its very nature, they argued, film was already “the Esperanto of international 
understanding.”53 Novelist and screenwriter Rupert Hughes shared this sentiment and argued that 
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with cinema, “the only universal language, Esperanto falls into insignificance.”54 According to 
many of Esperanto’s critics, the language missed the point of film entirely since it smothered the 
medium with unnecessary words. In his oft-cited 1924 book, That Marvel—The Movie, film 
critic Edward Van Zile acknowledged Esperanto as a useful harbinger of world peace, but 
asserted, “in comparison to the Esperanto of the Eye, the universal language sprung from the 
screen, its conquest of the earth is painfully slow, and its final complete triumph would still leave 
the world-language of the eye more potent than world-language of the tongue.”55  
The debate over the role of Esperanto in Hollywood shifted dramatically with 
advancements in sound technology. In 1927, Warner Bros. released The Jazz Singer, the first 
popular feature film to make use of synchronized sound. Though a handful of studios and 
directors had dabbled in sound films previous to The Jazz Singer, few found them cost-effective 
or reliable. D.W. Griffith’s Dream Street (1921), for example, included a short sequence of actor 
Ralph Graves singing, but few theaters could afford the sound-on-disc technology needed to 
screen it properly. Moreover, projectionists found early sound films cumbersome and prone to 
malfunction. With the invention of the Vitaphone, a device that affordably interlocked a 
phonograph with a film projector, The Jazz Singer was able to provide audiences with lively 
musical numbers and spoken dialogue. The film enthralled the public despite the fact it was still 
primarily silent. Costing Warner Bros. approximately a half million dollars to shoot, The Jazz 
Singer was a tremendous risk. Few knew if the “talkie” would prove more than a curiosity, as 
Irving Thalberg at MGM had assumed. After grossing over seven times its budget at the box 
office, the film demonstrated the financial potential for sound films and made a strong case for 
their staying power.   
																																								 																				
54	“Nobody	Too	Great	for	Screen,”	Motion	Picture	News,	November	27,	1920,	4119.		
55	Van	Zile,	193.	
	 49	
As the demand for talkies skyrocketed between 1927 and 1933, the major studios 
scrambled to adjust. Updating theater-chains to accommodate sound technology was expensive 
and time-consuming. Executives also had to employ a fleet of new technicians and crew 
members to manage sound stages and recording booths on the lot. In addition, many popular 
stars from the Silent Era were now finding their talent and hard work expendable as the studios 
gave long-term contracts to a variety of new performers with allegedly more marketable voices. 
John Gilbert, the star of The Big Parade, a film that had helped launch the studio system only a 
few years earlier, never fully adjusted to sound films and his career, along with those of many of 
his peers, started to decline. Thousands of working musicians also grew anxious as sound 
technology challenged the need for live performers to accompany screenings. For these reasons 
and many others, not all of the studios immediately embraced sound. Silent films remained 
popular and a majority of critics stayed hopeful that talkies were only a passing fad. They 
lambasted them for challenging the art of pantomime and turning cinema into little more than 
recorded theater.56  
For many critics, talkies actually signaled the death of the Hollywood studio system and 
film as a distinct art form. “Hollywood is no longer Hollywood,” a writer for Close Up 
proclaimed as “the movie which held dominion over the world by reason of its unity of language, 
the pristine Esperanto of filmdom, [has] now become the modern Babel.”57 For peace advocates, 
the coming of sound was a major blow to their worldview. Those who believed film was a 
technology for world peace operated under the assumption that seeing how other peoples lived 
was enough to foster international understanding. Sound films complicated this belief. 
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Understanding would not stem solely from seeing, but also hearing. Many feared sound would 
re-nationalize the medium and strip it of what was once considered an inherently egalitarian 
characteristic. An affiliate of the League of Nations made this clear:  
A universal language was about to speak and was therefore about to lose in consequence 
its very first quality which more than any other had won success for it everywhere and 
had held out the best hopes to those who saw in this new art form the surest and most 
efficacious means of universal interpretation and understanding.58 
 
Esperantists, however, envisioned sound technology as an opportunity and not a threat. 
 Because language is intrinsically political and has historically been one of the driving 
forces for communities to divide one another into categories of “us” and “them,” Esperantists 
figured the studios would never agree to release their films only in English. The fear of 
alienating key demographics abroad was too great. In the early twentieth century, the calls for 
self-determination had resonated around the globe. Communities in Africa, Europe, and Asia 
championed their mother tongues as hallmarks of their identities. In World War I, for example, 
Serbian and Croatian minority groups rallied for their independence from the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire largely because they spoke a language different from that of the ruling elite. Esperantists 
also recognized the immense financial burden that translation efforts would have on the studios. 
If Hollywood were to continue its reign as the undisputed king of film production and hold its 
grip on foreign markets, it would have to release films in dozens of languages, including French, 
Spanish, German, Japanese, and Thai. All films would have to include either dubbed voices or 
subtitles. Dubbing was impractical because it required hiring an entirely new cast of foreign 
talent to re-enact each scene from a recording booth. Many stars hated that idea because it 
removed all nuance from their initial performance. Was it really acting, they wondered, if 
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another performer was going to speak every line of dialogue? Moreover, many felt dubbing was 
hard to take seriously since the dubbed language never perfectly synced with the movement of 
the actor’s lips. Subtitles were more cost-effective but raised the question of whether audiences 
were willing to read at the theater. For some, the answer was simple: Esperanto. 
 Most Esperantists were technological enthusiasts and believed the spread of their 
language was the inevitable result of modern systems of communication and transportation. The 
cinema, which, according to the World Esperanto Association, was the most popular medium in 
the world, could be converted easily into a training vehicle for the language. For the first several 
years of the talkie, they argued, the studios should continue to release their films in English. 
However, before each screening, a short newsreel should precede the feature and provide an 
introductory lesson on grammar and syntax. Then, during the film, the audience could follow 
along with Esperanto subtitles. Because the language was allegedly simple to learn, audiences 
would quickly acquire the fundamentals and soon be able to comprehend entire films spoken 
only in Esperanto.59 Though the plan required considerable startup costs, most figured it would 
prove more affordable and less cumbersome than the alternatives. The idea resonated outside of 
Esperanto circles and even inspired some influential figures in Hollywood. Prolific film director 
Clarence Brown, for example, believed in the utility of the language and thought it would solve 
what many reporters called the “great talkie panic.”60 According to Brown, films were so integral 
to society and life that the talkie would be the “stimulus for every country to accept a universal 
tongue.”61 Though the studios never committed fully to adopting the language, they refused to 
ignore its potential. MGM and Paramount were particularly interested and made sure to purchase 
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the rights for an Esperanto version of select stories and screenplays. They even released a few 
films featuring select scenes with Esperanto dialogue.62 When reflecting on this development, a 
spokesperson for Universal pondered if “the English language may at some time be superseded 
by Esperanto or,” better yet, “Filmese.”63  
The notion of “Filmese,” while used in jest, reflected the primary criticisms many studio 
executives had of Esperanto, and explained why they assumed English would triumph as the 
international language of the screen. Though there were several million Esperanto speakers in the 
world, this paled in comparison to the number of speakers of any of the major languages in 
Europe and Asia. In a 1930 volume of the International Photographer, a fictitious conversation 
between two friends mocks the alleged popularity of the language throughout Hollywood:  
Man One: “I suppose some company will be making talkies in Esperanto before long.” 
Man Two: “What is Esperanto?” 
Man One: “It’s the universal language.” 
Man Two: “Whereabouts is it spoken?” 
Man One: “Nowhere.”64 
 
Because the language was constructed from several others and had no true national origin, critics 
argued it did not add up to the sum of its parts. It lacked necessary spirit and flair. It was too 
contrived. Moreover, they resented the fact that most Esperantists were wealthy. Learning the 
language was a luxury only for the well-to-do. “They should know,” Motion Picture Herald 
reported, “the masses do not know about Esperanto.”65 Even if all Hollywood films, many critics 
argued, featured only English dialogue, this still did not render them inherently less accessible to 
non-English speakers. According to Irving Thalberg, the true hallmark of a great American film 
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was its ability to express ideas and feelings that resonated with all peoples, not just Americans. 
Studio filmmakers wanted to capture and depict the universal sensations of love, fear, joy, and 
suspense without having literally to explain it to their audience. Words would always be 
secondary to feelings, at least in theory. 
Watching and hearing a film was meant to be an experience that overwhelmed the senses 
and resonated more with the heart than the mind. A film should not serve as a formal language 
lesson. If the talkies were well-produced and contained a captivating story, one commentator 
explained, they would still transcend language barriers because they were the “Esperantists of the 
heart.”66 If the cinema’s explicit purpose was to impart a skill to its audience, then the 
technology would never cultivate international understanding. According to the trade journal 
Close Up, doing so would actually force cinema to slip into irrelevance, as it would become a 
soulless bore reduced to little more than “the diluted moral Esperanto of other peoples.”67 
However, many studio executives figured American films would shatter what was popularly 
called “the sound barrier” because they tapped into fundamental features of human nature.68 The 
studio system’s knack for capturing what was universally relatable, despite language, was the 
essence of “Filmese.”  
Many movie moguls, particularly Irving Thalberg and Louis Mayer at MGM, believed 
deeply in the talent of their employees. Despite the claims of Esperanto advocates, they assumed 
the quality of their work would prove successful enough to convince people both in the United 
States and elsewhere to learn English. “Esperanto failed,” Mayer said plainly. “Just as silent 
American pictures have popularized American habits, customs, goods, and ideals abroad, so will 
																																								 																				
66	“The	Educational	Influence	of	Motion	Pictures,”	International	Review	of	Educational	Cinematography,	July	1934,	
467	“Behind	the	Whiskers,”	Motion	Picture	Herald,	April	22,	1933,	7.	
67	“As	Is,”	Close	Up,	August	1929,	85.	 	
68	“Films	Must	Break	Sound	Barrier	to	Spreading	Good	Will,”	Motion	Picture	Herald,	July	22,	1933,	39.	
	 54	
the American talking picture popularize the English language.”69 Albert Howson, a chief 
screenwriter and actor at Warner Bros., echoed this sentiment: “There is no doubt in my mind,” 
he declared, “that the talking screen will eventually make English the international language.”70  
The spread of English, specifically American English, he figured, would also make it easier for 
domestic business interests to secure a foothold in foreign markets. Howson celebrated “ours as 
the international language” instead of the “exaggerated Oxford intonation,” because it was not 
only “the most beautiful and most melodious,” but would “benefit trade of every kind and 
description.”71 The US State Department approved of such ambitious rhetoric because it saw the 
studio system as a forerunner for the “Americanization” of Europe after World War I. However, 
this troubled many British producers who considered American English a bastardization of the 
language and a threat to their longstanding national identity. “The Battle of the Accents,” as the 
press described it, was emblematic of the current state of the Anglo world: the hegemony of the 
British Empire was waning with the ascent of the technologically savvy United States. Perhaps 
nowhere was this more apparent than in the cinema. “Are the talkies to go British, or remain 
Ammurican [sic],” a writer for the popular Picture Play Magazine quipped.72   
Many Hollywood stars assumed the Mid-Atlantic accent would prevail. A blend of 
standard British and American English pronunciations, the Mid-Atlantic accent was not a native 
vernacular, but rather a hybrid commonly taught in East Coast boarding schools and in 
traditional theater companies. It was an extension of Victorian culture and most speakers 
considered it genteel and symbolic of an upper-class upbringing. Vincent Price and Audrey 
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Hepburn were the American performers most commonly affiliated with the dialect. However, 
some studio executives feared that if the accent became too ubiquitous in the cinema, it might, 
like Esperanto, alienate working-class demographics. One of the films that silenced the sound 
film debate and proved the marketability of standard American English was All Quiet on the 
Western Front (1930). 
Based on German author Erich Remarque’s best-selling novel of the same name, All 
Quiet on the Western Front is by many accounts the seminal anti-war film and the most 
influential of the early talkies. The story follows Paul Baumer, played by Lew Ayres, and his 
close companions as they transform from idealistic schoolchildren to disillusioned soldiers. On 
the eve of World War I, the young men listen attentively to the patriotic grandstanding of their 
teacher, Mr. Kantorek, who preaches the glory of fighting for the German Fatherland and even 
dying in its name. Like James Apperson, the protagonist in The Big Parade, Baumer and his 
friends become infatuated with romanticized conceptions of heroism and enlist in the army. They 
leap at the opportunity to fight along the Western Front and defend their nation from the 
tyrannical ambitions of the Entente. Because of the high casualty rates, however, the starry-eyed 
“soldiers” quickly find themselves appointed to a seasoned unit made up entirely of middle-aged 
men with no interest in fanning their delusions. Void of food and other basic supplies, Baumer 
eventually recognizes the root of his seniors’ cynicism. Constant bombardment from mortars and 
machine guns leads the young men to develop depression, alcoholism, and other stress-related 
ailments. Within a few months, most of Baumer’s friends are either killed or maimed in combat.  
After securing a temporary release from his commanding officer, Baumer visits home 
and walks into his old classroom after overhearing Mr. Kantorek propagating the same, enticing 
rhetoric that had encouraged his enlistment. Kantorek spots Baumer and asks him to tell his class 
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about the honor of “serving as one of the iron-youth who have made Germany invincible in the 
field.”73 Taking full-advantage of sound technology, the scene delivers its anti-war message 
masterfully. Though set in Germany, Ayres plays Baumer without a German or Mid-Atlantic 
accent, allowing his relatable, mid-Western pronunciation to shine through the screen. Standing 
before a room full of wide-eyed youths waiting to contribute to what they think will be the final 
push against the French, Baumer says plainly, “We live in the trenches out there, we fight, try 
not to be killed. Sometimes we are. That’s all.” Frustrated with his frankness, Kantorek 
interjects, “That’s not what one dwells on Paul.” A look of bitterness grows visibly across 
Baumer’s face as he turns his gaze to Kantorek and looks him square in the eyes: “You still do 
think it’s beautiful and sweet to die for your country, don’t you?” Kantorek nods confidently. 
“We used to think you knew, but the first bombardment taught us better. It’s dirty and painful to 
die for your country. When it comes to dying for your country, it’s better not to die at all. There 
are millions out there dying for their country and what good is it?” His comments enrage the 
students and they lash out at him for being a “coward” and a “liar.” He leaves and is soon 
stationed back at the Western Front. In the concluding scene, Paul sits miserably inside a 
claustrophobic trench surrounded by a dusty, lunar-like landscape. He notices a butterfly land 
slightly beyond his reach. As he repositions himself to touch this one, small beacon of happiness, 
an enemy sniper shoots him dead. The final image is a composite of a large cemetery and a unit 
of fresh young recruits marching toward the Front.  
 Baumer’s powerful critique of blind nationalism was effective because the audience 
could actually hear him defy his former teacher and denounce war. If the audience were to 
simply read the diatribe on an intertitle, the emotional resonance would diminish considerably. 
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The quiet rage evident in Ayers’ performance would be lost. Because the scene contains actual 
spoken dialogue, it functioned as a call to action for the audience, which partially explains why, 
despite its depressing ending, All Quiet on the Western Front was an enormous critical and 
commercial success. With a budget of more than one-million dollars, the film was a major risk 
for Universal Studios, which had struggled for years to keep pace with its larger peers. However, 
after grossing well over three million dollars in ticket sales, the film reconfirmed the studio’s 
reputation as a major player and established Lewis Milestone as one Hollywood’s most talented 
directors.  
Born in Russia (present-day Moldova), Milestone emigrated to the United States just 
before the outbreak of the war. He then enlisted in the US Signal Corps and developed a knack 
for shooting and editing films for the military. After the war, he became affiliated with Howard 
Hughes, who helped him build a career in Hollywood. Though Milestone directed a number of 
successful films and won an academy award for the comedy Two Arabian Nights (1927), it was 
All Quiet on the Western Front that garnered him recognition as a true artist. What made his 
directorial work in the film so unique was his ability to grasp the emotional power of sound. It 
was his first talkie and he clearly wanted to make heavy use of this new technology that coupled 
credible images of war with a strong pacifist message.  
 Unlike most films of that era, either silent or sound, All Quiet on the Western Front does 
not contain any music. Milestone did not want to sentimentalize the performances with a score. 
Instead, he relied on the cacophony of war to serve as his soundtrack, which enveloped 
audiences in realistic recordings of exploding grenades, roaring machine guns, whistling bombs, 
and screaming soldiers. In the film’s most iconic scene, Baumer’s unit fends off a violent attack 
from French forces pushing across No Man’s Land. Sweeping crane shots reveal hordes of 
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young men charging into enemy fodder as the pulsing thunder of high-explosives contrasts 
sharply with the piercing rattle of machine guns. The overlapping noise is jarring and creates a 
sense of chaotic dissonance. Coupled with violent images of solders riddling one another with 
bullets and penetrating one another with bayonets, the experience proved too overwhelming for 
some viewers. Paul Robinson, a World War I veteran and manager of a Florida theatre, for 
example, was transported to a hospital following a screening of the film. Crediting his condition 
to “a return of shell shock,” Robinson’s unfortunate experience was a testament to the power of 
sound in film. “When an exhibitor is not shock proof in the presence of the screen,” Motion 
Picture Herald reported in response to the incident, “what may one expect of the possibilities of 
impact on the sensibilities of the layman?”74 Milestone did not intend to inflict emotional harm 
on viewers, but he did intend to simulate the source of “shell shock” by engrossing them in the 
sights and sounds of active combat, which, for at least one veteran, were all too familiar. 
 Upon release, critics almost unanimously praised how the film’s sound design 
contributed to it pacifist message. Even critics who had pined for the end of talkies since the 
release of the Jazz Singer celebrated it as a tremendous achievement. Roy Winton, chief reviewer 
for the journal Movie Makers, admitted plainly that he had disapproved of all sound films until 
he saw All Quiet on the Western Front:  
Universal and Lewis Milestone have done the precise thing that this reviewer had 
predicted could never be done. They have made a talking movie that is packed full of 
cinematic quality and have mixed that quality so thoroughly into the substance of the 
photoplay that one cannot segregate those parts that are talkie and those that are motion 
picture art.75 
 
Because of its powerful spoken dialogue and atmospheric sound effects, the film, Winton 
believed, actually exceeded Remarque’s novel in recreating the brutal reality of the trenches and 
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in stirring anti-war sentiment. The reviewer for the popular magazine Screenland similarly 
acknowledged the film as a turning point for talkies. “Don’t go to be entertained,” the reviewer 
cautioned, “prepare to be shocked … it is the best of arguments for peace.”76 The film’s 
producers parroted such rhetoric and embraced the fact that Benito Mussolini, fearing it might 
incite resentment against his growing military, had it banned from screening in Italy.77 Studio 
executives at Universal treated Mussolini’s decision as a badge of honor. It was a testament to 
the film’s persuasive power. Marketing the film as a direct challenge to war propaganda, 
Universal dubbed it “the greatest antidote to war which has ever been placed on the motion 
picture screen, or has ever been held up to mankind as a human document of what war really 
is.”78 Milestone operated under the assumption that if audiences could see and hear what war 
was really like, then they would not be as susceptible to the belligerent hysteria that swept across 
the United States and Europe between 1914 and 1918. He figured peace was not necessarily an 
extension of understanding the customs of other peoples, as many advocates of the Pax 
Cinemana professed, but rather understanding the nature of modern, technological warfare. A 
glowing review in Variety best summed up how the film’s financial worth overlapped with its 
political potential. As Variety noted, the film was 
so compelling in its realism, bigness, and repulsiveness [that] the League of Nations 
could make no better investment than to buy the master print, reproduce it in every 
language for every nation to be shown every year until the word War shall have been 
taken out of the dictionaries.79 
 
After its initial release, All Quiet on the Western Front did indeed screen routinely in a 
variety of theaters for nearly a decade. It became the unofficial film of Armistice Day and many 
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exhibitors made it a tradition to screen it every November 11 for the public or private veterans 
groups.80 Like The Big Parade, the film also generated attention from leading researchers 
interested in studying the influence of anti-war films on the public. Abbott Lowell, President of 
Harvard University, and William Short, Secretary of the New York Peace Society, created the 
Motion Picture Research Council to partake in such efforts.81 Between 1929 and 1931, the 
Motion Picture Research Council conducted a series of experiments with some of the most 
renowned sociologists and psychologists in the United States. Their goal was to measure the 
effect a single film can have on the youth. In one study, over two hundred high-school students 
in Paxton, Illinois participated in a survey that asked about their attitude toward war. To gauge if 
the students had a favorable or unfavorable attitude toward war, they were instructed to indicate 
whether they agreed or disagreed with thirty-two provided statements. The statements included, 
“War is hardly necessary in the modern world”; War is glorious”; “War should be avoided at any 
cost”; and “War stimulates men to their noblest efforts.”82 Nine days after completing the survey, 
they watched All Quiet on the Western Front (1930). The following day, they completed the 
survey again. The study concluded, “The change in the children’s attitude toward war as a result 
of seeing the film is very evident … the change is in the direction of pacifism.”83 
Francis Onderdonk, a professor of architecture at the University of Michigan, also had a 
keen interest in the film. However, he thought the best way to appreciate its influence was to take 
it outside of research institutions and directly to the public. For nearly a decade, Onderdonk 
traveled the country in his “Peacemobile” and held local screenings of All Quiet on the Western 
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Front and other anti-war films in parks, schools, YMCAs, and other community centers.84 The 
Peacemobile was an automobile modified to function as a traveling micro-cinema. The vehicle 
accommodated a 16mm projector, speakers, and screen. Onderdonk customized the vehicle’s 
trunk so it could hold a projector mount that extended approximately fifty feet from the rear 
bumper. The screen, which stood about eight feet tall and eight feet wide, extended above the 
front windshield. Running along the sides of the screen were the flags of dozens of countries. 
According to Onderdonk, “Motion pictures are the most powerful of all means for molding 
mankind. … It is the most scientific, energy-saving way to spread ideas.”85 His ideas were 
always of the pacifist variety and, between 1930 and the onset of World War II, Onderdonk 
screened peace films like All Quiet on the Western Front for over 100,000 individuals. 
President of Universal Studios, Carl Laemmle appreciated the warm reception of All 
Quiet on the Western Front and was thrilled that viewers treated it as an instrument of peace. 
Laemmle was nearing retirement during its initial theatrical run and wanted the film to serve as 
his swan song, a positive and thought-provoking parting gift for an industry he had helped build. 
“If I fail to make a dollar on [it],” Laemmle remarked, “I shall be satisfied if it contributes to 
world peace.”86 The influence of the film on peace advocates brought him great pleasure. Before 
the outbreak of World War I, Laemmle had been an ardent pacifist and championed the spread of 
universal human rights. When an Ohio-based newspaper recommended that Laemmle should be 
considered as a serious candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize, he hired celebrated English poet 
John Drinkwater to write his official biography, The Life and Adventures of Carl Laemmle. One 
of the book’s concluding chapters reprints the Peace Prize recommendation in its entirety:    
																																								 																				
84	Josephine	Hoffman,	“News	and	Notes:	Peace	Films	Caravan,”	The	Educational	Screen,	March	1938,	96.	
85	Josephine	Hoffman,	“Motion	Pictures	Promote	Peace,”	The	Educational	Screen,	May	1936,	150.	
86	“Laemmle	Flay	“Experts”;	Off	Costume	Films,”	Motion	Picture	News,	July	19,	1930,	27.	
	 62	
Three times the prize has come to America; in 1906 to Theodore Roosevelt, in 1912 to 
Elihu Root, and in 1918 to Woodrow Wilson. Statesmen, all of these men, and perhaps it 
does appear to be a far cry from them to Carl Laemmle. But it really isn’t. It was Carl 
Laemmle who made it possible for the world to see All Quiet on the Western Front and 
nothing has ever been done by statesmen wearing the halo of presidential or kingly favor 
[that] has been more potent in pointing out the devastating horrors of world war. And 
why, therefore, should not Carl Laemmle have the Nobel Peace Prize? Rightly they may 
ask what Roosevelt or Root or Wilson and any of the rest of the foreign gentlemen who 
have been awarded the prize, ever did more for the peace of the world than Carl Laemmle 
has with Western Front.87 
 
The release of the biography was an obvious ploy by Laemmle to shape his own legacy and 
generate support for a Peace Prize nomination. It was a perfect example of self-made 
hagiography. However, it did reflect how the public perception of motion pictures had changed 
since the late nineteenth century. Because Laemmle played a crucial role in building the studio 
system and used it to release films with strong anti-war sentiments, he was lionized by more than 
one reporter as a legitimate purveyor of world peace. Motion pictures, a technology that was 
only a few decades earlier treated as little more than a “toy,” had become the bedrock of a 
profitable industry and powerful communication system that preached the inherent folly of war.
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Chapter Two 
“The Pictures that will Stop this War”: Rethinking Henry Ford’s Peace Ship and Fleeting 
Film Empire 
On the afternoon of May 7, 1915, a German U-boat fired one torpedo at the hull of the RMS 
Lusitania, a British ocean liner carrying nearly two thousand passengers, approximately eleven 
miles off the coast of Ireland. Several months earlier, German officials had dubbed the area 
disputed and stated repeatedly that German submarines were willing to strike if British ships 
continued to pass through it. Despite the warnings, the Lusitania forged ahead undeterred until 
commander Walther Schwieger of the Imperial German Navy ordered the attack. The torpedo hit 
starboard side and compromised the integrity of the ship’s bow, forcing it underwater in only 
eighteen minutes. Because the ship sank so rapidly, passengers struggled to dispatch lifeboats. 
Hundreds of passengers drowned or died of hypothermia in the frigid Atlantic waters, including 
wealthy industrialist Alfred Vanderbilt and the famous playwright Charles Klein. Of the 1,198 
passengers that had lost their lives, 128 were American citizens. 
The sinking of the Lusitania infuriated politicians who had promoted American neutrality 
throughout the preceding months. The media took aim at Germany’s clandestine tactics and 
condemned them as perverse and even illegal. The event proved to be perfect fodder for newsreel 
cameramen who quickly turned their gaze to the hundreds of memorials organized for those who 
had perished, particularly notable people like Vanderbilt. Though the actual sinking was never 
photographed, cartoonist Winsor McCay spent nearly two years recreating the event in a 
powerful animated propaganda film based on first-person interviews. Hailed as “the only record 
of the crime that shocked humanity,” the film inspired discussion over the ethics of using motion 
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pictures to produce allegedly “authentic” accounts of historical events that had no visible record.1 
William Randolph Hearst, who had employed McCay several years earlier to provide 
illustrations for his newspapers, criticized the film for stirring support for a war he vehemently 
opposed.  
The film did resonate, however, with former president Theodore Roosevelt and his 
Preparedness Movement, a coalition of politicians and activists who had petitioned the Woodrow 
Wilson administration to expand the United States’ naval and military capabilities for self-
defense purposes. The sinking of the Lusitania, they assumed, was precisely what they needed to 
win favor from Wilson and Congress. In addition, the event turned Roosevelt into an avid 
cinephile, forcing him to recognize the rousing potential of propaganda films. In fact, Roosevelt 
was so enamored by the efficacy of motion pictures in aiding his Preparedness Movement that he 
served as an adviser on the infamous The Battle Cry of Peace (1915), the most controversial film 
of the war. The Battle Cry of Peace portrays American pacifists as clandestine moles working 
with the Central Powers to undermine the United States’ military. In the film, after the United 
States proves itself unable to defend its borders, the Central Powers invade the East Coast, raze 
New York City, and burn the White House to the ground. Roosevelt read the initial screenplay 
and offered his own embellishments and believed the film would “arouse in the heart of every 
American citizen a sense of his strict accountability to his government in time of need.”2 
Moreover, Roosevelt used his military connections to convince acting Major-General Leonard 
Wood, Commander of the Army of the East, to lend soldiers and supplies as extras and props in 
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the film. “I advocate military preparedness,” Roosevelt exclaimed with his characteristic 
robustness, “not for the sake of war, but for the sake of safeguarding this nation against war.”3 
Equating militarism with peacekeeping was simply absurd to the thousands of American 
pacifists who had protested against America’s entry into the global arms race. Pacifist groups 
had found themselves in the crosshairs of Roosevelt and his supporters, such as the Women’s 
Peace Party and the New York Peace Society, and were quick to challenge their interpretation of 
“preparedness.” Preparedness, they argued, did not translate to self-defense and was merely the 
preferred euphemism for warmongers committed to sending hordes of young American men into 
the trenches. For several months, the public and the press debated how the United States should 
respond to the Lusitania tragedy. As the debate raged on, interest in the war grew, stimulating 
the motion picture industry to produce more stylized war films. President Wilson was suspicious 
of defensive militarism but certainly did not want to appear weak in the wake of German 
aggression. Soon Wilson found himself receiving diplomatic advice from an unusual source: 
automobile tycoon and aspiring movie mogul Henry Ford.  
Ford was an outspoken critic of the war and initially opposed any intervention from the 
United States. After the sinking of the Lusitania, he and several prominent peace activists 
organized an unofficial diplomatic mission to create a conference for neutral powers at The 
Hague. The ultimate goal was to persuade the war’s belligerents into brokering a peace treaty. 
An ocean liner, which the press called the Peace Ship, transported Ford and his anti-war cohorts 
to Europe where they attempted unsuccessfully to meet with influential statesmen. The press 
widely ridiculed the expedition and lambasted Ford as naive and eccentric.  
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Scholars have also pegged the Peace Ship expedition as an immense failure. Leading 
biographer Steven Watts, for example, claimed it was “one of the most embarrassing episodes in 
Ford’s life.”4 Watts suggested that the plan was premature and felt like an introduction to 
something that never came into fruition. Though the initiative did not achieve its stated aims, it 
did highlight Ford’s arrival as a significant figure in the motion picture industry and did 
represent his first contribution to the Pax Cinemana. Ford was an unlikely advocate for motion 
pictures but he believed genuinely that they could help bring a permanent end to war.  
Ford’s illustrious career as an automobile manufacturer is widely known, but scholars 
have largely ignored his contributions to cinema. Conventional histories of Ford usually explore 
his Model T as the most popular automobile in the United States and his auto factory as the 
embodiment of American technological know-how. By 1913, a small team of workers at Ford’s 
Highland Park plant could assemble a complete Model T in less than two hours. The enthusiasm 
for automobiles even trumped that of motion pictures. An advertisement for stock in the 
Sunbeam Motion Picture Corporation, one of New York City’s many independent production 
houses, made this clear: “The Motion-picture business,” it declared confidently, “has become 
second only to the automobile in its amazing evolution from scientific toy to NECESSITY.”5 
Surprisingly, scholars have neglected Ford’s filmmaking career, which is unusual because in 
1915 he operated the single largest motion picture production and distribution house in the 
world, rivaling every major Hollywood studio.6 Leading historians Stephen Watts and Richard 
Snow, for example, never even mention Ford’s filmmaking career in their groundbreaking 
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biographies. Besides archivist Phillip Stewart’s important Investigator’s Guide to the Films 
Produced by the Ford Motor Company, researchers have overlooked the topic almost entirely.7 
The motion picture department of the Ford Motor Company is rarely mentioned alongside the 
Hollywood giants such as Fox, Paramount, RKO, Warner Bros., and Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer. 
However, its influence in making motion pictures a central feature of modern life was clearly 
significant. Whereas Hollywood’s Big Five were economic powerhouses that promoted cinema 
as constructive entertainment, the Ford Motor Company promoted it as a means of industrial and 
social welfare.  
Ford's tenure with motion pictures reveals a great deal about film’s application to 
everyday life. Before World War I, motion pictures were not widely considered a sophisticated 
art or a particularly profitable business venture. Films were considered cheap novelties that 
appealed primarily to the crude tastes of the working class. The expansion of cinema during 
World War I triggered a shift in the popular perception of motion pictures by demonstrating their 
practical capabilities on the battlefield and their ability to shape public opinion. Filmmakers and 
big business took note, and after 1914, much to their interrelated efforts, motion pictures would 
gradually permeate all facets of daily life, forcing reporters and the public to embrace their 
staying power. Ford was in the vanguard of this movement and his direct impact on the 
integration of motion pictures into American industry cannot be overstated. This chapter rethinks 
the Peace Ship voyage as a filmmaking effort that spurred Ford’s overlooked and 
underappreciated attempts to use motion pictures to improve his factories and foster an enduring 
world peace between 1914 and 1925. It analyzes how Ford conceived of peace and its 
relationship to American technology and manufacturing. 
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…………………………………………. 
Henry Ford’s first encounters with the power of film dates back to the eve of World War 
I, when he watched several guest filmmakers record the inner-workings of his Highland Park 
Plant. The event inspired him to use motion pictures to help train workers and improve 
efficiency. He sought the advice of his close friend Thomas Edison who had agreed to tutor him 
on the fundamentals of motion picture technology. Edison validated his decision to develop a 
motion picture department and appoint Ambrose Jewett—head of advertising at the Ford Motor 
Company—to oversee the operation. Besides using the motion picture department to improve the 
manufacturing process, Jewett also pushed it into the bourgeoning newsreel business and helped 
cement it as formidable competitor to the more widely known Pathe and Paramount studios. As 
tensions mounted in Europe after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Ford gradually 
recognized his film department as an instrument of peace.  
Ford first entered the mainstream peace debate when he provided the most widely 
discussed rebuttal to Roosevelt and his Preparedness Movement in an extended interview with 
The Detroit Free Press. Ford wanted to vent his frustrations with the ongoing war in Europe and 
sway Wilson to embrace the calls for peace despite the sinking of the Lusitania. According to 
Ford, “preparedness has never prevented war, but has ever brought war to the world.”8 Ford 
loathed not only the grotesque nature of trench combat but also its glamorous depiction in 
popular films. “For months,” Ford argued, “the people of the United States have had fear 
pounded into their brain by motion pictures.”9 He saw the war as a useless barrier to material and 
political progress. Because it disrupted the international flow of industrial production, he insisted 
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that all parties involved merited public condemnation. “I hate war,” Ford exclaimed bluntly, 
“because war is murder, desolation, and destruction … heartless to those of the human race who 
do not want it, the countless millions, the workers.”10 Leading newspaper outlets reprinted Ford’s 
frank assessment of the conflict throughout the country, immediately bringing it to the attention 
of prominent pacifists in search of sympathetic businessmen.  
Only a few months earlier, pacifists from around the world had convened at The Hague 
for the first World Peace Congress. The goal was to bring about an immediate arbitration 
between European statesmen and create an action plan to discourage future arms races. By 
bringing together nearly 1,200 delegates from over one dozen countries, the Peace Congress 
represented a “who’s who” of the anti-war movement. The names of celebrated religious, labor, 
and feminist figures dominated the attendee list, including Anita Augspurg, Lida Gustava 
Heymann, Aletta Jacobs, and Emily Balch. Jane Addams—influential social reformer and civil 
rights icon—represented the American delegation and worked closely with Louis Lochner—
journalist and executive director of the Emergency Peace Federation—to develop ideas to avoid 
American military expansion. Not surprisingly, Theodore Roosevelt mocked the event publicly 
in a lengthy diatribe that lambasted participants as “silly, base, noxious, futile, cowardly, 
illogical, weak minded, hypocritical, evil, and hysterical.”11 To Roosevelt, these men and women 
were the real-life incarnations of the villains in his beloved The Battle Cry of Peace. Addams and 
Lochner understood that many Americans shared Roosevelt’s cynical interpretation of their 
pacifist message. As a result, they convened with Jewish-Hungarian women’s rights activist 
Rosika Schwimmer to discuss plans for expanding outreach and attracting greater attention from 
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the Wilson administration. When Ford expressed his opposition to the war in The Detroit Free 
Press, this new triumvirate for peace immediately spotted an ally. 
Addams, Lochner, and Schwimmer understood fully that if they were going to have any 
chance of brokering a peace treaty between belligerent nations or forming an alliance between 
neutral nations, they needed to think beyond the confines of traditional statecraft. Will power and 
good intentions, they assumed, could only take them so far. An enduring peace would require 
money and unprecedented recognition, which in 1915 were synonymous with Henry Ford. Ford 
was without a doubt one of the most popular Americans in the world. His name was fixed to 
mass production and the assembly line, which reporters celebrated routinely as a testament to the 
United States’ unparalleled efficiency. Addams, Lochner, and Schwimmer consequently viewed 
Ford as a fellow champion of the Progressive Era. His emphasis on how the working class would 
suffer disproportionately if the United States were to enter the war echoed the concerns of those 
who had attended the Peace Congress at The Hague. Due to Addams’ reputation and extensive 
connections, Schwimmer and Lochner made contact with Ford’s secretaries and organized a 
meeting at his manor in Dearborn, Michigan.  
After a brief jaunt around Ford’s illustrious property, Lochner and Schwimmer floated 
their idea to Ford about the need for an ongoing neutrality conference at The Hague. The 
conference, spearheaded by delegates from the United States, would remain in session until all 
European states could agree to an armistice. As the most powerful industrial nation in the world, 
in addition to its highly publicized neutral status, the United States, Ford agreed, had the 
responsibility to unite neutral nations and broker a peace treaty between the Central Powers and 
the Entente. They knew President Wilson was eager for mediation talks and were hopeful that 
with Ford’s financial backing and celebrity status, they could convince Wilson to support the 
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initiative. After a brief deliberation, Ford, Lochner, and Schwimmer agreed to travel to New 
York City and Washington D.C. to promote their idea to both the press and the President.  
At the end of November, while en route to New York City, Ford and Lochner noticed a 
series of promotional posters for The Battle Cry for Peace. According to Lochner’s account, 
Ford scoffed at the gaudy advertisements. “I’ll certainly tell the newspaper boys what I think of 
that play.”12 The Battle Cry for Peace was based on the popular book Defenseless America by 
Hudson Maxim. Maxim was a chemist credited with inventing smokeless gunpowder and an 
array of explosives used extensively throughout the war. Maxim’s brother, Hiram Stevens 
Maxim, invented the Maxim gun, the world’s first practical, self-powered machine gun. 
Variations of their weapons were ubiquitous throughout the trenches as belligerents from each 
side volleyed explosives and bullets back and forth for months, leading to deadly stalemates. 
Together they helped revolutionize modern warfare and indirectly contributed to the deaths of 
millions. Consequently, the Maxim name was synonymous with munitions manufacturing in the 
United States. Hudson Maxim’s company, the Maxim Munitions Corporation, profited 
handsomely from the war. According to Ford, Maxim, who had actually made an appearance in 
The Battle Cry for Peace, was using the film to carry “his poison of fear into every part of the 
Union to make a market for his goods.”13  
Ford went as far as to take out a full-page proclamation in several major newspapers 
condemning The Battle Cry for Peace and other films like it. After openly criticizing what he 
considered an exploitative relationship between the military and the motion picture industry, 
Ford attacked the film, a major hit for the influential Vitagraph Company, as nothing but “plain 
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propaganda for the professional war merchants and munitions makers.”14 James Blackton—silent 
film pioneer and founder of Vitagraph—took Ford’s comments personally and retaliated with a 
partially successful libel suit against Ford for one million dollars.15 “Every sane man wants 
peace,” Blackton rebuked, “but the man who preaches against patriotism is beneath contempt 
and not entitled to manhood suffrage.”16 By 1915, Ford’s views on motion pictures had become 
closely intertwined with his views on politics and business. And, after discussing with Lochner 
and Schwimmer the need for a neutral conference at The Hague, Ford saw an opportunity to 
project an image of himself and his company as dignified pilgrims for peace throughout every 
movie theater in the country. 
Once arriving at their accommodations in New York City, Ford, Lochner and 
Schwimmer discussed how to best implement their peace plan in ways that seized public 
attention. Lochner suggested somewhat in jest that a special ship could transport the delegates 
from the United States to Norway before embarking for The Hague. The idea of such a trip 
intrigued Ford, who, according to Lochner, “had a native instinct for publicity.”17 Conceptually, 
the voyage was incredibly cinematic and perfect for newsreels. Images of conferences and 
mediation talks made for rather dull viewing. However, a ship filled with influential Americans 
sailing gallantly across the Atlantic with a message of world peace was dramatic and memorable. 
It stressed action over rhetoric. This appealed mightily to Ford, who had insisted on doing 
something to end the war rather than simply talking about it.18 Ford left the details of the trip to 
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his secretaries, who quickly organized a plan to use the Oscar II, a Scandinavian America Line 
steamship, to set sail from New York City to Oslo, Norway on December 4, 1915.   
Equipped with a ship and an experienced crew, Ford, Lochner, and Schwimmer hurried 
to assemble delegates. Because Ford was already an acquaintance on good terms with President 
Wilson and Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, he figured he could recruit them to join 
their voyage and reinforce its legitimacy. After exchanging brief pleasantries at the White House, 
Ford told Wilson bluntly, “I have today chartered a steamship. I offer it to you to send delegates 
to Europe. If you feel you can’t act, I will.”19 Much to Ford’s chagrin, Wilson declined his 
“invitation,” claiming that as president he had a responsibility to keep his options open to all 
suggestions for peace. In reality, Wilson had already begun formulating a plan to concede to the 
pressures of the Preparedness Movement and invest heavily in redeveloping the military. Even 
though the United States would not officially join the war until April 6, 1917, Wilson wanted to 
ensure that the American military could successfully thwart a full-scale German attack. William 
Jennings Bryan, one of the most outspoken pacifists in the country, followed suit with Wilson 
and also declined to participate. Though they both offered some parting words of good fortune, 
Wilson and Bryan’s absence was a major blow. Bryan was exceptionally popular among 
European diplomats and his lack of participation imbued the voyage with an impending sense of 
failure.  
Despite the setback, Ford invited representatives from over forty newspapers to gather at 
his hotel in New York City. The media had been buzzing for days because of Ford’s meeting at 
the White House and his intermittent insistence that he was preparing something “big.”20 In a 
crowded room of attentive reporters, Ford promoted his upcoming voyage across the Atlantic as 
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an attempt to “get the boys out of the trenches by Christmas.” These words appeared on the front 
page of dozens of newspapers and became the unofficial slogan for what the press dubbed the 
“Peace Ship.”21 
The public’s initial response to the Peace Ship was mixed. Many treated it as an 
extension of the social activism that had characterized the Progressive Era, while others 
dismissed it as pointless advertising for the Ford Motor Company.22 The New York Times, for 
example, discussed Ford as both courageous and painfully naive.23 Without Wilson and Bryan, 
Ford struggled to garner the full approval of the press. As a result, he sent Schwimmer and 
Lochner scrambling to find popular delegates only eleven days before their scheduled departure. 
Schwimmer sent an invitation to the governor of every American state as well as to prominent 
figures in pacifist and suffragist circles. Within only a few days, at least twelve governors had 
declined to participate.24 So too had several leading social reformers, including Jane Addams. Of 
the fifty-one official delegates to embark on the Peace Ship, Louis Hana, Governor of North 
Dakota, and Helen Ring Robinson, Colorado State Senator, were the only elected officials. Yet, 
Schwimmer and Lochner did bring influential persons to their ranks, including notable 
progressives like labor lawyer Inez Milholland, Unitarian minister Jenkin Lloyd Jones, and 
feminist Lola Maverick Lloyd. Even so, the Peace Ship certainly did not have anywhere near the 
number of statesmen needed to “get the boys out of the trenches.”  
In follow up interviews, Ford admitted that he had never actually believed he could end 
the war in only a few weeks. His real goal, he insisted, was changing the conversation from war 
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to peace. According to Ford, the Peace Ship was not a publicity stunt, but a sincere attempt to 
fight the Preparedness Movement by forcing the idea of peace to the forefront of the public’s 
attention.25 As an outspoken critic of propaganda films like The Battle Cry of Peace, Ford 
figured he too could use motion pictures to sway public opinion.   
In addition to inviting forty reporters, including a correspondent for Moving Picture 
Weekly, to accompany him on the Peace Ship, Ford also financed four newsreel cameramen.26 
Why Ford did not have anyone from his own motion picture department participate in the Peace 
Ship is unknown, but he probably did not want to validate his critics’ perception of the initiative 
as little more than an extended advertisement for Model Ts. Bringing aboard a personal film 
crew to document their activities would have certainly raised questions over the authenticity of 
any footage slated for exhibition. Yet, he still managed to assemble a team of experienced 
filmmakers from major film industry companies like Universal Moving Picture Company and 
Mutual Film Corporation.27  
News of Ford’s embrace of motion pictures made its way into various trade journals and 
came to the attention of Pathe studios. Pathe was about to release the three-reel documentary The 
Horrors of War (1916), a powerful account of Russia’s violent skirmishes with Turkish forces 
along the Black Sea. Ford was invited to a special screening of the film only a few days before 
embarking for Norway.28 Taking advantage of the Peace Ship’s substantial press coverage, Pathe 
likely figured that endorsements from Ford would bolster ticket sales. Though one might 
consider The Horrors of War an example of peace propaganda, it was a radical departure from 
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the exploitative and thematically explicit The Battle Cry of Peace. After viewing the film, Ford 
described its content accurately: 
The other day a moving picture plant showed me a picture of war. I saw a field covered 
with dead. Wounded men were kicking in agony. Other men came on and stripped them 
of their clothes. Then came wagons and the dead and half dead were piled on like so 
much cordwood. If pictures like that would be shown to the people, war would be 
stopped.29 
 
The surviving extant footage from the film shows that its primary focus was the human cost of 
war. Most of the film is a dizzying montage of corpses lining the roads of small Turkish villages 
in the midst of winter. The contrast between the dark mounds of bodies and the fresh white snow 
is striking and disturbing. The film never veers into trite sentimentalism and maintains a fly-on-
the-wall aesthetic reminiscent of cinema verite. Critics praised the film for its frank and honest 
depiction of what was happening overseas. Instead of including blurbs of praise from critics, 
however, advertisements for the film included a straightforward quotation from Ford: “The 
pictures that will stop this war.”30 
When the Peace Ship finally set sail on December 4, 1915, over ten thousand spectators 
and well-wishers had gathered at the docks to it bid farewell. The United States was still more 
than a year away from officially entering the war, but the public still grieved for those fighting in 
Europe. Newsreel cameras captured energetic crowds playing anti-war anthems like “Tell the 
Boys it is Time to Come Home” and brandishing signs with the words “Peace at any Price.” One 
reporter called the event “one of the most picturesque, as well as noisy, demonstrations ever 
witnessed in New York Harbor.”31 Even William Jennings Bryan made an impromptu 
appearance and praised the ship as the modern equivalent of Noah’s ark. While many were 
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supportive, others attended simply to scoff at what British newspapers had recently titled the 
“Ship of Fools.”32  
In the preceding days, the media had become increasingly vindictive toward Ford and the 
Peace Ship. Alton Parker, a New York Judge and former presidential candidate, likened Ford to 
“a clown strutting on the stage.”33 Others took aim at Ford’s last minute attempt to encourage 
gifted university students to abandon their studies and join the cause. James Day, Chancellor of 
Syracuse University, refused to pass Ford’s invitation along to any students, claiming that it was 
a “grotesque plan that will accomplish nothing but the ridicule of your country.”34 The event 
even bore some semblance of the Atlantic City boardwalk when popular astrologer and fortune-
teller Gustave Meyer “predicted” that the stars were not aligned in the Peace Ship’s favor. “The 
peace cruise is destined to fail,” Meyer prophesized ominously, noting that “the evil planet Mars 
was posted in the fifth mansion of the heavens as the Oscar II backed into the river.”35 Adding to 
the absurdity, Lawrence Darmour, a newsreel cameraman for Mutual Weekly, noted that 
someone left a cage full of squirrels at the dock with a sign reading “To the Good Ship Nutty.”36 
Despite it all, Ford and Lochner publicly defended the plan, insisting that reporters were 
committed to publishing only the “yellowest” kind of reception in order to smear their 
campaign.37 
Once on the open ocean, however, Ford’s optimism faded. Only three days into the 
voyage, Ford and his cohorts listened to a radio broadcast of President Wilson addressing 
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Congress and detailing his plans to expand the United States military. “Preparation for defense,” 
Wilson said plainly, “seems to me to be absolutely imperative now.”38 For the delegates aboard 
the Peace Ship, the words pierced like a dagger. Wilson had finally caved to the rabid demands 
of the Preparedness Movement. With each individual having a seemingly conflicting plan to 
respond to Wilson’s decision, a heated debate erupted between the delegates. They all assumed 
correctly that Wilson’s remarks would instigate the United States’ gradual march to the trenches. 
According to Lochner, the newspaper reporters leapt “like a pack of hungry wolves” to detail the 
internal strife.39 Within one week, dozens of major newspapers were mocking the ironic “War on 
Ford’s Peace Ship.”40 Even though the newsreel cameramen neglected to capture any of the on-
ship drama, film critics still chimed in, citing Mack Sennett’s latest work as “some of the best 
comedy scenes since Henry Ford’s peace ship.”41 
Matters continued to take a turn for the worse when Ford contracted influenza several 
days later. The illness rendered him incapacitated in his private cabin. Since Ford isolated 
himself, rumors began to spread that he might have passed away. Once the ship arrived in Oslo 
on December 18, Ford fled to his hotel and only intermittently spoke with his colleagues or the 
press. Heeding the advice of his wife and secretaries, Ford left the group in secret on Christmas 
Eve and boarded a passenger liner en route to New York City. When Lochner, Schwimmer, and 
the rest of the peace delegates arrived in Sweden on Christmas morning, they all reconciled 
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themselves to the fact that Ford had abandoned them. Not only had they not gotten “the boys out 
of the trenches,” but they were also without their leader.42 
Without Ford, the media’s interest in the initiative diminished quickly. Once the activities 
of the Peace Ship stopped making headlines, the newsreel cameramen left on other assignments. 
Lawrence Darmour of Mutual Weekly, for example, followed the party to Copenhagen, but left to 
shoot skiing competitions instead.43 Others, like Joseph Rucker of Universal Weekly, became 
frustrated when government officials prohibited them from bringing their equipment into 
Germany while traveling through to The Hague.44 The challenging logistics of moving film stock 
during wartime, coupled with waning interest among the public, forced most newsreel 
cameramen to leave the peace party by late January. Even though the expedition eventually held 
a peace conference with a few official representatives from Sweden, Norway, and Finland, this 
did little to end the war. By the end of 1916, the expedition had fallen into obscurity.  
Ford continued to fund the operation until he abruptly withdrew all support for it in 
February 1917. When Woodrow Wilson made it clear that America’s entry into the war was 
inevitable, Ford reluctantly agreed to throw the support of his company behind the Allied war 
effort. “If this war is to be won,” Ford contended, “it will be won by the nation that knows best 
how to use tools and machinery [and] knows the secret of quantity production through 
standardization.”45 In spite of his opposition to war, Ford played an influential role in World War 
I. His company mass-produced the Liberty Engine, which powered the bulk of the Allies’ aircraft 
and supplied British farmers with much needed tractors. In addition, Ford filled the front lines 
with Model Ts, the most widely used vehicle throughout the conflict. Ford’s motion picture 
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department captured all of these activities in newsreel footage, which became a popular source of 
correspondence on the domestic front and promoted the role of Ford Motors in supporting the 
Allied cause.  
The decision to convert his factories into armories deeply disturbed Lochner, 
Schwimmer, and the other peace delegates. “Henry Ford deserted his ship,” Lochner remarked, 
“abandoned was his pacifism … abandoned were his views against ‘preparedness’ and 
militarism.”46 Speculating on what could have provoked Ford to dismiss his pledge to peace, 
Locher assumed that his associates had told him “the interests of his business were permanently 
threatened by the nature of his peace propaganda.”47 To save his business, Lochner surmised, 
Ford believed he had to drop his pacifism. On the surface, Lochner’s assessment of Ford’s 
decision to support the war effort made sense. However, a closer inspection of Ford’s treatment 
of war and peace reveals that Lochner had misinterpreted Ford’s worldview from the start. 
Ford’s understanding of world peace, as well as his understanding of how it could be obtained, 
was fundamentally different from that of orthodox pacifists like Lochner. 
Indeed, Ford was never a true pacifist. He had little interest in political theory or the 
nuance of diplomacy, and he had an incredibly myopic view of the war’s origins. Ford had made 
this perfectly clear to the press in the days leading up to the Peace Ship’s departure, when he told 
The New York Times that he believed clandestine munitions manufacturers were driving the 
conflict for personal gain. Refuting his critics’ assertion that he and his party were little more 
than childish do-gooders, Ford asserted that the Peace Ship was “not a sentimental proposition 
but a business proposition.”48 These words should have been a red flag for Lochner and 
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Schwimmer. Blinded by their idealism and own ambitions, they ignored Ford’s guiding 
principles. By stressing the importance of business in peacekeeping, Ford diverged from the 
basic ideology of his cohorts. “I do not like the word ‘peace’ as a word,” he continued, “Peace 
means nothing … I like the word ‘construction.’ Construction is what a useful manufacturer 
does.”49 Ford believed sincerely that because the profits from the arms trade were fleeting, he 
had to promote an enduring peace in order to protect industrial prosperity.  
Ford equated world peace with the ability to conduct business both domestically and 
abroad in order to maximize productivity. He ascribed to the fundamental tenets of Fredrick 
Taylor and scientific management. Greater productivity, he assumed, would lead to higher 
profits, which would lead to better wages, which would lead to a shorter working day and a 
higher standard of living for the masses. Because war threatened this pattern, it had to be averted. 
Mass production, Ford assumed rather incorrectly, would free hard-pressed Americans from 
basic struggles for subsistence, granting them ample time to participate in civic life and thereby 
eliminate the special interest groups that encouraged war. Ford was a humanitarian who cared 
deeply about the physical cost of war, but he also considered his business interests at all times. 
Peace and business were not at all mutually exclusive. To Ford, they were one and the same. The 
Peace Ship, Ford declared, was meant to force “the capitalists see that peace is practicable—that 
peace offers new opportunities for production.”50 
When Ford turned his back on the Peace Ship and discontinued all funding, Lochner and 
many other peace delegates ironically embraced communism. In a diatribe echoing the spirit of 
Karl Marx, Lochner described his newfound hope in a working class revolution: 
Our eyes were opened. … We returned convinced that, so long as the profit system which 
continually seeks new markets and which unceasingly finds itself in competition with 
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other concession hunters remains, permanent peace cannot be achieved. … We saw that 
our idealism availed little against a system built upon the exploitation of the many by the 
few.51  
 
To Lochner and many of the other peace delegates, Ford was now one of the capitalist elites 
working against the greater good. Ford, however, made no secret of his worldview, which 
historian Barbara Kraft summed up appropriately as “What was good for the business of the Ford 
Motor Company was good for America, and what was good for America was good for the 
world.”52 Though Ford ultimately abandoned the Peace Ship, he did not abandon his belief that 
industry, with the aid of motion pictures, would help secure an enduring peace based on free and 
open markets. 
 The Peace Ship experience fueled Ford’s growing interest in motion pictures. After the 
incident, Ford greatly expanded his role in the newsreel industry and the role of motion pictures 
in the operations of his plants. Thomas Edison, one of the founders of the medium, supported his 
close friend’s newfound interest. Ford tried desperately to convince Edison to partake in the 
Peace Ship expedition but Edison ultimately refused. He did, however, join the thousands of 
spectators at New York Harbor to wish Ford farewell. Perhaps more than any other event, this 
brief exchange symbolized the transition of motion pictures from the hands of independent 
inventors to those of large-scale system-builders.  
As Thomas Hughes and other scholars have made clear, system-builders dominated 
technological innovation after World War I. Technological systems typically refer to large-scale 
electrical, communication, transportation, production, and military networks that function as the 
foundation of modern society. They consist of both physical components—the actual ‘nuts-and-
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bolts’ that make the system operate—and social, political, and economic components that shape 
and are shaped by the system itself. Ford oversaw one of the most visible technological systems 
on the planet, which partly explained his popularity. The influence of his system extended far 
beyond the walls of his plants. It marshaled an unprecedented amount of labor and resources 
between several continents. Ford Motors directly and indirectly employed hundreds of thousands 
of workers via a supply chain that connected brutal rubber plantations in Africa to assembly lines 
in Michigan. The chief business of Ford Motors represented far more than automobile 
production. Its chief business was building an American society dependent and structured upon 
automobiles. Ford realized that motion pictures could help accomplish this goal.  
Though Ford’s style of manufacturing made him a household name, few appreciated the 
role motion pictures played in its success. Ford was without a doubt the first industrialist to 
incorporate motion pictures into what he called “the System.” After careful observation and 
gradual testing, Ford and his managers found motion pictures increasingly beneficial to the flow 
of production. Ford treated the application of motion pictures to his system of production the 
same way he treated any new technology. Within two years after its inception, his motion picture 
department had twenty-four full-time employees and dominated the fourth floor of the Highland 
Park Plant. When Carl Gregory, a writer for Moving Picture World, visited Ford’s motion picture 
department in December 1917, he was shocked to find a state-of-the-art studio equipped with a 
fleet of 35mm cameras. Like a well-oiled machine, Gregory noted, Ford’s “motion picture 
laboratory” had been broken down into thirteen interrelated parts: administration, studio, art, film 
stock, enlarging, developing, processing, title-making, printing, perforating, drying, assembly, 
and shipping. Likening the department to the assembly line on the factory floor, Gregory stressed 
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that “nothing is left to chance and the human element is eliminated in the making of Ford 
moving pictures.”53   
The Peace Ship episode taught Ford a great deal about cinema’s potential as a form of 
mass communication. With the intention, as he put it, “to inform the masses of America about 
America and to inform the masses of other lands about America,” Ford created one of the first 
popular educational film series.54 The Ford Animated Weekly—later renamed the Ford 
Educational Weekly—were short documentaries that examined American industry, technology, 
government, and society. Ford thought that his Weekly, as it was commonly referenced, could 
function as an independent news source capable of enlightening and inspiring. After securing a 
distribution deal with Goldywn Pictures in 1918, the Weekly became perhaps the most ubiquitous 
motion picture series in the world. In fact, its national availability rivaled that of any major print 
publication. It screened weekly in approximately 4,000 theaters for several million Americans. 
The series proved so popular that Ford’s motion picture department had them translated 
into almost a dozen languages and exported to theaters in Europe, South America, and Africa. 
The United States federal government took note and adopted many Weekly films for use in 
Foreign Service programs. “What the Peace Ship failed to do,” one reporter noted, “the Weekly 
may more surely accomplish.”55 Ford equipped the Weekly camera crew with a portable studio 
that allowed them to travel the United States and produce hundreds of films ranging from fifteen 
to twenty minutes. Though the series covered everything from sporting events to presidential 
elections, most of them were of the “Making of” variety.  
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By dramatizing the production of everyday items, such as pottery, shoes, cut glass, and of 
course automobiles, Ford hoped “to acquaint the general public with the technical side of 
America’s industrial world.”56 Ford believed earnestly that Americans possessed a natural 
technical know-how that required his support. Film journals and magazines celebrated Ford for 
expanding the motion picture industry and addressing head on, as one reporter noted, “the fact 
that most Americans have been woefully ignorant of the fundamental technical foundations of 
our modern industrial civilization.”57 Because his films revealed what he considered “real 
America,” Ford, the world’s most celebrated system-builder, came to see his Weekly as a 
legitimate purveyor of global democracy and capitalism.58 For his films to reach the largest 
audience, however, Ford knew that he had to think beyond theaters. Consequently, his motion 
picture department gradually turned its attention to public schools. 
The war forced educators to confront motion picture’s unprecedented persuasive power 
on the minds of youth. As a result, dozens of new organizations and journals, like the 
International Educational Cinemotographic Institute and Visual Education, emerged to analyze 
how motion pictures could best educate students on the realities of war. Henry Ford and his 
Weekly were involved heavily in these discussions. “Henry Ford,” proclaimed an advertisement 
for the Weekly, “has felt there should a great, powerful screen educator beyond the reach or 
influence of propaganda.”59 Because governments both foreign and domestic could not control 
																																								 																				
56	Jerome	Lachenbruch,	“Technique	of	American	Industry	Shown	on	the	Screen,”	Moving	Picture	Age,	March	1920,	
19.	
57	Lachenbruch,	19.	
58	“$1,000,000	a	Year	Invested	to	Maintain	the	Quality	of	the	Ford	Educational	Weekly,”	Motion	Picture	News,	
February	1,	1919,	654.	
59	“$1,000,000	a	Year	Invested	to	Maintain	the	Quality	of	the	Ford	Educational	Weekly,”	Motion	Picture	News,	
February	1,	1919,	654.	
	 86	
Ford’s films, advertisements from immediately after the war insisted that they had “attained an 
importance greater than they ever had before.”60 
The Weekly raised awareness of the possibilities of incorporating motion pictures into 
school curriculum. Ford’s motion picture department worked first with public schools in Detroit 
to produce a series of history and geography films. The films were popular with the Board of 
Education of Detroit, which encouraged their adoption into schools throughout the Midwest. By 
1920, the Weekly had made its way into thousands of public schools and nearly every YMCA in 
the country. Some overzealous superintendents, like John Cole of the Chicago Board of 
Education, went so far as to suggest that films like the Weekly would soon supplant the need for 
textbooks.61 His enthusiasm mirrored the unusual amount of faith many Americans had in 
corporations. The only ethical controversy surrounding the Weekly stemmed not from fears of a 
private company steering the content of public education but from the possibility of classroom 
fires. Film stock was highly flammable. In fact, Ford’s motion picture department always 
championed its independence from the state as one of its key strengths and selling points. Ford 
considered this when he exercised the idea of running for a seat in the United States Senate. 
When Ford decided to support the Allied war effort, he had to reevaluate his former 
adherence to isolationist politics. His anti-war views did not waver, but he did find himself 
enthusiastically in support of Wilson and the League of Nations. He was certain the United 
States needed to tighten its grip over world affairs. The Republican resistance to Woodrow 
Wilson’s League of Nations troubled Ford. He was certain that the postwar peace hinged on the 
establishment of an international body founded on anti-war ideals and spearheaded by the United 
States. The League of Nations, he figured, would protect American business interests and 
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champion systems of mass production. Though his Weekly only occasionally addressed these 
politics explicitly, Ford did think it could play a role in projecting American democracy and 
industry abroad. Wilson took note of Ford’s anti-war values and growing influence in 
educational circles and personally persuaded him to run for office. Ford’s home state of 
Michigan was always hotly contested and Wilson was certain that a Ford victory could help him 
secure the few Democratic votes needed to push Congress in favor of the League. Even though 
Ford had no clear affiliations with any political party, Wilson told him, "You are the only man in 
Michigan who can be elected and help bring about the peace you so desire.”62  
Ford narrowly lost the election by only a few thousand votes. Widespread condemnation 
of the Peace Ship certainly played a role in securing the Republican victory. Former Michigan 
Governor Chase Osborn, for example, claimed Ford’s “ridiculous ‘peace ship’ enterprise, which 
was criminal if done for advertising purposes, and insane if sincere, disqualifies him.”63 Ford’s 
loss came as a surprise to Wilson because only two years earlier Ford had actually won the 
Republican presidential primary in Michigan without even campaigning. However, the 
experience had little impact on Ford. He knew that his contributions to peacekeeping would 
come from shaping American industry and its systems of mass production instead of 
government. 
Edward Filene, an American businessman and activist credited with popularizing credit 
unions, was an associate of Ford’s who articulated better than anyone the idea that mass 
production could cultivate world peace. Filene did not partake in Ford’s Peace Ship but did share 
his concern over the use of motion pictures in spreading pro-war propaganda. Filene hoped to 
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eliminate international misunderstanding by strengthening the United States’ role in arbitration. 
Like Ford, Filene believed that an enduring peace would require the assistance of benevolent 
businessmen. According to Filene, “world peace has now become not only a practical possibility, 
but the logical outcome of successful business methods.”64 Ford shared this sentiment but was 
not too successful at explaining it. Filene published several popular books that championed 
Ford’s manufacturing system and called for the full-scale “Fordizing” of American life.65  
Filene was one of a number of vocal businessmen who believed that the roots of war lay 
almost entirely in the public’s ability to access goods and services. In the machine age, Filene 
argued, world peace depended little upon how much activists or politicians wanted it, but rather 
upon how well industrial machinery provided for the material necessities of the masses. 
Rejecting Marxist interpretations of conflict, Filene claimed that there was no need for a 
revolution where the working class takes control of the means of production. Instead, the state 
and the public should encourage talented system-builders, like Ford, to operate their plants at the 
greatest capacity possible. By mass-producing all material goods, Filene assumed quite 
incorrectly that traditional classes would become obsolete as prices for goods and services 
became affordable to all. A Fordized America did not mean a standardized America where every 
citizen had identical automobiles, homes, clothes, and other commodities. It referred to a society 
where all industries achieved such high levels of efficiency and productivity that the public could 
work only a few hours a day yet return home with unprecedented purchasing power. Filene 
summed up the idea accordingly: 
Mass production, in a word, includes the whole world through serving the whole world. It 
does not, and it can not, leave anybody out of its benefits. It destroys antagonism on the 
part of consumers by making prices as low as possible, and on the part of workers by 
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making wages as high as possible; and it undermines the whole incentive to war by 
making world exchange as profitable to everybody as it can possibly be.66 
 
This vision of a completely Fordized world represented what Filene and Ford considered the 
highest stage of capitalism. Filene’s ideas reflected the larger pro-business attitudes characteristic 
of American culture at that time. 
Many American businessmen and politicians in the 1920s believed that corporations had 
a positive influence on world affairs. When President Calvin Coolidge stated plainly “the chief 
business of the American people is business,” he recognized fully that many Americans viewed 
big business as one of the primary missionaries for their ideals. As an engine for the spread of 
liberal democracy and capitalism, American business could aid the State Department’s desire to 
secure markets abroad and preserve the postwar peace. Conveniently, Coolidge, like most 
American policy-makers of the era, figured that international peace and the interests of humanity 
aligned with the economic interests of the United States. Bestselling author Bruce Barton even 
went so far as to promote the expansion of American business as a holy endeavor. 
 Barton championed Jesus as the founder of American business in his influential book 
The Man Nobody Knows, which reframed the Gospels as a model for American corporations. By 
fixing big business to Christianity, Barton laid bare one of the central features of the era. He 
sanctified technological system-builders like Henry Ford and promoted industrial centers like 
Gary, Indiana as the New Jerusalem. “American business,” Barton praised, “was the salvation of 
the world.”67 His lofty ideas were emblematic of the wider appreciation for American industry 
and technology, which motion pictures had only recently come to signify. Of all the businessmen 
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revered for advancing the interests of the United States, none garnered as much attention and 
enthusiasm as Ford. 
Ford recognized that motion pictures could serve his unique brand of mass production 
and scientific management. The commissioning of dozens of instructional films helped improve 
his production process. His managers collaborated with the motion picture department to record 
workers on the factory floor in an earnest attempt to streamline production. Motion pictures were 
a valuable aid in time studies, allowing managers to locate areas of production prone to 
unnecessary tasks, worker fatigue, and even sabotage. Moreover, instructional films showed 
workers precisely what an ideal performance on the factory floor looked like. From welding to 
painting, cameramen captured every particular, piecemeal task. In fact, many workers, unaware 
that they had been recorded, were surprised to see themselves during one of Ford’s many 
mandatory employee film screenings. At the plants in Highland Park and Dearborn, managers 
screened films for approximately three-hundred workers every day. Equipped with fully-
functioning theaters, the plants, according to one observer, used films to stress “discipline, order, 
and system.”68 This was fitting, for the motion picture camera, he suggested, was essentially 
Fordism in a box.  
Though it would be an exaggeration to say that the instructional films functioned as a 
form of overt surveillance, some observers, including silent film comedian Charlie Chaplin, 
found the Ford system cold and alienating. In perhaps the most iconic scene in Chaplin’s 
landmark film Modern Times (1931), a Henry Ford lookalike emerges frequently on a large 
screen to bark orders at assembly workers teetering on the brink of insanity. Ford, however, 
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insisted that his films were not a means of control and in reality had the best interest of his 
workers at heart.  
The Ford motion picture department produced dozens of safety films to help prevent 
injury and death on the factory floor. Safety films were an important part of the larger Safety 
First movement that improved working conditions considerably in the first half of the twentieth 
century. The Safety First movement was a joint effort between the federal government, labor 
unions, and large railroad, mining, and manufacturing firms to lower accident rates in the 
workplace.69 The deadly Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire of 1911 triggered public outcry and 
raised awareness about the United States’ exceptionally dangerous production practices. Pressure 
from Progressive reformers and the public forced the federal government to enact workers’ 
compensation laws to protect employees from negligence. These laws dramatically increased the 
costs related to workplace accidents, thereby giving employers an incentive to improve safety. 
Heeding these developments, Ford recognized that films could be as effective as proper 
guardrails, signage, vents, exhausters, and air conditioning units at protecting workers from 
harm. Edward Filene credited the strong safety standards at Ford’s plants as one of the major 
reasons why the United States needed to fully “Fordize.”70 
Safety films tended to operate under the false assumption that workplace accidents were 
almost always the result of human error. They were an extension of time-honored common law 
practices which had placed the onus for workplace injuries entirely on workers rather than 
employers. However, for the first time on a large scale, states started recognizing that even 
though workers had the freedom to quit their jobs if they felt they were too dangerous, this did 
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not inherently absolve employers like Ford of liability. As a result, many safety films 
demonstrated the need for employees to monitor one another’s actions and never veer from 
standard procedure. The films made occasional “suggestions” on how workers could improve 
themselves and their home life. Abstaining from alcohol and gambling were often at the 
forefront. Ford, like most industrialists of his era, was a supporter of prohibition and treated 
alcohol as a threat to workplace safety and thus his interests. This garnered him nods from many 
publications, like Visual Education and Moving Picture World, which often praised safety films 
for allowing non-English speakers the possibility of seeing precisely how and why accidents 
occur. “Experience has shown,” one reporter noted, “that these pictures are a powerful force in 
educating the workers, especially of foreign birth … their minds readily grasp the universal 
language—pictures.”71  Some reporters even went so far as to credit safety films with helping 
“Americanize” foreign workers.  
It was not uncommon for safety films to be screened alongside broader educational films 
that championed American business and values. The management at Chicago North Shore 
Railroad Company, for example, loved safety films because they taught the “foreign-born men 
much-needed lessons in health, sanitation, American history, and American standards of 
living.”72 Ford similarly championed his company’s safety films because they allowed his 
workers, the majority of whom hailed from Central and Eastern Europe, an opportunity to 
comprehend the technological systems of the United States. To Hugh Frayne, general organizer 
of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), safety films were the greatest “Americanizing, 
civilizing, and humanizing influence in the world.” For industrial workers, he argued 
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passionately, “the motion pictures are of the most potent value as they stamp upon the minds of 
the uneducated, constructive picture lessons and afford them a chance to read with the eye.”73  
Despite the condescending and paternal undertones to safety films, they proved 
undeniably effective. Management at the Ford Motor Company traced a gradual decrease in 
accidents following the first year of screening safety films.74 Though Ford made no secret of his 
disdain for organized labor, the various trade unions acknowledged the efficacy of his films and 
helped enforce Ford’s dubious reputation as an ally to the working class. Safety films screened 
every afternoon after the completion of the first shift. Management actually provided workers 
with tickets the day prior to the film’s screening, which usually lasted anywhere between forty-
five minutes and an hour. Despite Ford’s reputation as something of a stoic curmudgeon, he 
insisted that his films needed to be at least relatively entertaining. To hold workers’ attention, the 
films had to have plot, characters, action, drama, and even occasional moments of humor. 
Though titles for his safety films, like Making Wheels for Automobiles, appear less than exciting, 
Ford was adamant that his films were not dry and that his employees enjoyed them genuinely. “I 
have seen people shed tears,” one proponent of Ford-style safety films exclaimed, “over these 
films time and again.”75 With safety films, Ford took the Safety First campaign to a new level.  
Inspired by Ford’s idea to blend entertainment with safety instruction, field representatives for 
insurance companies made sure that nearly every major American business had integrated safety 
films into their training programs by the mid-1920s.  
Those companies who shared Ford’s safety film template, such as US Steel, DuPont, 
General Electric, New York Central Railroad, and American Smelting and Refining, brought the 
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cinema into the working life of millions of Americans. “Today,” a reporter noted in 1923, “safety 
movies are penetrating remote corners of the country. … Even the miner at work below the 
surface of the earth is visited by the safety movie man.”76 Throughout the 1920s, motion pictures 
spread far beyond traditional theatrical circuits and into coalmines, lumberyards, railroad cars, 
and factories. Of course, these developments cannot be credited only to Ford. Historians have, 
though, failed to recognize one way in which he was a pioneer in the Safety First campaign. By 
demonstrating how films could be integrated into production methods and used as learning tools 
on a large-scale, Ford played a critical role in making motion pictures a ubiquitous facet of 
everyday labor.  
Ford’s reputation as a film producer continued to grow in the 1920s. Lyne Metcalfe, a 
journalist for popular film journals, championed Ford’s motion picture department as the “First 
Altruistic Movie Enterprise.”77 However, once Ford started to become dangerously outspoken 
about his anti-Semitic views, key figures in the American film industry lost interest in his work. 
His anti-Semitism gradually put him at odds with his partners at Goldwyn Pictures, who had for 
several years agreed to distribute his Weekly throughout the national theatrical circuit. Ford’s 
distrust and eventual hatred of what he considered a Jewish capitalist elite is well known today. 
Adolf Hitler infamously embraced Ford as an American hero and kept a painted mural of him in 
his office. Between 1920 and 1927, Ford published a series of anti-Semitic articles in his newly 
purchased Dearborn Weekly, which contained a regular report on the affairs of the “Jewish 
menace.” Eventually, Ford had these articles assembled into The International Jew, a four-
volume compendium dedicated to exposing a fraudulent, yet widely believed, Jewish plot to 
control the global economy. When the press pressured Ford to address the origins of his anti-
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Semitism, he contended that it was his former peace delegates Rosika Schwimmer and Herman 
Bernstein, who had convinced him of a Jewish plot to undermine world peace: 
On the Peace Ship were two very prominent Jews. We had not been to sea 200 miles 
before these two Jews began telling me about the power of the Jewish race, how they 
controlled the world through their control of gold and that the Jew, and no one but the 
Jew, could stop the war … I was so disgusted that I would have liked to have turned the 
ship back. … When I got back to the United States I still had in mind what the Jews had 
told me. I was determined that the situation should be made clear to the people of the 
United States through publicity.78 
 
Schwimmer and Bernstein denied Ford’s version of the events as fantasy.79 Sadly, however, 
Ford’s anti-Semitic values were tragically contagious and helped spread the false conspiracy that 
a body of international Jews was responsible for World War I and the United States’ refusal to 
join the League of Nations. 
In 1924, Goldwyn Pictures merged with Metro Pictures Corporation and Louis B. Mayer 
Pictures to form Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM). The merger troubled Ford. Samuel Goldwyn—
the Jewish-American founder of Goldwyn Pictures—ultimately decided to dissolve his 
partnership with Ford in 1926. Goldwyn cited the increasing cost of distributing the Weekly as 
the deciding factor. It was uncertain at that time how much Ford’s anti-Semitism played in the 
decision but it did occur the same year that Stuart Blackton sold the Vitagraph Company to 
Warner Bros., cementing the Big Five as the only major film studios in the United States. 
Because Jewish-Americans had initially founded and owned the Big Five studios, Ford became 
increasingly hostile to the larger film industry.  
Though film historians traditionally refer to the Big Five’s dominance of Hollywood 
between 1926 and 1939 as a “Golden Age,” Ford viewed it as an immediate threat to postwar 
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peace. His International Jew contained several chapters criticizing Jews for “taking control of 
the powerful projecting force of motion pictures” and lacing them with “an influence that is 
racially, morally, and idealistically foreign to America.”80 Ford’s remarks became central to one 
of the first hate crime cases in the United States after Aaron Sapiro, celebrated activist and 
lawyer, sued Ford for inciting violence against American Jews. Sapiro boasted that the 
Hollywood studios, particularly MGM, “were proud of me because I had brought Henry Ford on 
his knees before them.”81 After severing ties with Ford, MGM and the other studios transformed 
the American motion picture industry into a vertically integrated business empire that oversaw 
all facets of film production, distribution, and exhibition from the top down. Ironically, the 
operation closely resembled the structure of Ford’s motion picture department. 
In the late 1920s, Ford’s status as a movie mogul waned considerably. It would be an 
exaggeration to say that Ford’s anti-Semitism was the sole reason for the eventual collapse of his 
motion picture business. However, it did hurt his reputation as the first altruistic moviemaker. 
Though many Americans agreed with Ford’s anti-Semitic attitude toward Hollywood, such 
attitudes did not resonate with the cosmopolitan film critics and journalists who had once revered 
him and certainly did not endear him to movie moguls like Louis Mayer and Carl Lamaelle. 
Because of his comments, Moving Picture World sarcastically awarded Ford the “world’s 
championship stupidity prize.”82 Photoplay was much harsher, pegging him as “contemptible, 
archaic, and a menace to civilization.”83 The historical record shows that Ford genuinely 
believed that a Jewish conspiracy involving the motion picture industry was working to 
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undermine the spread of democracy and the interests of the United States. How much he believed 
his motion picture department could challenge this phantom menace is unknown. Ford’s anti-
Semitic brand of pacifism reflected one of the many contradictions that plagued discussions over 
the nature of the postwar peace. However, Ford’s influence on spreading enthusiasm for motion 
pictures proved enduring.
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Chapter Three 
Ravished Armenia and the Pursuit of International Justice 
On the afternoon of April 11, 1919, officials guided Kemal Bey into the heart of Beyazit Square, 
a historic public space in Constantinople, Turkey. At the close of the fourth century, Constantine 
the Great had commissioned the building of the square to serve as an intermediary between the 
surrounding churches and civic centers. It was an ideal spot for meeting, conversing, eating, and 
walking. Over 1500 years later, conceptually, little had changed: couched between the celebrated 
Bayezid II Mosque and the Imperial University (now Istanbul University), Beyazit Square’s 
primary function had remained. It is unlikely, however, that Kemal Bey, a former governor of 
three provinces in the Ottoman Empire, considered any of this as an official lowered a noose 
around his neck, tightening it appropriately. Somerset Gough-Calthorpe, the British military 
general of Constantinople, watched confidently as Kemal Bey’s standing-platform was removed, 
making him the latest victim of the square’s secondary function, public execution. Kemal Bey, 
according to Calthorpe, received the only punishment suitable for “a perpetrator of crimes, the 
nature of which would send a shudder through any civilized Community.”1  
 Three days earlier, Lieutenant-General Mustafa Nazim, one of the acting presidents of the 
Turkish courts-martial, had read the verdict for Kemal Bey’s role in the systematic deportation 
and execution of hundreds of thousands of Armenian citizens in the Ottoman Empire. Heeding 
the logic of hierarchical accountability and command responsibility, the Turkish courts-martial 
concluded that Kemal Bey “created, with premeditation, the circumstances in which that tragedy 
could be perpetrated.” According to Nazim, Kemal Bey’s actions cultivated “mortal sins and 
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crimes under the precepts of Islam and are contrary to the principles of humanity and 
civilization.”2 His verdict was quite radical; the concept of “humanity” did not fit easily within 
preexisting legal discourse, particularly in authoritarian Turkey. Eleven thousand miles away, 
this surely came as pleasant news to eighteen-year-old Aurora Mardiganian, an Armenian 
refugee to the United States and survivor of Kemal Bey’s “death marches.”  
 While Kemal Bey was hanged, Mardiganian was busy promoting the release of Ravished 
Armenia, a Hollywood silent film based on her brutal experiences at the hands of the Young 
Turks. Ravished Armenia, the first feature film to depict genocide, starred Mardiganian as 
herself, and promised audiences an “accurate” and “authentic” representation of “the greatest 
tragedy of the world.”3 Henry Morgenthau, former American Ambassador to Turkey, praised the 
film for its precision and immaculate production. The film, directed by Oscar Apfel and 
produced by the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, raised approximately 
thirty million dollars in aid and boosted international awareness of the genocide. “This is not a 
charity,” one newspaper reported, “It is a chance to give to the relief of suffering humanity. It is 
a cause that appeals to the heart of every humane man and woman.”4 The film’s marketers 
promoted Ravished Armenia as more than entertainment; it was an opportunity to remedy a 
crime that had apparently extended well beyond the official borders of the Ottoman Empire. The 
film, like Nazim’s verdict, echoed an earlier warning the Triple Entente had made to the 
Ottoman Empire in 1915.  
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 After learning of the massacre of tens of thousands of Armenians in the province of Van, 
the Triple Entente made it perfectly clear to the Ottoman Empire that it would not escape the all-
encompassing Hand of Justice: “In view of these new crimes of Turkey against humanity and 
civilization, the Allied Governments announce publicly to the Sublime Porte that they will hold 
personally responsible for these crimes all members of the Ottoman Government, as well as 
those of their agents who are implicated in such massacres.”5 Thirty years before the Nuremberg 
Trials, the notion of “crimes against humanity” had arisen due to the Young Turks’ systematic 
eradication of the Ottoman Empire’s Armenian population. It was a landmark moment in the 
history of international law: Kemal Bey became the first person to hang for breaking the new 
code of universal morality.  
Millions of Armenian sympathizers in the West championed the verdict. “ARMENIANS 
AVENGED,” popular headlines read, challenging contemporary historians’ rendering of the 
Armenian Holocaust as the “forgotten genocide,” an odd designation considering the fact that by 
1920, it had, in the Western world, become perhaps the most widely discussed humanitarian 
issue of all time.6 The Armenian genocide encompassed several waves of mass killings: 
beginning with the Hamidian massacres of 1894-1896, when the Ottoman Empire sanctioned the 
killings of between 80,000 and 300,000 Armenians in an effort to reassert control of the 
Armenian territory after the Russo-Turkish War; and continuing under the veil of World War I, 
when the ultra-nationalist Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) organized the large-scale 
deportation and elimination of Armenians from all Ottoman provinces, resulting in the deaths of 
another one and a half million. Armenians were a convenient scapegoat for Ottoman officials 
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because they had a reputation for pushing for internal reforms and did not conform to popular 
interpretations of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism. Reports on the relentless slaughter of 
Christian Armenians resonated deeply with the Euro-American public. “No Turkish trickery of 
any kind,” The New York Times reported, “will affect the claims of justice.” Upholding a belief 
in universal rights, the article continued: “The conscience of mankind will not be appeased until 
these three bloodthirsty friends of the Young Turks … are hanged together in Bayazid Square.”7 
The Times implicated the Three Pashas—Enver, Tallat, and Djemal—as the primary architects of 
the Armenian genocide, along with dozens of their less influential accomplices, many of whom 
quietly awaited sentencing at the ongoing military tribunal in Constantinople. Tragically, 
however, widespread enthusiasm for legal justice was short lived. 
 Within two years, the Turkish courts-martial, as well as other tribunals designed to 
punish those responsible for the Armenian genocide, had collapsed. The Three Pashas had fled to 
Germany, and Turkey descended into civil war with Ataturk’s nationalist party at the forefront. 
During the uproar, British censors had initially banned Ravished Armenia from screening in 
theaters, fearing it might incite Turkish rage or nationalist fervor capable of interfering with the 
military tribunals. However, Ataturk’s supporters did not need any additional fodder: they had 
already martyred Kemal Bey, promoting him as a national hero “who was hanged by a puppet 
government merely to please the victors and to satisfy impertinent Armenians.”8 By 1921, the 
British military presence in Constantinople had waned considerably. Ataturk’s nationalists seized 
the opportunity and took foreign soldiers hostage. After brief negotiations, they successfully 
blackmailed the British government for a prisoner swap: in exchange for the twenty-nine British 
in Turkish custody, Britain would release all prisoners related to the Turkish war crimes trials. 
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Reluctantly they accepted, ultimately ending a series of tribunals that, if successful, would have 
been matched only by the later Nuremberg and Tokyo trials in the establishment of international 
criminal law. Throughout the entire affair, Kemal Bey, a mid-level administrator, was the only 
one in the Ottoman Empire’s vast bureaucratic machine to receive the death penalty for 
committing “crimes against humanity.” Ultimately, juridical forces failed to bring justice to the 
approximately two million Armenians who had perished under the oppression of the Young 
Turks’ administration. 
The failure of the trials speaks pointedly to the nature of law, which, according to 
celebrated literary theorist Shoshana Felman, is “a discipline of limits” that attempts “to bring a 
conscious closure to the trauma of war … to close the case and to enclose it in the past.” The 
language of law, she argues, is designed to “separate ourselves from the atrocities,” which helps 
humans collectively contain traumatic events.9 However, when legal justice fails as it did for the 
Armenian genocide, critical artistic genres become ever more salient. Art, such as cinema, 
provides new avenues for achieving justice. Juridical forces attempt to “close” traumatic events 
with concrete verdicts, unlike artistic forces that strive to keep them “open.” “We need art,” 
Felman argues, “the language of infinity—to mourn the losses and to face up to what in 
traumatic memory is not closed and cannot be closed.”10 Mardiganian, like millions of other 
Armenians, witnessed and endured the murder of family and friends, expropriation, starvation, 
torture, rape, and slavery. Legal forces had yet to establish a discourse that could contain the 
collection of heinous acts that functioned together to destroy in whole the Armenian population 
in the Ottoman Empire. Law distanced the genocide as a traumatic event; film brought it closer. 
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This chapter provides a deep textual and historical reading of Ravished Armenia—
Hollywood’s greatest contribution to the Pax Cinemana—to probe the nature of international 
justice during the interwar years. Maintaining the postwar peace, the film’s producers argued, 
required belligerent nations to atone for their crimes. The film directly and indirectly 
championed international law as the means to hold guilty parties accountable. In order to 
articulate how the film expressed notions of international law and justice, this chapter delves into 
the actual transcripts of the Turkish courts-martial. Originally published in Takvimi Vekayi, an 
official periodical of the Ottoman Empire, the transcripts of the Turkish courts-martial reveal 
how prosecutors attempted to hold perpetrators like Kemal Bey to a new universal standard.  
By the onset of World War I, many Western states had already adopted, with varying 
degrees of sincerity, the concept of universal rights in the discourse of official policy-making. 
The war’s unprecedented scale and manner of destruction, however, accelerated tremendously 
the push of liberal idealists in countries such as the United States, Great Britain, and France to 
pressure their governments into implementing legislation and institutions dedicated to promoting 
universal rights for all peoples, regardless of citizenship. This push cemented for many the belief 
that a distinct universal morality binds all people, regardless of race, class, gender, or religion. 
The politics of Ravished Armenia speaks pointedly to this ideological development. 
Consequently, this chapter first aims to locate Ravished Armenia at the vanguard of a cinematic 
movement that complemented the growing legal and political agitation for international justice 
and global peacekeeping. The second part of this chapter, however, is more critical, 
demonstrating how these idealistic notions operated under the assumption that patriarchy and 
Euro-American hegemony were the natural order for humanity. 
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President Woodrow Wilson—perhaps the most dominant figure behind the spread of 
liberal idealism—told Americans in 1917: "The tragic events of the thirty months of vital turmoil 
through which we have just passed have made us citizens of the world. There can be no turning 
back.”11 For Wilson, a question remained: what was the best manner to approach the conditions 
of the new global world? He understood wholly that the nature of industrial technology and total 
warfare had debunked the once widely believed interpretation of Western history as a tale of 
progress. Still, Wilson, a relentless optimist, promoted a global ideology that considered all 
humans inherently intertwined, rational, and striving for a universal “common good.” In his 
influential Fourteen Points, a list of conditions for a postwar peace settlement, Woodrow Wilson 
had advocated the spread of democracy, open markets, international law, non-isolationist 
governments, and self-determination.12 Wilson opportunistically figured that international peace 
and the interests of humanity were fundamentally fixed to the economic and political interests of 
the United States. Nevertheless, his Fourteen Points laid the groundwork for the League of 
Nations, which adopted the “Armenian question” for one of its initial agendas.  
For Woodrow Wilson and the millions of other liberal idealists like him, the end of the 
war represented the world at a vital crossroads: one direction pointed toward the common good 
accompanied by fixed notions of democracy, capitalism, and cosmopolitanism; and the other 
direction pointed toward evil accompanied by fixed notions of nationalism, tyranny, and 
																																								 																				
11	Woodrow	Wilson,	“Second	Inaugural	Address,”	March	5,	1917.	Available	at:	Millercenter.org	(accessed	March	
18,	2014).	
12	In	short,	Wilson	encouraged	all	belligerents	in	World	War	I	to	agree	to	the	following:	1)	abolish	secret	treaties	
and	embrace	open	diplomacy;	2)	freedom	of	the	seas;	3)	remove	customs	and	economic	barriers	for	free	trade;	4)	
reduce	national	armaments;	5)	readjust	colonial	territories	fairly;	6)	remove	the	German	Army	from	Russia;	7)	
restore	Belgian	independence;	8)	restore	all	French	territory,	including	the	disputed	Alsace-Lorraine;	9)	endorse	
self-determination	for	Italians;	10)	endorse	self-determination	for	Austria-Hungary;	11)	endorse	self-determination	
and	independence	for	the	Balkan	nations;	12)	endorse	self-determination	for	Turkey;	13)	endorse	independence	
for	Poland;	and	14)	endorse	the	formation	of	a	League	of	Nations	to	ensure	independence	for	all	countries.	
Woodrow	Wilson,	“President	Woodrow	Wilson’s	Fourteen	Points,”	January	8,	1918.	Available	in	full	at:	
Avalon.law.yale.edu	(accessed	February	14,	2014).	
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despotism. This popular postwar sensibility universalized human history into two irreconcilable 
forces. By 1919, many American filmmakers had already adopted this idealist rhetoric and 
aligned themselves with the cause outlined by Wilson. In fact, the League of Nations ultimately 
failed to address the genocide and grant self-determination for the Armenians who had lived 
under Ottoman rule. Though bold and ambitious, Wilson’s League of Nations had always 
struggled to gain practical political and legal traction. Culturally, however, it had a tremendous 
impact, particularly in the cinema. 
Ravished Armenia was part of a spontaneous political initiative that challenged the 
ontology of film by deconstructing the barrier between artist and spectator, producer and 
consumer, and public and private. The producers of Ravished Armenia did not intend the film to 
serve as passive entertainment; it was meant to incite action, specifically raise awareness and 
support for the Armenian Diaspora, which had become embroiled in a hostile and ultimately 
futile debate with the League of Nations and the Turkish government for reparations and land 
rights after the genocide. The film’s producers, aware of the Armenians’ plight, treated the film 
as an unofficial legal apparatus that contributed to Wilson and the League’s original promise to 
the Armenian community. With its ambition to uplift “humanity” by remedying the Young 
Turks’ crime against Armenia—an event firmly detested but ultimately ignored by the League of 
Nations and other politico-legal forces—the film was ahead of the curve. Still, Ravished Armenia 
did not exist in a vacuum; instead, it was part of the larger climate of opinion that had 
underscored cinema with a distinct humanitarian impulse. A textual analysis of the film 
illuminates this historical reading.  
 Originally, Ravished Armenia consisted of nine reels, granting it a running time of 
approximately eighty-five minutes. Sadly, however, much of the film has been lost; only twenty 
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minutes of footage currently remain. Though the film broke many box office records and was 
widely lauded by critics upon its release, Ravished Armenia, like the Armenian genocide itself, 
gradually faded from public memory. Little care was taken to preserve properly the original 
nitrate-based reels, and it is unlikely that a complete version of the film will ever surface. 
Thankfully, a few film historians, particularly Anthony Slide, have taken it upon themselves to 
salvage and preserve the film’s original screenplay and production photos.13 These items, 
coupled with the extant footage and surviving press materials, offer the best means to analyze the 
film as a significant political text.  
This chapter explores Ravished Armenia in two distinct manners: first, it reconciles the 
surviving footage with the surviving script, providing for examination the most accurate 
rendition of the film as it originally screened in theaters; and second, it analyzes the extant 
footage as a stand-alone piece. The footage is worthy of careful scrutiny because it has grown 
organically over several decades. In the 1990s, a videotape surfaced that supposedly contained 
two reels of Ravished Armenia. On closer inspection, however, it became apparent that it was not 
two consecutive reels, but rather a radically re-edited version of select scenes. This version, 
which also contains footage not found in the original, was likely assembled in the 1950s for a 
short documentary on the Armenian genocide.14 In 2009, Richard D. Kloian—director of the 
Armenian Genocide Resource Center of Northern California—restored, reformatted, and slightly 
re-edited this version with new subtitles, intertitles, and a dramatic score. Though the extant 
footage is a dramatic reimagining of Ravished Armenia, it still provides an idea of what the 
																																								 																				
13	See:	Anthony	Slide,	Ravished	Armenia	and	the	Story	of	Aurora	Mardiganian	(Jackson,	MS:	University	Press	of	
Mississippi,	2014),	20-22.	
14	The	footage	not	found	in	the	original	film	most	likely	stemmed	from	newsreel	footage	and	All	Quiet	on	the	
Western	Front	(1930).	
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original production must have looked like.15 As the end result of a multitude of different creative 
agents forced to negotiate with the genocide, the footage echoes Shoshana Felman’s argument 
that artistic forces refuse to close traumatic events or leave them locked in the past. In the last 
five years, the footage has made its way online, finding new audiences on YouTube, Vimeo, and 
Internet Archive, where it continues to muster feverish political discussion and debate on the 
nature of the killings. On the eve of the one hundredth anniversary of the Armenian genocide, the 
Ravished Armenia extant footage—an exciting piece of filmmaking in its own right—remains 
more relevant than ever. 
As a staged reenactment of Aurora Mardiganian’s actual lived experience, Ravished 
Armenia contains all the stylistic hallmarks of a docudrama, a genre that did not truly come into 
its own until the 1940s. Though the film’s producers admittedly took a degree of artistic license 
in retelling Mardiganian’s story, they remained largely convinced that the completed film was a 
historically accurate rendition without explicit political commentary. “The Truth, and Nothing 
But the Truth,” swore one film advertisement.16 With a dedication to realism and the camera 
refusing to draw attention to itself, the film takes on a documentary feel reminiscent of cinéma 
vérité or “observational cinema,” a style of filmmaking that strives for objective truth by 
situating the camera as an innocuous fly on the wall. This approach heightens the emotional 
power of the film and amplifies its underlying political intention to incite activism, blurring lines 
of demarcation between producer and seer. 
Operating under the assumption that its images represent “truth,” Ravished Armenia 
functions as a virtual trial, with the audience situated as the jury, and the film’s director and 
producers as the judges and prosecution. Unlike in the Turkish courts-martial, which had to 
																																								 																				
15	Slide,	20-22.	
16	“COMING	TO	THE	CENTENARY	CHURCH,”	The	Southeast	Missourian,	March	13,	1920,	7.	
	 108	
wrestle with presenting purported evidence—mere reflections of the offenses themselves—the 
audience-jury could actually see the Young Turks’ “crimes against humanity” as they had 
occurred, demanding a more personal judgment. The producer-prosecution presented the film as 
a carrier for witness testimony, one that the American public, according to the film’s press 
release, “MUST see,” as if it were a civic duty or responsibility.17 Of course, producers knew all 
too well that activism and financial gain were not mutually exclusive. According to the director 
of a popular theater chain in New York City, “Ravished Armenia broke attendance records at 
every Loew Theater and proved that humanity is the same in a metropolis as in a village.”18 
Many Americans agreed that the film granted the ability "to speak, with the intimate knowledge 
of eye-witness, of the urgent necessity of extending the delivering hand to the suffering 
Christians of Armenia.” The producer-prosecution made a “verdict” that the act of viewing the 
film was actually helping to “SAVE A LIFE.”19 Legal rhetoric such as this was littered 
throughout the film’s press and reception materials. Though readily willing to give financial 
assistance, few American moviegoers could enter the theater absolved of intense personal bias. 
In 1919, the gaze of the audience-jury was focused deeply through preconceived notions 
concerning Turks and Armenians. As stated previously, liberal idealists in the interwar years 
argued feverishly that a universal morality implicated all of humanity. However, their 
interpretation of “humanity” was comprised of two incompatible halves: the “civilized world,” 
exemplified primarily by the white, Christian, and capitalist United States; and the “uncivilized 
world,” exemplified primarily by the Islamic, autocratic Ottoman Empire. Ravished Armenia 
exploited this duality, portraying Armenians as pure and innocent, and Turks and Kurds as 
																																								 																				
17	Original	press	release,	reprinted	in:	Slide,	13.	
18	“How	Granlund	Answered	Thomas,”	The	Moving	Picture	World,	May	31,	1919,	1349.	
19	Original	press	release,	reprinted	in:	Slide,	14.	
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“barbaric and fanatical.”20 Though all belligerents in World War I were guilty of sanctioning 
pointless massacre, most liberal idealists viewed the Ottoman Empire as exceptionally violent. 
“It is doubtful if there is any other area in the world,” one newspaper reported on the Turkish 
slaughter of Armenians, “where the war is so plainly a case of murder.”21 The Ottoman Turks 
were on the fringe of Woodrow Wilson’s and the League of Nations’ understanding of the global 
village. They epitomized the “evil” Wilson had vowed to combat.  
From a legal standpoint, the film’s suspicion of Islam is rather ironic. The Turkish courts-
martial’s conception of universal rights did not emerge despite Islam but because of Islam. Two 
legal systems technically governed the Ottoman Empire in 1919: the secular Kanun law and the 
traditional Islamic Sharia law. These systems, however, were not mutually exclusive and 
occasionally helped grant local non-Muslim communities, like Armenians, more agency and 
autonomy throughout the empire. During the Turkish courts-martial, the acting President 
Lieutenant-General Mustafa Nazim repeatedly called upon Islam as the backbone of his 
conception of universal human rights. This should come as no surprise since the historic spread 
of Islam was the result of its inclusivity. Because Islam is a universal faith, notions of class, 
occupation, race, and history are theoretically irrelevant in matters of law.  
Nazim made no distinction between international justice and Islamic justice. In his mind 
they were one in the same. During the indictment of Sait Halim Pasha, Halil Bey, and Ahmed 
Nesimi Bey, three ministers accused of supporting the Armenian genocide, Nazim insisted that 
their stature was no excuse because “even Grand Caliphs have respectfully bowed in front of 
																																								 																				
20	Anthony	Slide’s	book	contains	a	copy	of	the	original	film	script	by	Frederic	Chapin.	See:	Ravished	Armenia:	The	
Script.	
21	“ARMENIAN	BATTLES	UNDER	HARDSHIPS,”	The	Day,	August	11,	1915,	9.	
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Islamic Justice.”22 Nazim even went so far as to declare Jihad against the ministers for 
besmirching the dignity of the Ottomans with massacres and profiteering.23 Such atrocities, he 
claimed, were “not only incompatible with Ottoman Laws and the Constitution, but also the 
dictates of our faith.”24 Unlike the Turkish courts-martial, Ravished Armenia ignored the 
relationship between Islam and new conceptions of human rights in favor of portraying Islam as 
a foil for the civilized Christian West. The film suggests heavily that human rights and 
international law were rooted not in Islam, but in Christianity. 
The film’s poster, modeled directly after Emmanuel Fremiet’s famous “Gorilla Carrying 
off a Woman” sculpture, depicted this tension clearly: a dark-skinned, brutish Turk with an 
elongated lower-jaw and hunched posture, grips a blood-soaked sword in his left hand, and 
carries a half-naked female beauty under his right arm, doubtless to rape (Fig. 6). The poster 
explicitly equated Turks with apes, embellishing the popular Euro-American belief in the Near 
East as a backwards region filled primarily with inhabitants—excluding the fair-skinned 
Christian Armenians—fundamentally opposed to the “natural” laws of civilization and humanity. 
After referring to Ravished Armenia and the recent execution of Kemal Bey, one newspaper 
elaborated: “The Gorilla is at bay, but not yet chained,” demonstrating clearly the caricature of 
Ottoman Turks as animals in need of discipline, and the extent to which the film and the Turkish 
courts-martial were embroiled in the same critical discourse regarding art and justice.25 
The portrayal of Ottoman perpetrators in the actual film, however, is surprisingly much 
subtler than the poster suggests. In a move uncharacteristic for the silent era, few actors take on 
																																								 																				
22	See:	TRANSCRIPT	OF	HIS	HIGHNESS	PATISHAH’S	EXTRAORDINARY	COURTS-MARTIAL,	reprinted	in	English	in	
Yeghiayan,	25.	
23	Yeghiayan,	24.	
24	Yeghiayan,	22.	
25	Clive	Marshall,	“The	Gorilla	at	Bay,”	The	Milwaukee	Sentinel,	January	12,	1919,	28.	
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the mannerisms or physical demeanor of an animal, preserving the producers’ dedication to 
realism and docudrama fundamentals. Still, the depiction of Turks, Kurds, and Chechens in the 
film echoed the firmly established racial attitudes and hierarchy of the era: Turks are poised, 
hollow, cunning, and calculating; Kurds are sadistic, hedonistic, emotional, and easily duped; 
and Chechens are tribal, sparse, and thrifty. Moreover, all Ottoman subjects in the film, with the 
exception of a few prostitutes and maiden stand-ins, are male. Of course, men did comprise the 
entire Ottoman administration; however, the decision also underscored the Euro-American 
conception of Islamic law as inherently and exceptionally misogynistic.  
Though the women’s suffrage movement was gaining traction in the United States, by 
1919 the Ottoman Empire had ironically come to exemplify the popular belief that women 
required male guardians for protection. Turks, according to one newspaper, acted regularly on 
their “brute instincts to kill and destroy.”26 To many Americans, including the film’s makers, the 
Ottoman Empire was a less evolved state, where men instinctively murder, rape, and punish, 
behaviors allegedly encouraged under Islam. Many Americans, for example, assumed that 
women in the Ottoman Empire needed to wear a niqab, a traditional veil, in order to avoid 
accidentally triggering the advances of sexually depraved Turkish men. In one particular scene in 
Ravished Armenia, Mardiganian avoids encroaching sex-traffickers by cleverly donning a niqab 
and slipping into a group of Ottoman women. Although the scene demonstrated Mardiganian’s 
resourcefulness, its primary intention was to provoke audience sympathy by suggesting how the 
survival of Christian women during the genocide hinged on self-degradation. The niqab was a 
reoccurring symbol of Turkish male oppression throughout the film. Therefore, a civilized nation 
like the United States was needed not to champion the agency of women, but to show barbaric 
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Turks how to behave like gentleman. The Turkish gorilla in the film’s poster carries the 
personification of Armenia itself: a helpless yet unusually attractive female. The film’s 
producers, the American Committee for Relief in the Near East, reinforced this representation 
through its publicity campaigns. Print material frequently depicted vulnerable Armenian girls, 
hugging desperately the feet of flag-waving, sword-wielding Columbia—the popular female 
characterization of America (Fig. 8).  
Illustrations such as this reflected the geo-political status of the United States after World 
War I. Unlike Europe, the United States had emerged from the war relatively unscathed, 
preserving Americans’ faith in industry, technology, and traditional notions of progress. By 
1919, the United States had reached superpower status, and assumed with gusto the unofficial 
role as the world’s premier moral compass. Where the British had failed to implement justice 
through the Turkish courts-martial, American idealists naively professed that cinema would help 
reprimand those accountable. Illustrations such as those of the American Committee for Relief in 
the Near East, however, were rather ironic, considering the fact that the United States federal 
government refused to intervene militarily in order to prevent the widespread massacre of 
Armenians, despite ambassador Henry Mogenthau’s assessment that “nothing short of actual 
force” would do.27 Seemingly, the United States had decided that the only way to help the 
damsel Armenia was to generate financial aid, an initiative driven by the film.  
Americans saw in Armenians, besides femininity, the qualities they had fixed to their 
own national identity. Americans celebrated Armenians as a fellow “liberty-loving, industrious 
people” committed to “virtuous” principles and institutions.28 They had a natural entrepreneurial 
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spirit and an alleged knack for exploiting the free market. Stressing the axiomatic features of the 
Protestant work ethic, news outlets characterized Armenians as “thrifty, industrious and 
temperate,” as people who “do not waste their substance in riotous living.”29 Though references 
to these attributes would gradually fade throughout the twentieth century as Armenia was pulled 
increasingly into the sphere of the Soviet Union, Americans in 1919 widely described Armenians 
as culturally and historically analogous to themselves. “The Armenian people,” one periodical 
professed, “could be assimilated with our people with no more difficulty than that of most of the 
Latin races of Europe.”30 According to many commentators, Armenians, like Americans of the 
late eighteenth century, had to endure the oppression of a large, tyrannical empire. Both were 
beacons of truth in a sea of alleged corruption.  
Fortunately, the United States—“Land of the Free”—could accommodate the thousands 
of Armenian refugees pouring into Ellis Island. The American public cheered them on. 
Enforcing notions of the American Dream, millions of Americans promised that upward mobility 
was inevitable if Armenians would continue their habits of hard work and frugality. The final 
scene in Ravished Armenia, according to its screenplay, strengthened this assumption. “THE 
LAST SURVIVOR OF A MILLION CHRISTIAN GIRLS,” reads the final title sequence before 
fading into the image of Mardiganian, a manifestation of Armenia itself, hopefully “gazing off at 
the Statue of Liberty.”31 The film ended on an optimistic beat, assuring audiences that the cost of 
their admission would directly help others like Mardiganian find salvation in the new Christian 
Promised Land. Moreover, the scene obviously reinforced the nation-building iconography of the 
United States as the world’s melting pot and liberator of the destitute. To the American majority, 
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however, Armenians were not ordinary immigrants; they were members of “the oldest of all 
Christian countries.”32 
Entrenched in biblical tradition, Ravished Armenia contributed to the cultural articulation 
of both Armenia and America’s national mythologies. Allegedly, within the territory of Armenia, 
the Garden of Eden had flourished; Noah’s ark had landed on Mount Ararat; and the first 
Christian nation had emerged. The United States, echoing its unofficial title as the “City Upon a 
Hill,” embraced a teleological interpretation of its history beginning with Christian Armenia and 
reaching its apex in the postwar world. In one memorable scene, as described in the Ravished 
Armenia screenplay, Mardiganian and a local priest kneel before a hanging crucifix in the wake 
of the genocide. As they ask God for guidance, “a heavenly light from the cross illumines their 
features.”33 The only nod to the supernatural in the entire film, the scene suggests that God 
divinely ordained Mardiganian’s survival and ultimate migration to the United States, solidifying 
the belief in a familial link between Americans and their “suffering brothers and sisters.”34 This 
cultural imagining of Armenians and Americans as part of the same grand Christian happening 
appealed to a people that needed a new home and a state looking to legitimate its new 
superpower status. 
The inclusion of God’s will challenged the film’s dedication to realism and actually 
further stripped Mardiganian of individual agency, something the film accomplished 
unremittingly. Though Ravished Armenia depicted a young women’s incredible determination to 
survive against seemingly insurmountable male foes, it was hardly a piece of feminist 
filmmaking. Within the film, Mardiganian was molested, raped, and sold into slavery, which the 
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film both condemned and celebrated. Sexual violence, as the title suggests, was the dominant 
theme and selling point of “Ravished” Armenia. The film’s press materials guaranteed images of 
“young and beautiful” Armenian girls “between the ages of 10 and 20”—Christians 
nonetheless—bound in ropes and sold into exotic harems.35 At a price affordable for even the 
most strapped American, the film stressed that these “Armenian beauties” sold for only “85¢ 
each” (Fig. 7)36  
Marketers exploited relentlessly the fact that Armenians were Christians, not only 
because it made them appear more sympathetic and familiar, but also because it aroused taboo 
sexual desires. In one of the film’s most shocking scenes, a series of young Armenian women are 
crucified on wooden crosses (Fig. 10). The young women, presented nude with their long hair 
barely covering their breasts, demonstrate Ravished Armenia’s ability to combine effortlessly 
erotica, religion, and ultra-violence (Fig. 11). Conveniently, the film could easily dodge 
conservative criticism because its creators masked the intentionally arousing aspects of Ravished 
Armenia under the façade of historical accuracy and celebrated Christianity. When questioned on 
the film’s explicit sexual content, producers relied on the fact that Turks did indeed take specific 
measures to abduct those Armenians they considered the prettiest, and therefore the most 
profitable on the market. Without remorse, the Ottoman Empire and Hollywood had both 
commoditized Aurora Mardignaian. 
Despite the film’s tendency to strangely fetishize rape and sexual violence, it is important 
to remember that it still refused to render it as a mere footnote to the larger massacres. In one 
devastating scene from the Ravished Armenia footage, a posse of nine gendarmes physically 
attacks a group of young Armenian women in the Van province. Some are beaten unconscious 
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while others violently resist. The gendarmes then drag and carry the young women into 
makeshift tents where they strip them of their clothes and force them to the ground. The 
camera’s slow shutter speed creates a dizzying effect as the young women’s limbs fly frantically 
across the frame. Suddenly, the chaotic movement comes to an abrupt halt and the women 
quietly exit the tents one-by-one with their tattered clothes in hand. The juxtaposition is jarring 
and effective. By depicting rape explicitly and without remorse, the film recognized that it was 
an integral part of the systematic effort to eradicate the Armenian population in whole. Couched 
between scenes depicting forced drownings and desert marches, the sequence treats mass rape 
and sexual violence as genocidal acts in and of themselves. This was significant and echoed the 
Turkish courts-martial’s equally ambivalent assessment of the rape and sexual violence that 
occurred when the Ottoman state deported its Armenian citizens from their homes.  
Tragically, criminal courts have long downplayed or ignored rape and sexual violence. 
The difficulty of acquiring evidence and victim testimony, particularly in highly patriarchal 
societies like the Ottoman Empire, has made it a slippery subject for both prosecution and 
defense in international criminal trials. In fact, mass rape was not accepted as an act of genocide 
until 1995, when the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda convicted mayor Jean-Paul 
Akayesu of contributing to the genocide of millions of Tutsi by aiding, abetting, and ordering 
several dozen instances of rape and sexual assault at his bureau. Unlike in the case of Akayesu, 
however, the prosecution in the Turkish courts-martial neglected to articulate fully what exactly 
constituted rape and sexual violence.  
The enormity of the Young Turks’ crimes against the Armenian community left the 
Turkish courts-martial with extraordinary legal responsibilities. Furthermore, there was no 
established precedent for treating rape and sexual violence as acts of genocide or crimes against 
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humanity. This helps explain the courts’ unwillingness to define rape and sexual violence 
clearly. The transcripts from the trials reveal clearly that the prosecution’s primary focus was on 
holding those accountable for “premediated massacres, looting, destroying villages, burning 
homes and people, perpetrating violent acts, and other brutal crimes.”37 By and large, instances 
of overt massacre and looting dominated the proceedings while rape and sexual violence were 
marginalized in the broad category of “violent acts and other brutal crimes.” Though the courts-
martial condemned many acts of women being “deflowered and brutalized,” the prosecution 
never fully explored the events themselves.38  
The courts’ unease to broach the subject echoed that of American news outlets, which 
often masked the ubiquitous sexual violence in Armenia with euphemisms. The New York Times, 
for example, stressed that the Turks had committed “unspeakable acts” against Armenian 
women. Though the reporters clearly intended their comments to be interpreted as compassionate 
chivalry, in reality they were useless and perhaps even harmful. During the proceedings of the 
courts-martial, euphemisms such as this actually deprived victims of the opportunity for justice 
and closure. Hindsight shows that restitution for rape and sexual violence was impossible since 
the courts-martial never specifically addressed the coercive circumstances in which those crimes 
were perpetrated. Though the trials deserved credit for acknowledging rape and sexual violence 
as genocidal acts, the failure to confront them explicitly contributed to the silence that Ravished 
Armenia exploited. 
As a film character, Mardiganian is never a fully formed subject; she is primarily the 
object and recipient of atrocious acts. Catering to the patriarchal gaze of the American male 
viewer, the film’s screenplay introduces Mardiganian inside an idyllic garden filled with 
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beautiful plants and produce. Symbolizing Eve before “the fall,” Mardiganian is a happy, 
innocent, virgin teenager with a stable family life and playful disposition. Within the screenplay, 
gardens repeatedly become what French philosopher Michel Foucault referred to as a 
“heterotopia,” a space of otherness that exists beyond the material life-world.39 Mardiganian 
takes refuge in several immaculate gardens before paradise is lost as a result of the always-
encroaching Turkish serpents. The screenplay deliberately idealizes pre-genocide Armenia as a 
region free from sin and corruption, and it also omits several controversial events Mardiganian 
had described in her memoir, notably her stabbing one of her captors to death with a dagger. In 
order to protect her image as the quintessential Armenian pinup girl, the screenplay attributes 
Mardiganian’s survival less to her own initiative and know-how, and more to a divine deus ex 
machina and the valiant acts of the fictional male hero, Andranik.  
In the silent era it was uncommon for a film to have a strong female protagonist; 
consequently, the film’s writers created Andranik, a character loosely based on the factual 
Andranik Ozanian, a leader in the Armenian national liberation movement whose exploits had 
earned him the designation of the “Armenian’s Robin Hood, Garibaldi, and Washington, all in 
one.”40 In the screenplay, Andranik serves as both Mardiganian’s love interest and as a surrogate 
for the male viewer. He is handsome, cunning, courageous, and keen with a sword. Mirroring the 
audience’s parental and possessive gaze, Mardiganian is “happy in the thought that Andranik is 
watching over her.” After the local Pasha attempts to purchase Mardiganian from her father, 
Andranik holds her and “swears no man shall have Aurora but him.”41 Regardless of his efficacy, 
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he, like the audience, is situated as Mardiganian’s guardian angel. He would free her whether 
though force or financial assistance, from the crimes of the Young Turks.  
Along with these condescending creative decisions, Hollywood exploited Mardiganian 
further, forcing her to accompany screenings of the film throughout the country, despite her pleas 
for privacy. These publicity stunts established her as a Hollywood starlet, bringing her 
tremendous anxiety and disillusionment. After public appearances became too demanding, 
Mardiganian suffered a nervous breakdown and for the first time since leaving Armenia 
considered suicide. The film’s producers then made the decision to hire a fleet of Mardiganian 
look-alikes to tour with the film in her absence. Though the film successfully raised millions of 
dollars for Armenian relief, of which Mardiganian received little, it did so at the expense of her 
physical and mental wellbeing, illustrating clearly, in the words of Armenian director Atom 
Egoyan, “Hollywood’s uneasy marriage of glamour and atrocity.”42 
Unlike most films of the silent era, Ravished Armenia provides a unique approach to the 
representation of trauma, moving beyond a shallow dichotomy between victim and perpetrator. 
Though the film disparages Turks relentlessly, and galvanizes Armenians with equal enthusiasm, 
it actually manages to implicate the entire Ottoman state, rather than a few exceptionally sinister, 
archetypal antagonists. Ravished Armenia does not contain a central “bad guy,” and instead 
vilifies every bureaucratic apparatus key to mobilizing the Ottoman Empire’s resources and 
personnel to systematically eradicate the Armenian population. This is an important distinction, 
because according to Zygmunt Bauman and Raul Hilberg—two of the most influential scholars 
of the Holocaust—genocide is not a deviation from modern civilization, but a normal 
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consequence of it.43  Genocide, like the Holocaust, has been rendered possible due to the proper 
functioning of ordinary bureaucratic apparatuses, which comprise the structure of a given 
society. “The machinery of destruction,” Hilberg argues, “was the organized community in one 
of its special roles.”44 The two scholars argue that scholarship should move away from 
intentionalist understandings of the Holocaust, which focus primarily on key figures such as 
Adolf Hitler and Joseph Goebbels, and concentrate instead on the structural makeup of the 
German state. In respect to the Ottoman Empire, Ravished Armenia does precisely this, shifting 
attention away from the Three Pashas—the primary architects of the genocide—and toward what 
Hilberg dubbed “the destruction process.”45   
  Indeed, the engine of genocide rests in a symphony of administrative agencies working 
consciously or unconsciously towards a common goal: the total extermination of a people or 
culture. President Wilson, like many idealists, had argued that the Ottoman Empire was 
exceptional in its commitment to violence. However, Hilberg and Bauman’s work debunks 
Wilson’s assumption, demonstrating that any state is capable of marshalling a destruction 
process, which once in motion is steered by its own internal logic. “THE WHEELS OF 
ADMINISTRATION MOVE SWIFTLY,” reads a title in the Ravished Armenia screenplay, 
anticipating the moment when Talaat Bey, the Interior Minister, realizes that the Armenian 
“affair” has been left to his “discretion.”46 Ravished Armenia does not depict a disorderedly 
Ottoman Empire on the brink of anarchy, instead it implicates the entire fully functioning state, 
tracing the implementation of the three distinct stages of a genocide: the definition, concentration 
(and seizure), and annihilation of Armenians in all Ottoman provinces. 
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Though the courts-martial occurred before Hilberg coined the phrase, it still recognized 
the Armenian genocide as a planned effort between various institutions of the state. The 
transcripts demonstrate without a doubt that the prosecution’s strategy was to reveal a conspiracy 
between the Three Pashas, the Young Turks’ Central Committee, and the Teskilati Masousa 
(“Special Organization”). The prosecution decoded a series of cipher-telegrams that proved that 
members of the Central Committee, a shadowy body of radical nationalists who dominated the 
Young Turks’ party, repeatedly worked with the Special Organization, a military forces unit 
under the control of Enver Pasha, to deport, execute, and bury millions of Armenian citizens. In 
one particularly incriminatory telegram, Salihzeki Bey—Governor of Zor province—when asked 
if he had exterminated 10,000 Armenians as instructed, boasts, “I have pride; what is 10,000? 
Raise your figure.”47 Moreover, the courts-martial acknowledged how state officials implicated 
average Ottoman citizens in the destruction process as well. One cipher-telegram with the 
signature of Mahmud Kamil, an influential Army Commander, discusses the mandate that 
prohibited any Muslims from sheltering Armenians. According to the telegram, Armenian 
shelterers were to be killed on the spot and their property burned. If any government official was 
caught safeguarding Armenians, “he was to be dismissed and tried by a military tribunal.”48 
Spreading culpability throughout the state and its citizenship was integral to the “flow” of the 
destruction process, which Ravished Armenia had made visible. 
In a stirring twenty-minute montage, the extant Ravished Armenia footage downplays 
Aurora Mardiganian and reveals the destruction process in action. The film begins with a still 
image of the Three Pashas pointing on a map to what can only be Armenia, illustrating clearly 
that members of the highest level of Ottoman government had sanctioned the genocide. Dramatic 
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combat footage along the western front appears, suggesting how Ottoman authorities had masked 
the Armenian massacres under the turmoil of World War I. The camera’s framing and movement 
then adopts the momentum of the process itself. First, a wide shot presents a seemingly endless 
row of Armenian soldiers dropping their weapons on the orders of superiors. In January 1915, 
based on fabricated claims that Armenian soldiers had conspired with Russia, the Ottoman 
Empire did indeed disarm all Armenians in the Ottoman army. In the film, as the Ottoman army 
escorts the now unarmed Armenian soldiers to an undisclosed location off screen, a quick match-
action cut shows them digging their own graves (Fig. 12).  
In subsequent scenes, the camera continues this pattern. Beginning with a wide-shot 
crowded with people, the scene culminates in a slow-pan that guides the subjects out of frame. 
These moments grant the viewer a sense of impending doom. Even though Armenia is comprised 
geographically of dry semi-desert and mountainous steppe, areas seemingly ripe for grand 
pictorial landscapes, the camera refuses to grant the viewer a sense of space, which might allude 
mistakenly to a feeling of freedom. The camera instead resists Armenia’s vastness in favor of 
suffocating wide-shots, with shuffling Armenian bodies filling the frame from corner to corner 
(Fig. 13). Indicating that the genocide was relatively easy to instigate, these congested frames 
reflect the fact that Turkish officials, due to Sharia law, had already identified Armenians as non-
believers with limited rights, keeping them in close-knit communities on the fringes of society. 
Rapid-fire cutting, mirroring the frenetic Armenian experience, guides the viewer through 
the remainder of the destruction process. In approximately twelve minutes the film depicts mass 
murder, suicide, burning, drowning, and rape; the singling out and execution of religious and 
community leaders; the plundering of Armenian corpses, homes, and businesses; the 
congregation of Armenians into deportable caravans; the separating of men, women, and 
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children; forced marches through isolated areas void of water and food; and slave auctions in 
Turkish markets. At first glance, the events look like pandemonium, however, on closer 
inspection, they are anything but. The film provides continuous hints that Turkish officials are 
the ones encouraging and directing this behavior. Official notices are drawn, plans are discussed, 
and ordinances are enforced. Even in the film’s most violent scenes, particularly the “game of 
swords,” where women are thrown or forced to sit upon a propped blade, actions are conducted 
under the approving eyes of Turkish authorities, including Beys, Kaymakams, Valis, Mutasarrifs, 
and gendarmes (Fig. 14). Though the film singles out authority figures, it still, like the courts-
martial, never absolves ordinary Turkish citizens from blame. 
A genocide requires the mobilization of an entire state, according to Hilberg and 
Bauman. As a result, it is difficult to identify anyone as a wholly innocent bystander to the entire 
affair. Those that were silent, indifferent, or blindly following orders despite their better 
judgement were indeed accomplices to the genocide. With a few notable exceptions, nearly all 
Turks and Ottoman citizens portrayed in Ravished Armenia willingly jump at the opportunity to 
murder, pillage, and assault Armenians. Though an alarming number of Turks unaffiliated with 
the government did indeed partake in the events, there were many who refused. Mardiganian 
discusses several in her memoir. Though the film omitted the concerned Turks who had actually 
aided her escape, it still demonstrated how the destruction process required willing participants 
from every echelon of society. Without the luxury of creative license, the courts-martial had to 
reconcile the fact that many of the perpetrators of the genocide were never involved directly in 
the killings themselves. Instead, they were low-level administrators who simply followed 
protocol from their desks. To them, the killings occurred out of sight and out of mind.  
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The prosecution not did overlook desk killers— “ordinary” bureaucrats—who oversaw 
the administrative functions needed to carry out the genocide. When questioned on why Mithad 
Bey, Responsible Secretary of Brusa, did not take any measures to respond to the destroyed 
villages in his respective province, he insisted that he “had no personal connection with the 
matter; it simply was not part of my duties.”49 The acting president of the courts-martial did not 
grant clemency to those who attempted to divert responsibility to another individual or 
department in the state. Adopting an approach similar to joint-criminal enterprise, the courts-
martial punished Mithad Bey and others for “indirect participation.”50 By recognizing the power 
of individual agency—the capacity for one person to shape his/her life and the lives of those 
around them—within the impersonal structure of the state, the court challenged the Young 
Turks’ insistence that the Armenian affair was an unprompted reaction to domestic upheaval. 
The Republic of Turkey, the Ottoman Empire’s successor state, insists to this day that the 
events in Armenia were the result of a breakdown of law and order, nothing more than chaotic 
violence spurred by World War I. Ravished Armenia, on the contrary, underscored the verdict of 
the courts-martial, contending that “beyond a doubt that the decision to implement the massacres 
was reached jointly among the Triumvirate,” and then “organized and perpetrated by the leaders 
of the Ittihad ve Terakki Party (Young Turks).”51 Acknowledging the systemic root of the 
Armenian genocide marks the Turkish courts-martial and film’s greatest achievement. 
When Ravished Armenia premiered in 1919, it foreshadowed the humanitarian impulse 
that would permeate all aspects of filmmaking in the interwar years. The proliferation of 
organizations for international peace and understanding, like the League of Nations and the 
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Turkish courts-martial, created new opportunities to experiment with international law. This 
development sent cinema into an ontological crisis, shifting the focus of many filmmakers from 
passive entertainment to uplifting “humanity.” The tragic collapse of the courts-martial, 
however, demonstrated how the interests of humanity often conflicted with political concerns at 
both local and national levels. Appealing to the universal, Ravished Armenia challenged 
audiences to confront these allegiances; and as a provocative packaging of the Armenian 
genocide as an event, the film traced Aurora Mardignaian’s movements from the Ottoman 
Empire to Hollywood, illustrating how the experience of the genocide extended far beyond 
national borders. Ravished Armenia kept the Armenian genocide open to a multitude of 
interpretative processes. Though the film operated under deeply entrenched gender and racial 
assumptions, it still managed, unlike the League of Nations, to perpetuate the Armenian genocide 
as an ongoing experience worthy of careful political scrutiny. With a deep historical and textual 
reading of Ravished Armenia, this chapter is intended to illuminate what film and law both did 
and did not achieve in the pursuit of international justice.
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Chapter Four 
Whom the Gods Would Destroy and the Pursuit of the League of Nations 
On September 6, 1919, President Woodrow Wilson gave a fiery speech to a crowd of 
approximately 20,000 at the convention hall in Kansas City, Missouri. “I have come out with a 
cause,” Wilson exclaimed with the fervor of an evangelical pastor, “It is as great as the cause of 
mankind, and I intend, in office or out, to fight that battle as long as I live.”1 The speech was part 
of Wilson’s intensive campaign to rally support for the League of Nations in cities across the 
United States. The decision to ratify the United States membership in the League divided the 
Senate dramatically. To break the deadlock, Wilson knew that he had to muster tremendous 
support from the public. However, Wilson’s health was deteriorating quickly. He was prone to 
erratic headaches, tremors, and loss of vision. Despite warnings from his physician and close 
friends to avoid arduous speaking events, Wilson committed himself fully to championing the 
benefits of the League directly to the American people. Insisting that the League was designed 
according to uniquely American principles, Wilson remarked, “One of the things that America 
has had most at heart throughout her existence has been that there should be substituted for the 
brutal processes of war the friendly processes of consultation and arbitration, and that is done in 
the covenant of the League of Nations.”2 
The formation of the League was without a doubt the greatest effort to institutionalize an 
agenda for world peace in the immediate years after the war. President Wilson and the other 
architects of the League blamed much of the war on the secret coalitions and alliances that 
European states had built throughout the preceding decade. Wilson figured that an international 
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organization composed of representatives from the great powers would eliminate any clandestine 
diplomacy and prevent future wars. Politicians and the public mostly approved of the idea in 
theory. However, the details of the League’s covenant and constitution proved controversial. 
Many Americans, for example, took aim at Article X of the League’s covenant, which insisted 
that the “Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression 
the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League.”3 The 
article’s vague language implied that member states had agreed to defend one another in the 
event of an outside attack. The provision outraged many Republican congressmen who feared 
that it created a contractual obligation that would inevitably pull the United States into another 
European conflict. Moreover, Republicans were also frustrated that Wilson had largely ignored 
their consultation when developing parameters for the League. Because Republicans held the 
majority of seats in the Senate, Wilson knew that in order to garner the votes needed to secure 
the United States’ membership he had to convince senators’ constituents that it was essential to 
the safeguarding of democracy. Fortunately for Wilson’s campaign, however, it had considerable 
backing from the motion picture industry. 
In anticipation of such an incident, First National Pictures released the seven-reel epic 
Whom the Gods Would Destroy (1919). Designed to rally support for Wilson’s peace crusade, 
the film promised to “set before the world the benefits of a society of nations.”4 The film was a 
massive undertaking for the trailblazing director Frank Borzage and represented one of the most 
ambitious productions ever attempted at that time. Far exceeding typical shooting schedules, the 
film took nearly eighteen months to complete and required more than 114,000 feet of film. 
Borzage modified the script several times throughout production to accommodate new 
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developments in the war and to include the provisions of the Paris Peace Conference. The film 
employed over twenty principal actors, including silent film stars Jack Mulhall and Pauline 
Stark, and nearly eight thousand extras. With a budget exceeding $100,000, Borzage called for 
the construction of sixty-one custom sets. Marketed as “the greatest story since the world began,” 
the film enticed audiences with both a powerful romance and a “vivid account of Wilson’s ideas 
of a League of Nations.”5  
Though the film is now considered lost, it is still possible to explore its content and 
influence through surviving print materials. Due to the film’s unique blend of entertainment and 
political activism, dozens of peace organizations endorsed it and incorporated it into their 
outreach activities. It helped popularize Wilson’s message and represented the motion picture 
industry’s newfound interest in producing films that propagated peace. In response to the shifting 
tastes and interests of theatergoers, the motion picture industry began downplaying nationalist 
rhetoric around 1919 and instead exploited the public’s growing interest in pacifism. Examining 
the production, release, and reception of the film provides a unique window into the divisive 
politics of the League’s formation and the heated debate over the United States’ role as the new 
arbiter for world peace. 
…………………………………………. 
 An unconventional figure wrote and produced Whom the Gods Would Destroy, renowned 
cartoonist Charles Macauley. Prior to entering the film industry, Macauley worked for many 
major newspapers, including the New York Herald and the New York World. By 1910, he had 
developed a reputation as one of the most sought-after illustrators in the world. Macauley was 
commissioned to provide the illustrations for Arthur Conan Doyle’s famous Sherlock Holmes 
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stories and Robert Louis Stevenson’s landmark novella, The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. 
Hyde. Moreover, millions of people everyday saw his playful sketches of political figures like 
Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Smith. Unlike many cartoonists, however, he usually avoided 
drawing mean-spirited caricatures of elected officials, garnering him the approval of many 
political and religious associations. Impressed by his drawings, Woodrow Wilson reached out to 
Macauley with the hope that he would provide visual imagery for his 1912 presidential 
campaign. Wilson believed that to rally support in the twentieth century, cartoons and films were 
needed as much as if not more than the printed word. Macauley was a firm supporter of Wilson’s 
and he agreed wholeheartedly to support his cause. The experience marked the beginning of a 
dynamic friendship that lasted for over a decade and launched Macualey’s career as a filmmaker. 
Examining his contributions to Wilson’s campaigns reveals the creative evolution of Whom the 
Gods Would Destroy and the White House’s growing interest in the political fortunes of the film 
industry.   
 Macauley first created a series of portraits for Wilson that emphasized his progressive 
political philosophy. His illustrations depicted Wilson as a dignified statesman who would serve 
the interests of working-class and middle-class Americans. They addressed his commitment to 
creating new antitrust laws, reducing tariffs, busting monopolies, and reforming the banking 
system.6 They also delicately weighed in on his pledge to create new employment opportunities 
for African Americans while simultaneously lionizing his Southern heritage. In contrast, 
Macualey pegged Wilson’s opponents, William Howard Taft and Theodore Roosevelt, as mere 
puppets to a handful of wealthy industrialists. Their focus on regulating monopolies rather than 
breaking them provided Democrats with the fodder they had needed to distinguish Wilson from 
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these otherwise progressive candidates. When Wilson’s campaign manager struck a deal with 
Universal Pictures to produce and distribute one of the first political advertisements in American 
history, he hired Macauley to write the screenplay based on the imagery and themes of his 
cartoons. 
 Titled The Old Way and the New (1912), Macauley’s first foray into filmmaking 
represented a live-action version of his illustrations and foreshadowed the style of Whom the 
Gods Would Destroy. Beginning with a title card stating “The Old Way,” the eight-minute film 
cuts to a shot of the lavish office of a bourgeois capitalist. A servant is seen shuffling nervously 
around the room before hanging a portrait of Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft next 
to a massive vault. A door opens and an archetypal “Fat Cat” lumbers in wearing a top hat and 
black suit. The man rubs his protruding stomach, which his trousers can barely contain, before 
plopping into a desk chair and flipping angrily through a stack of letters. Two of his employees 
then approach with their heads hanging low and their hats in hand. Clearly apprehensive, the two 
men can say only a few words to their boss before he leaps up from behind his desk and wags his 
finger violently in front of their faces. “Raise your wages five per cent,” a title card interjects, 
“You’d ought to be glad you’re living!” After ejecting the men from his office, he lights a cigar 
and reads a letter with gusto, reinforcing his Fat Cat persona. A close-up reveals its contents to 
the audience: “Gentlemen, we need a million dollars to swing 100,000 votes … Yours for the 
minimum wage, High Tariff Boss.” The man chuckles menacingly as his servant opens the vault 
and literally shovels mounds of cash into a clearly labeled “Dough Bag.” With his cigar in hand, 
the man saunters over to his portrait of Taft, points at it, and nods in approval.  
The film’s second act follows one of the ousted employees walking down a city street. He 
passes an illustrator, played by Macualey himself, completing a satirical portrait of his boss 
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standing between Taft and Roosevelt. With his arms draped around the two candidates, the boss 
stares directly at the viewer with a sign branded across his protruding stomach. “Protected 
Interests,” it reads. The man glares at the portrait, shakes his head in disgust, and continues on 
his way. As he meanders down the sidewalk, he suddenly sees another portrait that stops him 
dead in his tracks. A slow panning shot reveals a massive mural of Wilson’s running mate, 
Thomas Marshall, followed by a shrieking bald eagle with an American flag clinched in its 
talons. The man’s enthusiasm builds increasingly as he walks besides the mural, revealing it 
gradually to the audience. A feeling of suspense slowly builds as Woodrow Wilson’s face comes 
into frame. The man stares at Wilson’s portrait and pats his chest in admiration. A title card 
appears on the screen: “The New Way.”  
In the final sequence, the tone of the film shifts as it breaks from the established scenario 
and addresses the audience directly. A poster appears in the middle of the frame, stating, 
“WANTED: 100,000 EARNEST CITZENS TO CONTRIBUTE EACH ONE MODEST 
DOLLAR TO ELECT A PRESIDENT OF AND FOR THE PEOPLE.” Given his newfound 
confidence in Wilson, the man reaches into his pocket and pulls out one dollar and an envelope. 
He quickly scribbles down an address and places it in the mailbox. A look of relief grows on his 
face. The message is clear: wages and working conditions will improve under a Wilson 
presidency. The film is an obvious, yet effective, take on the class tensions and labor struggles 
that were typical of the progressive era. Wilson’s campaign promise for a “New Way” served as 
a foil to Roosevelt’s “New Nationalism” platform. By breaking monopolies and stripping them 
of protective tariffs, Wilson figured he could even the playing field and create a more egalitarian 
private sector. Macauley’s film personified these issues in an effort to generate donations for 
Wilson’s campaign. The final image leaves the viewer with an ominous warning: “Your 
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government is in danger! This Appeal is to You! Send Your dollar Now!” Though Macauley 
wanted the film to serve as a call to action, he also wanted it to stir laughter and affection. His 
fondness for humor and drama distinguished his films from his propaganda-producing peers. 
Today, many historians have credited Macauley’s work as integral to Wilson winning the 
election.   
In 1916, Wilson once again returned to the campaign trail and looked to Macauley to help 
muster support. At this point, Macauley had graduated to directing, and he realized that after 
Wilson’s four years in office, audiences no longer wanted to see Wilson treated as an abstraction 
or a symbol. They wanted to see Wilson as he truly was. Consequently, Macualey decided to 
avoid any staged set pieces or obvious pleas for donations and asked Wilson to give him 
permission to shoot candid footage inside the White House. Though reluctant, Wilson ultimately 
agreed and granted Macauley and his crew one week of unprecedented access. The result was the 
groundbreaking documentary Motion Picture Portrait Studies of President Wilson and His 
Cabinet (1916). Because of the cumbersome title, most audiences and newspapers referred to it 
simply as The United States Government in Action.  
Macauley’s goal was to show theatergoers what he believed Wilson did best: govern. As 
the writer, director, and producer of the film, Macualey provided a new view into the daily 
workings of the White House. “I had long felt,” Macauley said of the project, “that the people of 
the United States were entitled to know more intimately the men who run things for them at 
Washington.”7 Advertisements championed the film as “the only one of its kind ever made in the 
world” as well as a powerful representation of democracy and freedom of speech.8 Samuel 
Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, wrote a publicized letter to Macualey 
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praising the “marvelous” film for allowing ordinary Americans the opportunity to “make them 
feel that they have a personal acquaintance with those who control the national government.”9 
The film dovetailed with Gompers’ larger mission to bridge the perceived gap between workers 
and elected officials.10  
The surviving press coverage for the film shows that many viewers took note of its ability 
to humanize Wilson. “One feature of the picture which attracted large attention,” a reviewer for 
The Moving Picture World wrote, “was the wonderful variety of smiles shown by the 
President.”11 Macauley wanted to lift the veil of mystery that surrounded the activities of the 
President and to reveal that beneath the stoic facade was a man genuinely concerned with the 
interests of the public. “In a full face view,” the reviewer continued, “President Wilson smiled in 
a way which was new to those who have seen thousands of photographs of him … this motion 
picture smile may become known as ‘the Wilson smile.’”12 Drawing liberally from the 
conventions of documentary, fiction film, and propaganda, Macauley closed the divide between 
producer and spectator. As he entertained, he also encouraged active participation in civic life. 
Whom the Gods Would Destroy took these ideas to new heights by creating a theatrical 
experience that immersed audiences in a fictitious romance and an actual fight for the League of 
Nations. 
Macauley adapted the screenplay for Whom the Gods Would Destroy from his 1917 play 
Humanity, which, unlike the screenplay, is still accessible in select libraries. A textual analysis of 
the play is useful in shedding some much-needed light on this important, yet lost, film. The 
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scenario and characters of the four-act play reflected the anxieties and expectations of millions of 
Americans in 1917, particularly fears over German authoritarianism and its potential to resurface 
even after the war. Only a League of Nations, the play suggests, could maintain an enduring 
peace and prevent despots from rearing their heads. Within each act, Macauley wrote a scene 
located inside the League’s council room—“a tremendous hall draped with flags of all the 
nations of the earth”—in order to brief his readers directly on the theoretical operations of the 
League.13 
The play’s first act introduces the reader to an alternate reality that closely resembles the 
state of the world immediately after the war. The great powers have created a League of Nations 
and a World Court to “exalt the spirit of brotherhood in all the peoples of the world.”14 The 
reader learns of these developments from the Black Emperor, a character who serves as both the 
antagonist and as a clear allegory for the German Kaiser. Similar to the opening scene in The Old 
Way and the New, Humanity begins inside the Black Emperor’s lavish palace. Surrounded by 
portraits of former kings from around the world, the Black Emperor details his sinister plot to 
unleash an epidemic disease on the fictitious nation of Belsermania and take control of its rich oil 
fields. “Though the world thinks I am no longer powerful,” the Black Emperor says to himself, 
“it will yet have cause to cry out in pain, as my hand closes about the throat of humanity.”15 The 
Emperor’s problem, however, is that the provisions of the League of Nations prohibit him from 
formally conquering the territory under any circumstance. As a result, he manipulates American 
millionaire William Banfield into purchasing the oil fields under the assumption that he will sell 
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them to the Emperor after the epidemic runs its course. Void of integrity, the wealthy Banfield 
concedes and admits plainly that he has “no other object in the world than to make money.”16  
The scene frames the debate over the League of Nations as a battle between forces of 
good and evil. Much of the opening dialogue reads like actual speeches from pro-League 
activists and touches upon their most sensational talking points. For example, the notion of using 
diseases to murder civilians echoed the paranoia of many peace advocates who had observed 
World War I’s characteristic cache of new weaponry. Moreover, the Black Emperor’s lust for oil 
was a reimagining of European imperial ambitions in Africa and Asia. Macualey clearly intended 
to reinforce the popular assumption that competition over raw materials and resources was a 
major catalyst for war. The disloyalty of the money-grubbing Banfield mirrored the concerns of 
contemporary evangelical groups who contended that greed was a sin spreading rapidly 
throughout American society. Banfield also embodied the concern of Henry Ford and many 
progressives who circulated the idea of clandestine elites working with the Kaiser to undermine 
the United States.  
The second act of Humanity explores the Black Emperor’s grudge against American 
genius Wayne Hamilton, a handsome inventor who is in love with Banfield’s niece, Helen. 
Hamilton is a prominent political figure because he created a series of weapons that had allowed 
the United States to defeat the Emperor’s forces during the preceding war. Hamilton is the 
story’s protagonist and represents the United States and its knack for technological innovation. 
Borrowing heavily from real-life events, the story champions how Hamilton turned the tide of 
the conflict with his ability “to concentrate and hurl the greatest mass of ammunition and 
supplies ever gathered in the history of the world.”17 Hamilton, though handsome and inventive, 
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is far from perfect. He is a manifestation of the most common criticism that Europeans had of 
Americans. He is overly optimistic and painfully naïve. Despite his brilliance, Hamilton is 
deeply superstitious and prone to magical thinking. The Emperor exploits these attitudes by 
employing Alma, a beautiful and proud subject of the empire, to convince Hamilton that she can 
communicate with the dead. Her paranormal “skills” come into play in the third act when 
Hamilton learns that his sister Mary has traveled to Belsermania to tend to the ill.  
While working with their patients, Mary and several doctors discover that the Emperor is 
behind the epidemic. When they try and inform their superiors, the Emperor has them killed. 
Alma carries a personal telegraph device that keeps her privy to the true nature of their deaths, 
but she convinces Hamilton that Mary had contracted the deadly disease from a contagious 
patient. The Emperor then purchases the Belsermanian territory from the wealthy Banfield and 
orders his troops to relocate there. Once the League of Nations learns of the Emperor’s nefarious 
activities, it objects and threatens to ostracize him from the international community. The 
Emperor ignores calls for arbitration and declares war. The World Court consequently outlaws 
the Emperor and his nation from all affairs and the representatives of the League of Nations 
gallantly agree to once again “fight the battle of democracy against militarism.”18 
Humanity’s third act opens with the war nearing its end. The Emperor and his forces are 
surrounded in Belsermania as Hamilton organizes the final assault. However, Hamilton is 
worried because the Emperor is holding Helen hostage behind enemy lines. Banfield, her 
wealthy uncle, feels guilty for aiding in her capture and asks the Emperor to have her released. 
Instead, the Emperor confiscates Banfield’s wealth and assets and explains how he had 
manipulated the American millionaire for his own gain. Frustrated, Banfield tells the Emperor 
																																								 																				
18	Ibid,	11.	
	 137	
that he will never win the war because his only chance of survival rests on Alma’s ability to 
sabotage Hamilton and his troops. Unbeknownst to the Emperor, Alma is now in love with 
Hamilton and sympathetic to his cause. After entering the headquarters of the Emperor’s forces, 
she sees that his cronies have enslaved Helen and plan to marry her off to an influential Baron 
loyal to the Emperor’s cause. “This is hardly fair,” she says to the Baron, “There is no credit in 
persecuting the helpless … that is the doctrine of our beautiful militarism.”19 The Baron scoffs at 
her idealist take on the ideology of the state, which overwhelms her with confusion. She then has 
an epiphany and refuses to be “the instrument of defeating the democracy of the world.”20 
Instead, she decides to mislead the Emperor’s generals with false information regarding 
Hamilton’s final assault. Taking the bait, the generals launch a doomed counter-offensive. Once 
the generals learn of Alama’s deceit, the Baron carries out orders to shoot her on the spot. The 
merciless act impels Banfield to act and to try to wrestle the gun away from the Baron. A scuffle 
ensues before several soldiers enter the room and kill Banfield. Helen witnesses her uncle’s 
death but survives and is quickly rescued by the heroic Hamilton. 
The moral transformation of Banfield and Alma in Humanity reflected the Protestant and 
nationalist values that were ubiquitous throughout American literature at that time. Even though 
their actions triggered a major cataclysm, Banfield and Alma atoned for their sins by giving their 
life to secure a League victory. Their fates reflected a distinct evangelical tradition in the United 
States that preached that anyone could attain salvation so long as he or she adhered to the highest 
principles in their final hour. Alma’s character arc also personified the attitudes that many 
Americans had about the German people during the war. Because Germans lived under 
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authoritarian rule, many assumed, they too were the victims of the Kaiser and were certainly not 
inherently evil. 
The play’s final act returns to the council room of the League of Nations. The chairman 
of the League informs the reader that the Emperor has committed suicide and that his former 
subjects have embraced democracy and appointed representatives to serve in the League. “There 
will be no more wars of aggression,” the chairman asserts proudly, “we will typify the spirit of 
the world.”21 Helen then comes forward and embraces the flags of all nations. She pulls them 
enthusiastically to her chest while the officials stand and cheer, “The symbol of our 
brotherhood—Humanity!”22 The scene reveals a great deal about Macauley’s worldview and the 
philosophical contradictions surrounding the League’s formation. Macauley, like Woodrow 
Wilson, operated under the belief that liberal democracy was the natural order for all societies. 
Any authoritarian nation, he reasoned, could transition seamlessly to a democracy since that was 
the latent desire of the people. The notion stemmed from the false assumption that all people 
wanted nothing more than American conceptions of popular sovereignty and representative 
government.  
After the publication of Humanity in 1917, Macauley traveled to Washington, D.C. and 
spent four months conducting research for a film adaption of the play. As President Wilson made 
his ideas for a League of Nations publically known, Macauley worked with fellow screenwriter 
Nan Blair and gradually incorporated each detail into the screenplay. Instead of repeating the 
alternate reality of his play, Macualey decided to set the film in the contemporary world and 
replace several shallow archetypes with real-life figures. Macauley forwent the mysterious 
“Black Emperor” and made the villain Wilhelm II, the actual German Kaiser and King of 
																																								 																				
21	Ibid,	16.	
22	Ibid.	
	 139	
Prussia. He even consulted with Wilson and several members of his administration personally to 
confirm that he was doing justice to their peacekeeping ideology.23 He wanted the film to 
function as a primer on the administrative procedures of the League. They allegedly approved of 
his screenplay and liked the fact that their campaign had the support of individuals from the film 
industry. Once completed, advertisements embellished these connections, claiming the film was 
“backed by America’s foremost thinkers” and “Members of the Paris Peace Conference helped 
make it.”24 The film adaptation of Humanity represented the culmination of Macauley’s work as 
an artist and activist. 
In Humanity, Macauley treated war as the inevitable consequence of the Emperor’s 
hubris. The new film allowed him to explore this theme further. Echoing Wilson’s treatment of 
World War I as “the war to end all wars,” Macualey framed the war’s exceptional cruelty as the 
end result of Europe and the United States’ repeated failure to learn from the past and recognize 
the folly of militarism. Adopting a teleological perspective, the film framed the entire duration of 
world civilization as a mere prelude to the creation of the League. However, to avoid confusion 
with the popular war propaganda film The Heart of Humanity (1918), Macauley decided to 
change the title from “Humanity” to “Whom the Gods Would Destroy,” a famous saying often 
attributed to Euripides, an ancient Greek playwright.  
According to conventional lore, Euripides warned his fellow Greeks of the fall of 
Prometheus, a mythological titan who had angered the gods by giving the power of fire to 
humans. When responding to threats that he would be punished for his actions, Prometheus 
replied, “Whom the gods would destroy they first make mad.” The phrase suggested that 
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displays of bitterness and anger were a sign of foreboding punishment from the gods. 
Throughout the war, pacifist groups used the phrase incessantly in speeches and publications.25 It 
even served as the title for a widely read anti-war essay published by the renowned sociologist 
Franklin Giddings. By appealing to the discourse of established pacifist groups, the title 
distinguished the film from the usual studio fare. 
 Whom the Gods Would Destroy also situated a contemporary tale within the longue durée 
of human history. Beginning on an optimistic note, the film provided audiences with a 
melodramatic portrayal of the birth of Jesus Christ in the manger. The scene, according to one 
critic, demonstrated how “Christ brought to a troubled world the philosophy of love, which ever 
since has been struggling to overcome the human tendency to create strife.”26 Working closely 
with Macauley, director Frank Borzage showed this tension by cutting abruptly from the manger 
scene to the violent conquests of Attila the Hun. Audiences found the five-hundred-year jump in 
the story jarring but also effective. In approximately ten minutes, the film then descended into a 
chronological montage of the rise and fall of various military leaders, including Mehmed II, 
Suleiman I, and Napoleon. According to one critic, the violent tenure of these supposed “great” 
leaders faded into one another in “kaleidoscopic rapidity.”27 The sequence reached a crescendo 
with the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, bringing the story to the present. The 
months before the onset of World War I served as the backdrop for the film’s initial plot, a 
romance between a young American inventor and a Belgian burgomaster’s daughter. The 
similarity to Macauley’s Humanity was clear. 
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  Prolific film star Jack Mulhall played the male protagonist Jack Randall, an independent 
inventor who tinkers with explosives and chemicals. After a series of experiments, Randall 
develops a new explosive agent that he predicts will change the nature of industry and warfare 
forever. But, like Hamilton, the protagonist in Humanity, Randall is also naïve. Unaware that 
German operatives are keeping a close eye on his work, Randall continues his experiments under 
the assumption that he will eventually use his invention to benefit the American public. Before 
he can bring the powerful device to interested parties in the United States, however, several 
“representatives” of a large German chemical company approach him with an offer to study full-
time at the prestigious University of Berlin. Taken with the idea of pursuing his scientific 
interests in a foreign land, he agrees enthusiastically to move to Germany and bring his talent 
and explosive device with him. Though initially impressed with the country, he soon becomes 
disillusioned with his new life after mingling with the impressionable German student body. 
Randall, a proud American and supporter of liberal democracy, grows suspicious of the 
autocratic ideals of his cohorts and fearful of the Kaiser’s increasing commitment to militarism. 
After discovering that his recruiters are also members of the German Secret Service, Randall 
finally realizes that his studies are part of a dubious program orchestrated by the Kaiser.  
“The Menace,” one reviewer noted, “schemes to gain possession of this invention and 
conquer the world.”28 The Kaiser’s plan is to conscript gifted inventors from the United States to 
develop the most powerful weapons for the German military. Though fabricated, the film’s 
scenario mirrored actual developments in the history of technology. World War I transformed 
technological innovation by bringing together the interests of business, government, and 
academia. In both Germany and the United States, large firms worked closely with institutes of 
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higher education to employ formerly independent inventors in lucrative research and 
development programs. Many of these programs engineered important chemical agents and 
explosives that were used extensively throughout the war. As the nature of technological 
innovation changed, popular films clearly took note.  
 In order to escape the German war machine, Randall abandons his studies at Berlin and 
flees to Belgium. Before he can become accustomed to a new university, however, the war 
breaks out and German soldiers march into the country like a colonial force ready to ride herd. 
Occupied Belgium mirrors the conditions in the fictitious Belsermania from Humanity. Randall 
witnesses a series of atrocities committed against the Belgians and struggles to survive. Amidst 
the turmoil, he meets Julie Mathieu, played by the widely acclaimed star Pauline Starke. Julie is 
on the lam after chauvinistic soldiers killed her entire family. Even her father, an influential 
burgomaster, could not escape the Kaiser’s violence. The first two acts of the film did little to 
break from the typical portrayal of the Kaiser as a sadistic warmonger.  
 The horrors of the war strengthen the bond between Randall and Mathieu, who quickly 
fall in love. Randall’s passion for Julie stimulates his patriotism and he vows to escort her across 
the trenches to allied territory. After a series of suspenseful chases, he brings his lover to safety 
and then enlists in the army. He fights in the war for two years before reuniting with his soul 
mate.29 The two agree to marry one another as Woodrow Wilson outlines the parameters for the 
League of Nations. Word of the League reaches Germany when a piece of paper falls from the 
sky into the hands of an anonymous soldier. The solider picks up the paper and reads: “Woodrow 
Wilson offers the German people membership in a League of Nations.” Intrigued, the soldier 
starts attending various peace meetings in secret until the war’s belligerents agree to an 
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armistice. The scene reinforced the assumption that the majority of Germans were good people 
yearning to be liberated from the Kaiser’s rule. 
The film’s final act incorporated newsreel footage from the Paris Peace Conference to 
reconcile the fictional love story with current events. Images from the formation of the League 
screened alongside Randall and Mathieu’s wedding to symbolize peace prevailing over war and 
love prevailing over hate. This sentimental optimism echoed the tone of the opening scene. By 
positioning the film’s love story between the birth of Christ and the League of Nations, the film 
suggested heavy-handedly that the two events were of equal importance in spreading notions of 
universal morality. Because of the film’s epic scale and relevance to the most pressing issue in 
foreign affairs, Macauley figured that he had all the requirements needed for a blockbuster. To 
ensure success, he hired Harry Reichenbach, one of the most successful promoters in the motion 
picture industry, to aid the film’s publicity campaign. 
Reichenbach had a reputation for staging elaborate spectacles around films to intrigue the 
public and to ensure that their titles made newspaper headlines. He considered himself the 
“father of ballyhoo” and charged companies approximately $1,000 dollars a week for 
“exploiting, publicizing, attracting attention, and creating sensational manifestations for 
pictures.”30 He served as a press agent not only for leading performers like Rudolph Valentino 
and Douglas Fairbanks, but also for President Wilson on one of his diplomatic expeditions to 
Italy. During the war, Reichenbach worked with the Committee on Public Information to 
promote Wilson’s image as a reliable ally. Reichenbach boasted that he had the “Italians ready to 
accept him as the greatest living statesman … they would bow down to him before they did to 
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the saints.”31 Though the President approved of the work Reichenbach had done for his 
administration, he did not, however, appreciate all of his entertainment exploits.  
For the release of Tarzan of the Apes (1918) and its sequel The Revenge of Tarzan 
(1920), Reichenbach hired animal trainers to book rooms at affluent New York hotels under the 
name T.R. Zann. He then gathered crowds of spectators to watch “Mr. Zann” shepherd live 
animals, such as chimpanzees and lions, to his room. Reichenbach’s hosts were rarely notified in 
advance of such shenanigans and raised concern over ethics and public safety. Fiascos such as 
this even forced President Wilson to occasionally condemn Reichenbach’s methods. In response 
to such criticism, Reichenbach once replied, “I spent $8,800 of my own money doing press agent 
work for President Wilson. … I deserved some return.”32 Despite the controversial relationship 
between Reichenbach and Wilson, Macauley figured his tenacity was precisely what the film and 
the League of Nations needed in order to succeed.  
 Reichenbach used his clout in Washington, D.C. and the motion picture industry to 
ensure that the major trade journals would cover the release of the film in detail. He needed 
coverage from trade journals because he thought too many conservative newspapers would 
ignore the film on account of its pro-League message. Since the fighting had stopped, 
Reichenbach also predicted that audiences would soon lose interest in rousing war films. “It’s 
not a propaganda picture,” he exclaimed adamantly, “it’s not a war drama, but a picture that 
presents in a most dramatic way the foreseen manner in which a world peace was to be brought 
about.”33 Peace films, he assumed, were not only fashionable, but also profitable. Because the 
film’s connections to the White House were a convenient selling point, Reichenbach organized 
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advanced screenings for members of the National Press Club. He wanted to advertise the film’s 
“intense moral lesson” to diplomats, correspondents, and government officials.34 The media buzz 
in Washington, D.C. also helped legitimate his rigorous letter-writing campaign.  
From the Macualey production office, Reichenbach had approximately ten thousand 
letters mailed per week directly to the homes of individuals affiliated with the peace movement. 
He worked closely with dozens of pacifist and peace organizations to ensure that participants 
received personal invitations. By the time of the film’s release, Reichenbach and his associates 
had sent over two million letters. “No film in recent history,” Reichenbach argued, “has been 
promoted to a greater or more far reaching extent.”35 The letters advertised the plan to premier 
the film simultaneously in at least one hundred major cities around the world, including New 
York, Paris, London, Rome, and Rio de Janeiro.36 In each city, Reichenbach communicated with 
leading activists who sympathized with the film’s plea for the League of Nations. The League to 
Enforce Peace (LEP) was particularly involved in the campaign and endorsed the film routinely 
in its publications and amongst its four hundred thousand members. 
 The League to Enforce Peace was one of the most vocal and influential organizations to 
advocate for the formation of the League of Nations and the World Court. Prominent politicians 
and businessmen, such as William Howard Taft, Elihu Root, Edward Filene, and Alexander 
Graham Bell, founded the organization in 1914 as a reaction to the emerging violence in Europe. 
Reichenbach understood that support from the organization’s founders would prove useful in 
promoting the film. The LEP brought together Democrats and Republicans in a grassroots effort 
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to petition for the creation of an intergovernmental organization dedicated to the pursuit of world 
peace. Such an organization, the LEP leadership assumed, would work with the Permanent Court 
of International Justice at The Hague to strengthen the United States’ role in international 
arbitration.37 The organization stressed the need to formulate international law through an 
international parliament composed of elected officials from member states. Though the LEP 
emphasized internationalism, it championed the United States as the world’s premier moral 
compass. “The great issue before us,” one member of the LEP asked, “is, therefore, the 
Americanization of the world or the Europeanization of America.”38 Many LEP leaders 
embraced Wilson’s belief that the end of the war represented the world at a vital crossroads. 
There were only two paths, Wilson insisted, “Utopia or hell.”39  
The LEP was a relatively conservative organization overall. The leadership by and large 
embraced time-honored interpretations of manifest destiny and believed that world peace hinged 
on the spread of American democratic and free market ideals. Though the LEP was critical of the 
war, it did not align itself with the many anti-war and pacifist groups that had advocated an 
immediate ceasefire. Many members criticized the pacifist advocacy of Henry Ford’s Peace Ship 
and pined for the swift defeat of Germany and the Central Powers. In fact, many LEP members 
supported Theodore Roosevelt’s Preparedness Movement and Wilson’s decision to join the 
allied war effort. “The League to Enforce Peace,” read an official statement in 1914, “is not a 
stop the war movement. It contemplates a league of nations to be set up after the present war.”40 
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Consequently, the LEP’s mission matched the plot and message of Whom the Gods Would 
Destroy perfectly. 
 Like most peace organizations, the LEP leadership recognized the value of using of film 
in supporting their cause. In 1917, John Freuler—President of the influential conglomerate 
Mutual Film Corporation—articulated much of the LEP’s treatment of film in its weekly 
bulletin. Freuler’s article, “The Motion Picture as an Influence for World Peace,” echoed the 
thesis he had put forth in a handful of other influential publications, including The World Court 
and Advocate of Peace.41 “Provided due liberty is permitted by governments,” he argued, “films 
will bring about a feeling of international fellowship such as has never hitherto been 
approached.”42 Freuler shared the sentiment of many other advocates of the Pax Cinemana and 
embraced film as a means of acquainting distant societies with one another: “Wars are really just 
misunderstandings … the motion picture, which introduces to us and makes us familiar with all 
the peoples of the world is probably the greatest instrumentality toward sympathetic 
understanding between nations.”43  
Freuler assumed incorrectly that the conflicts in the Balkans, particularly the ones 
surrounding Serbian nationalism and the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, 
stemmed entirely from “a lack of neighborly feeling—an aloofness toward the family next 
door.”44 Freuler shared the LEP leadership’s distaste for glorified depictions of war and 
welcomed the emergence of peace pictures. “Suppose the crying necessity for peace,” Freuler 
preached, “could be brought to the attention of humanity through world-wide resources of the 
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motion picture industry.”45 The LEP leaders liked this idea but had few connections in the 
industry and no experience with film production. So, when Reichenbach brought Whom the Gods 
Would Destroy to their attention, they leaped at the opportunity to get involved with a film that 
championed their mission.46 The LEP embraced Freuler’s guiding principle: “Let me make the 
world’s film—I care not who wages its wars.”47 Whom the Gods Would Destroy, the LEP 
leadership assumed, was a manifestation of this sentiment.  
 Nearly a week before the film’s multi-city premier, Reichenbach organized a private 
screening in New York City for the executive board of the LEP. In attendance were William 
Howard Taft, Hamilton Holt, Oscar Straus, and many others.48 The board approved of the film 
and appreciated how “the picture shows in a vivid manner the blessing of peace as maintained by 
a League of Nations.”49 The LEP leadership was also surprised to see that their organization had 
actually appeared in the film. Newsreel footage from the LEP’s convention in Philadelphia was 
incorporated into the final reel. Audiences allegedly saw William Howard Taft signing the 
“Declaration of Interdependence” in the historic Independence Hall.50 The positive reception 
from the LEP foreshadowed that of the public and the press. 
 By all measures, Whom the Gods Would Destroy was a commercial and critical success. 
“If you want to see how much out-of-date war films have become,” one reviewer wrote in 
response to the film’s peace message, “see this sumptuous production.”51 Its relevance to current 
events, another reviewer noted, made it “the best box office attraction since The Heart of 
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Humanity.”52 The reviewer for Motion Picture World ensured theatergoers that the film was 
thankfully “not of the propaganda type, but is an excellent argument for world leagues.”53 Others 
ignored the underlying call to activism and applauded the film simply because it was “full of 
action and wonderfully well-staged.”54 Though it was not the highest grossing film of the year, it 
did come close to matching attendance records at many theaters. In fact, the film was popular 
enough that it continued to screen in select locations for fifteen months after its initial release 
date, a rare occurrence in that era.55 Even though “war pictures were out of fashion,” one critic 
surmised, “there was a dramatic story entirely apart from the war.”56 The film dovetailed with 
Wilson’s campaign for the League of Nations and helped drum up considerable support. Despite 
these accomplishments, it was not without controversy. 
In March 1919, an associate of the German government filed for an injunction with the 
New York Supreme Court against Macauley and Reichenbach to prevent them from screening or 
advertising the film any further. The plaintiff acted on behalf of Jeanne Luckemeyer, known in 
Germany as Countess Von Bernstorff, to seek $100,000 in damages. Luckemeyer was a German-
American woman married to Count Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, the controversial German 
politician who had served as Ambassador to the United States between 1908 and 1917. 
According to the plaintiff, the portrayal of the couple in Whom the Gods Would Destroy unfairly 
held “the Countess up to ridicule.”57 The lawsuit addressed a specific title card from the film, 
which introduced the Countess and her husband as villains: “Bernstorff and his American wife,” 
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it read, “whom he used to spread his campaign of arson, sabotage, and murder.”58 Reichenbach 
scoffed at the accusations and insisted that the “crimes charged against von Bernstorff were 
actually committed and that an alien enemy such as the Countess, has no rights in the courts.”59  
The film’s depiction of Ambassador Bernstorff was inspired by his tumultuous 
relationship with President Wilson and his role in many conspiracies to undermine the interests 
of the White House. Bernstorff helped traffic weapons to Mexico in spite of Wilson’s opposition 
and organized the Phenol Plot of 1915, a covert operation orchestrated by the German 
government to redirect American supplies of phenol away from companies that developed 
explosives for the British army and to the German chemical and pharmaceutical company, 
Bayer. The event probably inspired the film’s treatment of German companies as accomplices to 
the Kaiser’s plan to deprive the United States of talented chemists like Randall, the film’s 
protagonist. Ultimately, Justice Daniel Cohalan sided with Reichenbach and rejected the 
injunction. This was a major victory for the film’s cause because Justice Cohalan was one of 
New York’s most vocal opponents to the formation of the League of Nations.60 As a firm 
supporter of Irish nationalism, Cohalan publicly condemned Wilson and the Paris Peace 
Conference for failing to recognize the sovereignty of the fledgling Irish Republic. Few notable 
politicians, however, shared his concern, emphasizing another one of the many nuances that had 
surrounded the debate over the League’s formation. Because of Cohalan’s decision, the film 
continued to screen undeterred. And yet, controversy ensued again after it was released abroad. 
 Soon after its premier in the United States, David Howells, a producer for the distribution 
company First National Pictures, purchased from Macauley the foreign rights to the film. He 
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planned to distribute it to theaters outside the United States, particularly in Europe. Because the 
war devastated European film industries, Howells wanted to cash in on the immediate demand 
for American productions. He released Whom the Gods Would Destroy successfully in France, 
Great Britain, and the Netherlands.61 However, for unknown reasons, the film was banned in 
Sweden. This was an unusual development because Sweden was one of the founding members of 
the League of Nations and few Swedes would have taken issue with the film’s pro-League 
message. The decision to ban the film had most likely come from concerns inside the Swedish 
film industry. Sweden had remained neutral during the war, which provided enough time and 
resources for creative talent to construct one of the most lucrative film industries in the world. 
Though Sweden had a long tradition of avoiding acts of censorship, it was likely that the 
government intervened to quell concerns over the potential for American films to saturate 
Swedish markets. The event demonstrated how difficult it was for peacekeeping films to 
navigate the conflicting interests of business and politics. Even though Sweden joined the 
League enthusiastically, the Swedish government was unwilling to compromise the economic 
interests of its domestic entertainment industry. Actions such as such as this were perfect fodder 
for several American Congressmen, who argued that the League of Nations would create new 
economic opportunities for European states at the expense of American industries.   
Nevertheless, most American representatives, regardless of party affiliation, actually 
supported the formation of the League. Even Henry Cabot Lodge—the de facto Republican 
Senate Majority Leader—approved with only a few reservations. “The United States,” Lodge 
argued, “is the world’s best hope, but if you fetter her in the interests and quarrels of other 
nations, you will destroy her powerful good, and endanger her very existence.”62 He shared the 
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concern of many Republicans, as well as Democrats, that the dubious nature of Article X in the 
League’s covenant would work against the immediate interests of Congress. Moreover, there was 
concern that the United States would be responsible for a disproportionate amount of the 
League’s finances. Ardent critics, like Republican Senators George Norris and William Borah, 
who the press dubbed the “Irreconcilables,” promoted an image of the League’s headquarters in 
Geneva, Switzerland as an overbearing bureaucracy bent on controlling Washington, D.C. To 
counter these exaggerated claims, the League to Enforce Peace (LEP) organized a series of 
speaking events, which included screenings of Whom the Gods Would Destroy, to convince 
prominent Republicans that membership in the League was not only cost effective, but also 
advantageous for American businesses looking to invest in European markets. The LEP also 
argued that the details of the covenant were minor issues that should not distract from the 
League’s greater potential to eliminate war. When it seemed as if enough Republicans were 
willing to accept the covenant so long as Article X had a caveat acknowledging that 
Congressional approval was needed before member states could declare war, the LEP leadership 
pleaded with Wilson to concede.  
Wilson, however, was stubborn and adamantly refused to negotiate the provisions of 
membership. He wanted to commit the United States fully to the League’s covenant as it had 
been drafted at Versailles in order to establish its newfound status as “the savior of the world.”63 
Lodge agreed that the war had demonstrated the need for the United States to take on a greater 
role in world affairs. However, he contended that the global nature of the League would 
undermine the Monroe Doctrine and shift the focus of American foreign policy too far away 
from the western hemisphere. The debate intensified as Whom the Gods Would Destroy made its 
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initial theatrical run. During these months, reporters and politicians started increasingly to 
discuss cinema as an integral component to the formation and success of the League.64 “You may 
be sure,” Wilson remarked, “I shall value the support of the theaters and the motion pictures for 
the League of Nations as a very potent help.”65  
Wilson’s fondness for the film industry generated the attention of studio executives at 
Paramount Pictures, Metro Pictures, and Fox Film. Movie moguls were favorable to Wilson’s 
politics and hoped that the League would create new opportunities to produce and distribute 
films throughout Europe.66 When they assumed that the United States’ membership in the 
League was imminent, they began delicately to incorporate pro-League messages into some of 
their advertising campaigns. Many of these were nearly identical to those of Whom the Gods 
Would Destroy. Paramount Pictures, for example, re-released and rebranded the war propaganda 
film Hearts of the World (1918) as “a vivid reason for the League of Nations.”67 By aligning 
themselves with Wilson and the League, they wanted to distinguish themselves from their 
competitors and show their customers that they were always on the “right side” of history. 
Another advertisement for Paramount Pictures made this explicitly clear. “Words won’t make a 
League of Nations,” it stated confidently, “but understanding will.” After suggesting that the 
public had bestowed the company with the authority to speak for nation’s best interests, the 
advertisement continued, “The motion picture accepts the responsibility … to be the chosen 
instrument by which harmony is brought to all the races of the earth.” When the name Paramount 
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is seen, the advertisement assured, “you are in league with the greatest harmonizing force 
humanity knows.”68 It would be easy but wrong to dismiss this lofty rhetoric as little more than 
empty grandstanding. Many executives at Paramount did genuinely believe in Wilson’s crusade 
and assumed that films would indeed help bring about a safer, better world. A reporter for The 
Film Daily described the sentiment at Paramount accurately:  
The success of the League of Nations will depend in a large measure upon the 
abolishment of narrow creeds and prejudices, and the motion picture camera is expected 
to be the gun which will hold sway over the hundreds of millions who will be guided by 
the League of Nations.69 
If the United States was at the center of the League’s operations, it was easy to imagine a 
handful of American studios wielding the “gun” of the world’s film business. They were after all 
far larger and more profitable than those in Europe. “Naturally,” one reporter quipped 
condescendingly, “America, the master hand of the motion picture, is called upon to lead in this 
[League of Nations] work.”70 To ensure that leaders from within the film industry recognized the 
humanitarian and financial possibilities that the United States’ membership would bring, 
Woodrow Wilson commissioned William Fox, the President of Fox Film, to travel to Europe as 
an affiliate of the League and gauge the possibility of building international production facilities. 
One of the goals was to create “after-the-war dramas” that could “weld together the bonds of 
unity that President Wilson’s League of Nations is destined to promote.”71 Just a few weeks after 
these projects began, though, Wilson suffered a series of devastating strokes that forced him to 
retreat from the public eye and discontinue his activism for the League. He cancelled his 
remaining speaking events, including a scheduled meeting with Aurora Mardiganian to promote 
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the film Ravished Armenia.72 While confined to the White House, Wilson continued to receive 
film-related inquiries. Unaware of the severity of his condition, the renowned British publicist 
and film producer Charles Higham reached out to Wilson and offered to finance a League 
propaganda film that he could outline as he saw fit.73 However, as opposition to the League 
mounted steadily, such film activities were put on hold.   
In March 1920, nearly one year after the release of Whom the Gods Would Destroy, the 
Senate voted on the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles and the League’s covenant. The 
preceding months were heated and one reporter even joked that the source of all this Washington 
bickering must have been “a clause in the League of Nations that will make further theatrical 
wars impossible.”74 Though the comment was made in jest, it reflected how embedded film had 
become within discussions over the fate of the League. After lengthy deliberation, the final tally 
was forty-nine votes for ratification and thirty-five opposed. All in all, Wilson was seven votes 
short of receiving the two-thirds needed for ratification. It was a major blow but the fight was not 
yet over. If the United States had any chance of clinching its membership, Democratic 
presidential candidate James Cox, a strong supporter of Wilson’s foreign and domestic policies, 
needed to defeat the Republican candidate Warren G. Harding in the upcoming presidential 
election.  
Harding was not an overtly charismatic or forward-thinking man but he did have a 
number of valuable allies in the Republican establishment. Henry Cabot Lodge, who had a 
personal dislike for Wilson, coached Harding and helped him craft a platform based 
disproportionately on anti-League sentiment. Moreover, he had the support of the media-savvy 
																																								 																				
72	“Cincinnati	Makes	Aurora	Mardiganian’s	Visit	an	Event,”	Motion	Picture	News,	August	30,	1919,	1810.	
73	“English	Producers	Agree	to	Stay	Out	Of	Exhibitor	Field,”	Exhibitors	Herald,	June	26,	1920,	44.	
74	“Striking	Humor,”	The	New	York	Clipper,	September	10,	1919,	13.	
	 156	
Will Hays. Before becoming the head of the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of 
America (MPPDA), Hays served as Chairman of the Republican National Committee. Despite 
pressure to run for office himself, he had allied with Lodge and agreed to manage Harding’s 
campaign. Like Wilson, Hays also understood the persuasive potential of motion pictures.75 He 
had studied Wilson’s successful campaigns in 1912 and 1916 and adopted many of his strategies. 
With Wilson unable to secure a third term nomination at the Democratic National Convention, 
Hays knew that he could use film to help sway votes away from the capable and admirable Cox. 
By pushing Harding’s image and message into thousands of movie theaters across the country, 
Hays created a powerful campaign based on a promise to “return to normalcy.” Of course, 
normalcy did not include a spot for the United States on the League’s roster. To counter the 
deluge of pro-Harding newsreels and media coverage, the independent studio Harry Levey 
Productions released Uncle Sam of Freedom Ridge (1920), a manipulative and unapologetic 
work of propaganda for the Democratic Party.76  
Whom the Gods Would Destroy helped create a market for films that promoted the 
League of Nations and internationalist ideals. Following this trend, Uncle Sam of Freedom Ridge 
boasted that it was an explicit and desperate plea for the United States to join the League. Based 
on Margaret Prescott Montague’s best-selling novel of the same name, the film promised 
audiences that it would “voice the feelings of millions” and help “bring a new fellowship into the 
world.”77 Many Americans were already familiar with the story since a serial version was widely 
distributed in a variety of major newspapers. Woodrow Wilson’s friend and advisor Bernard 
Baruch, a stockbroker and former chairman of the War Industrial Board, personally paid for the 
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story’s mass publication. In addition, Baruch donated $49,000 to help fund the film version after 
speaking with George White, the director of the Democratic National Committee, and several 
members of Cox’s campaign. News of their collaboration infuriated Republican Congressman 
Frederick Britten and Senator William Kenyon, who led an investigation into the matter to see if 
White and the Democratic Party had violated any corruption charges.78 Will Hays and the 
Harding campaign reveled in the negative press as rumors began to spread that Baruch and 
White had received massive payouts from undisclosed British interests.79 The charges were 
eventually dropped and Baruch insisted that he had acted entirely as a private citizen and a 
“friend of the League of Nations.”80 The incident brought a degree of controversy to the release 
of the film, especially because it loosely entangled Woodrow Wilson. Wilson had claimed earlier 
that Montague’s story was the finest work to come out of World War I and “breathes of a 
patriotism so pure and wholesome as to make all the other things of life seem of little 
consequence.”81 Of course, Wilson’s brief stint in literary criticism had little to do with 
recreation and leisure. He knew that he needed all the support he could muster in order to sway 
public opinion in favor of the League. If he had to tug at Americans’ heartstrings with 
sentimental propaganda, so be it.  
Unlike Whom the Gods Would Destroy, Uncle Sam of Freedom Ridge did not actually 
detail any of the operations or activities of the League. Instead, it was a dramatic reimagining of 
the sentiment in Wilson’s famous plea to the Senate in 1919, where he argued that the League 
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had come into existence with the hand of God. “Dare we reject it,” Wilson asked, “and break the 
heart of the world?”82 The film visualized this notion by depicting the final years of an old man 
who lives in a small, rural village with his son. When the war breaks out, the son proudly 
responds to the call of duty and enlists in the armed forces. After months of combat the son is 
tragically killed in action. When news of his death returns home, the old man, now referred to as 
Uncle Sam due to his activism at Red Cross and Liberty Loan functions, is overwhelmed with 
grief. However, what keeps him motivated is the proposal of the League, which he is certain will 
bring a permanent end to war. As the senators bicker over whether or not the United States 
should join the organization, Uncle Sam writes a letter to Washington detailing his plan to 
commit suicide if the League is vetoed. When the Senate does denounce the League, his heart 
breaks. To atone for this failure, he wraps himself in an American flag and shoots himself. News 
of his death captivates members of the public, who eventually force their representatives to 
secure the United States’ membership. 
Fittingly, the first person to see the completed film was Wilson. A special screening was 
arranged at the White House nine days before its premiere at the lavish Selwyn Theater in New 
York City.83 At that point, Wilson’s health had deteriorated significantly, leaving him bedridden. 
Edith Bolling Wilson, his wife, had taken over his executive duties and was serving as the 
unofficial President, the first women in American history to assume such responsibilities. Wilson 
was unable to respond to the film or offer any real feedback. In a unique example of life 
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imitating art, Wilson, like the character Uncle Sam, had scarified his well-being for the 
formation of the League. 
The film’s premiere served as an unofficial rally for James Cox and the Democratic 
cause. Notable progressives and LEP executives, including William McAdoo, George Creel, and 
Oscar Straus, gave speeches before the film and helped bolster its marketing campaign. In 
Washington, D.C., additional screenings were organized to coincide with the recently proposed 
League of Nations Day and Veterans Appeal Day.84 The film’s producers wanted to garner 
endorsements from servicemen and World War I veterans. As a result, they reached out to 
various veteran associations and invited their members to special screenings. Though the film 
fared fairly well at the box office and helped keep the benefits of the League at the forefront of 
the upcoming presidential election, critics found the film far more polarizing than Whom the 
Gods Would Destroy. Many praised the film as a powerful melodrama while others found it 
insufferable for anyone who did not wholly agree with its politics.85 Unlike Whom the Gods 
Would Destroy, the film did not cross party lines and few critics denied that it represented 
anything more than a desperate and last-minute attempt to save the League.  
One month after the film’s release, millions of Americans cast their ballots for the 
presidency. Even with the additional support Cox had received from inside the film industry, 
Harding won in a landslide with 404 electoral votes and sixty percent of the popular vote. Uncle 
Sam of Freedom Ridge proved of little significance against Will Hays’ greater, anti-League 
media blitz. On the surface, Hays seemed an unlikely candidate to help abolish any chance for 
the United States to follow suit with its allies. Like most Republicans, he actually believed in the 
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central idea of the League and predominantly took offense at Wilson’s guiding belief that “only 
the Democratic party was the sole protagonist of the peace.”86 The refusal to join, according to 
Hays, stemmed not from a conflict of ideas, but of temperaments.87 Hays argued that personal 
animosity between Wilson and a handful of Republican senators, particularly Henry Cabot 
Lodge, secured the opposition vote on ratification. Hays believed that both Wilson and Lodge 
were too arrogant, stubborn, and averse to cooperation, despite the fact that they both shared the 
same lofty worldview. “They were filled with high moralities,” Hays exclaimed, “and the sense 
that the role of the United States was to be that of a deus ex machina, arbitrating the fate of the 
world from some Olympian height.”88 In the end, Hays figured it was Wilson’s own hubris and 
bitterness that prevented the United States from joining the organization that had won him a 
Nobel Peace Prize. As Euripides had warned, “Whom the gods would destroy they first make 
mad.” 
After Harding won the presidency, reports on the League of Nations gradually faded from 
media headlines. New releases replaced Whom the Gods Would Destroy and Uncle Sam of 
Freedom Ridge and these films drifted quietly into obscurity. In certain respects, Whom the Gods 
Would Destroy left an enduring and visible footprint on the history of the Pax Cinemana. It 
temporarily made the League of Nations a fashionable topic for the film industry but failed to 
actually secure the United States’ membership. Director Frank Borzage, however, returned to its 
pacifist and idealist themes in two more successful anti-war films, A Farewell to Arms (1932) 
and Three Comrades (1938).89 As with Whom the Gods Would Destroy, prominent pacifist and 
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anti-war groups in the 1930s, including the Women’s Peace Party, incorporated the films into 
their outreach activities as a reaction to the rise of German aggression. Together, Borzage’s 
trilogy of anti-war films demonstrated how the interests of business and activism could overlap 
successfully. In addition, Whom the Gods Would Destroy had an exceptional impact on two 
prominent members of the League to Enforce Peace: Abbott Lowell, President of Harvard 
University, and William Short, Secretary of the New York Peace Society. Drawing from their 
experience promoting the film, the two went on to develop the Motion Picture Research Council, 
a private think tank dedicated to analyzing the social value of films and their potential as an aid 
to international peace.90 However, by neglecting to preserve any complete prints, the studio and 
distributors ensured the film would be relegated to the dustbin of history. Like the vast majority 
of films produced during the silent era, it will most likely never be seen again, making it 
impossible for scholars to fully understand its important—albeit mixed—legacy.
																																								 																				
devices	that	were	evident	in	Whom	the	Gods	Would	Destroy.	An	American	man	falls	in	love	with	an	English	nurse	in	
Italy	but	the	war	quickly	tears	them	apart.	Against	all	odds,	the	couple	reunites	as	Italy	and	Austria-Hungary	
simultaneously	agree	to	an	armistice.	Borzage	stripped	the	story	of	Hemingway’s	trademark	cynicism	and	created	
a	film	depicting	the	power	of	love	triumphing	over	the	power	of	war.	With	Three	Comrades	(1938),	an	adaption	of	
Erich	Remarque’s	novel	of	the	same	name,	Borzage	continued	to	humanize	portrayals	of	German	soldiers	as	he	
had	done	in	Whom	the	Gods	Would	Destroy.	Unlike	most	American	films	at	that	time,	Three	Comrades	depicts	
German	soldiers	as	complex	and	moral	individuals	who	were	consumed	by	the	Kaiser’s	overzealous	ambitions.	The	
story	follows	three	veterans	and	close	friends	who	return	from	the	war	and	find	work	in	an	auto-repair	shop	in	an	
economically	devastated	city.	Their	experience	from	the	war	leaves	them	feeling	aimless	and	lost.	Eventually,	one	
of	the	men	meets	a	beautiful	young	woman	who	teaches	him	that	life	is	fleeting	but	also	meaningful.		
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Chapter Five 
The League of Nations and the Pursuit of American Cinema 
Without the benefit of the United States as a member, the League of Nations forged on 
disappointed, but undeterred. By the mid-1920s, the League had established itself as a vast 
bureaucracy comprised of dozens of landmark international organizations. The three principal 
bodies included the Council, the Secretariat, and the General Assembly. Managed primarily by 
the League’s four permanent members—the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Japan—the 
Council was responsible for handling political concerns and disputes between states. During 
three of four annual sessions, Council participants mediated discussions about controversial 
issues such as borders and treaties. The Secretariat managed the administrative and financial 
affairs of the League and published various journals detailing League proceedings. The General 
Assembly consisted of one to three representatives from each member state and held meetings 
every September in Geneva, Switzerland. Its purpose was to serve as a discursive space for 
developing plans and organizations to strengthen international cooperation and understanding. 
Of the League’s three principal bodies, it was in many respects the most dynamic and successful 
as a result of its vast network of connections. The General Assembly worked closely with semi-
autonomous bodies like the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International 
Labour Organization as well as dozens of smaller auxiliary bodies. It was within these auxiliary 
bodies that officials found room to explore the possibility of using films to advance the interests 
and activities of the League. 
The International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC) became the first 
appendage of the League to address formally the need for a long-term plan dedicated entirely to 
the study of film and world peace. The ICIC was an influential organization responsible for 
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encouraging collaboration and exchange between artists, academics, scientists, and intellectuals 
from around the world. Notable members included renowned physicists Marie Curie, Albert 
Einstein, and Robert Millikan. The ICIC operated out of the magnificent Palais-Royal in Paris 
and laid an institutional framework for today’s United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO). French philosopher Henri Bergson served as the ICIC’s first 
director and had a keen interest in cinema. Bergson had already pondered the potential of film as 
an educational tool in several of his publications. As other League organizations worked to 
undermine clandestine diplomacy, Bergson and the ICIC made advances in making education 
more open and egalitarian. International education, Bergson argued, was critical to preventing 
future conflicts.  
In the immediate years after the war, the ICIC stressed repeatedly the need to improve 
opportunities for international education between all nations and peoples. International education 
did not simply refer to student exchanges but rather to the broad diffusion of knowledge across 
borders. Proponents argued that knowledge was universal and primarily apolitical. Adhering to 
one of the central ideas of the Enlightenment, they assumed that a particular nation or group 
could not own or control knowledge, and that all individuals had a natural right to broaden their 
perspectives and learn from others. Consequently, they argued, the member states of the League 
had an obligation to share important advances in all fields and academic disciplines. 
Theoretically, the communal commitment to the arts, humanities, mathematics, and sciences 
would better prepare individuals for the realities of the new global world and familiarize the 
public with the current customs and affairs of neighboring societies. Because of the increased 
integration of the world after World War I, the ICIC asserted that the public required greater 
opportunities to develop the skills and attitudes needed to thrive in cross-cultural environments. 
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Cinema was at the forefront of this discussion and the ICIC was receptive to any proposals for 
incorporating it into the formal operations of the League. 
This chapter details the League’s relationship with cinema by focusing on two major, yet 
largely forgotten events that began under the auspices of the ICIC: the creation of the 
International Film Congress and the International Educational Cinematographic Institute (IECI). 
Organizers intended the International Film Congress to serve as an annual forum for leaders 
within the world’s film industries to study and promote the educational benefits of film. Despite 
repeated efforts to garner support from the United States, prominent figures in the American film 
industry denounced the development. This discussion laid the groundwork for the ICIC to 
establish a separate body dedicated entirely to cinematic pursuits. This organization was the 
International Educational Cinematographic Institute (IECI). Oddly enough, it was fascist Italy, 
with assistance from many influential American film producers, that agreed to fund and base the 
organization—a testament to the reach and popularity of film’s idealist implications during the 
1920s. The central goal of the IECI was to help “the screen, appealing to the countless millions 
of all races and all countries, be able to exercise its full power as an ambassador of a better 
international understanding and universal peace.”1 The IECI’s official journal was littered with 
lofty commentary such as this, proclaiming film’s ability to cultivate “mutual cooperation among 
all the peoples.”2 “By means of the educational film,” the IECI boasted, “[we can] ensure 
progressively the Prosperity and the wellbeing of Humanity.”3  
Though the ICIC framed the International Film Congress and the IECI as purely 
educational and humanitarian endeavors, their activities were still subject to the harsh realities of 
																																								 																				1	George	R.	Canty,	“International	Film	Censorship,”	International	Review	of	Educational	Cinematography,	official	journal	of	the	International	Educational	Cinematographic	Institute,	July	1929,	240.	2	International	Review	of	Educational	Cinematography,	April	1929,	8.	3	Ibid,	25.	
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global economics and politics. Unless the League’s cinematic activities, this chapter makes clear, 
had tangible benefits for American business or diplomatic interests, then they were unlikely to 
receive needed support from Hollywood or the US State Department. By providing a history of 
the International Film Congress and the IECI, this chapter sheds light on the League’s inner 
workings and ambivalent relationship with the United States. Concerns over an alleged 
American monopoly on film production and distribution were contentious within the ICIC and 
provoked conflicting interpretations of the postwar peace: one that placed the League at the 
center of global arbitration and another that placed the United States there. 
…………………………………………. 
On July 28, 1924, Julien Luchaire—Henri Bergson’s friend and expert adviser—
presented a report to the ICIC on the “Relations of the Cinematograph to Intellectual Life.” In 
the report, Luchaire first made a case for cinema’s unprecedented availability around the world. 
“Never at any time,” Lucahire argued, “has any product of human thought enjoyed so 
widespread and rapid a circulation.”4 Because films, especially Hollywood films, had become so 
ubiquitous in Europe, he questioned whether or not it was healthy that “only the Bible and the 
Koran have an indisputably larger circulation that that of the latest film from Los Angeles.”5 
Luchaire, however, was not as inherently opposed to Hollywood as many of his colleagues were. 
In fact, he credited Hollywood’s global reach with helping to universalize the medium. To ensure 
that a film would profit in foreign markets, he complimented Hollywood’s tendency to “compose 
works in a form that will enable them to be understood and appreciated by spectators of the most 
																																								 																				4	Julien	Luchaire,	“Relations	of	the	Cinematograph	to	Intellectual	Life,”	July	28,	1924.	Available	in:	William	Seabury,	Motion	Picture	Problems:	The	Cinema	and	the	League	of	Nations	(New	York,	NY:	Avondale	Press,	1929),	236.	5	Ibid.	
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varied races and countries.”6 In addition, Luchaire celebrated the fact that films were silent and 
therefore not prone to basic language barriers. These characteristics distinguished cinema from 
other major art forms and made it “intrinsically international.”7  
Luchaire was a noted French scholar who specialized in Italian history and literature. He 
was the author of many books that celebrated Italian and French contributions to western 
civilization. The emergence of German militarism in the early 1900s concerned him greatly. He 
was part of a large cohort of French intellectuals who considered German expansion a threat to 
what he considered a common Latin identity. The peoples of the Iberian and Italian peninsulas, 
he argued, had a linguistic and cultural bond that made active diplomacy natural and easy to 
navigate. During the war, he and popular Italian historian Guglielmo Ferrero founded the 
propaganda magazine, Review of Latin Nations. Like much of the literature at that time, the 
publication was vehemently nationalistic and called for a strengthening of pan-Latinism in 
Europe to combat the spread of Germanic influences. Luchaire and Ferrero used the magazine to 
articulate what exactly constituted as “latin-ness” and “Germanic-ness,” as well as how one 
could identify their distinct attributes. Ignoring the complexity of the Classical world, they 
focused predominantly upon art and literature to promote a conception of Germany’s newfound 
aggression as a challenge to the permanence of some monolithic Latin Europe. The magazine 
ceased publication after the war and Luchaire became a predominant figure in championing the 
spirit of internationalism.  
Though his actions seemed contradictory, they demonstrated how popular conceptions of 
nationalism and internationalism operated under the same basic assumption that cultures were 
akin to fixed units that required their own sovereign spaces. Few intellectuals questioned the 
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permanence of nation-states as a means of organization and figured that an enduring peace 
hinged on improving the dialogue between them, a chief priority of the League. Films, Luchaire 
presumed, were an underappreciated educational tool and would help bridge various cultural 
gaps while simultaneously reaffirming longstanding national identities. 
The main issue that Luchaire brought to the ICIC was one of content. As with other 
advocates for the Pax Cinemana, glamorous war dramas troubled him deeply. He also feared that 
if too many films romanticized crime and urban violence, they might compromise the integrity of 
Europe’s youth. As an aficionado of Greco-Roman culture, he could not resist the urge to frame 
Greek theater as the ultimate benchmark for the maturation of cinema. Sophocles and 
Aristophanes, he suggested, produced works for the masses but never delved into the trite 
sentimentalism of the usual Hollywood fare. “It is essential,” Luchaire declared, “to consider 
without delay what can be done to ensure that [film’s] influence will at the same time be moral 
and instructive.”8  
Luchiare put forth three resolutions that he thought would improve the intellectual 
capacity of film and make it useful as an instrument of international understanding. His first 
resolution called for the compilation and publication of an international catalogue of films for 
scientific and medical purposes. The catalogue would use the Brussels system of bibliographic 
classification to detail the film’s basic features: description of content, production credits, length, 
date it was produced, and its availability for purchase or exchange. Too many universities and 
research centers around the world, he reckoned, were oblivious to the fact that hundreds of films 
had been produced since the early 1900s which would ultimately prove beneficial to 
professionals and students in all academic disciplines. Medical doctors could observe 
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complicated surgical procedures while zoologists could observe the behavior of animals that 
were inaccessible to them personally. Moreover, historians could actually “see” seminal 
moments in other people’s history. The sharing of films across borders might also strengthen the 
relationships between distant institutions, such as the International Bureau of Education (IBE) 
and the International Health Office (IHO), a central aim of the ICIC. To promote these goals, 
Luchaire put forth another resolution that called for the ICIC to organize an international 
exhibition of educational and scientific films.   
The proposed catalogue and exhibition of films would help lay the groundwork for the 
wider integration of films into teaching and education. Luchaire was not as bold as some his 
contemporaries who believed earnestly that films would soon replace the need for blackboards, 
books, and even teachers. He championed film as an adjunct to teaching and denounced the calls 
from some circles to develop classes entirely around films. Instead, he argued, educators needed 
to recognize that each subject and lesson had its own needs and expectations. A standard means 
of incorporating film into the curriculum was impossible. Discovering the many roles of film in 
education, he proclaimed, was a process that would require the ongoing support of the League. 
Part of the process was holding a regular film congress for those interested in discussing and 
expanding film’s implications for science and education. 
Luchaire’s most important resolution called for the creation of an international film 
congress that would bring both industry professionals and educators together to discuss the role 
of film in shaping culture and the status quo. According to the report, “the scientific artists and 
educational interests affected by the development of cinematography would be the first question 
to be examined.”9 However, Luchaire recognized that the educational benefits of cinema did not 
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always align with the financial motives of the entertainment industry. The international congress, 
therefore, would also create an opportunity to discuss pressing issues relevant to the success of 
the major studios, such as censorship laws, tariffs, and property rights. Lastly, the film congress 
would prove useful for gauging if there were a need for the League to create a permanent 
“International Cinema Federation” comprised of representatives from every country’s respective 
film industry.10 The ICIC adopted each of Luchaire’s resolutions and soon after hired him to 
serve as the first director of the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IICC). The 
IICC was a French-sponsored organization created to serve as the executive branch for the ICIC 
in Geneva. From its Paris headquarters, Luchaire appointed himself and two of his associates, 
Fredrick Cornelissen and Jean Locquin, to plan and direct the first International Film Congress. 
It marked the League of Nations’ first official foray into promoting film as “a means of good will 
and better understanding of the nations.”11 
Luchaire, Cornelissen, and Locquin had no personal experience producing films or 
working in the film industry. Cornelissen was an advisor in the General Assembly of the League 
of Nations and Locquin was a prominent art critic and member of the French Chamber of 
Deputies. Nevertheless, they were optimistic that they could bring together educators, diplomats, 
and the “best minds” from every film industry in the world, specifically Hollywood.12 Their plan 
was to hold the Film Congress in Paris for three full days in June 1925. They mailed out 
hundreds of invitations to interested parties, including the likes of Charles Chaplin, D.W. 
Griffith, and Cecil B. DeMille, and assured reporters that the event would have a large 
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attendance and produce practical results.13 They created a program that addressed four main 
issues: the need to produce and exchange more educational films; the need for a permanent film 
bureau in the League of Nations; censorship laws and artistic freedom; and the feasibility of 
producing international co-productions. Though the Film Congress garnered considerable 
attention in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, industry leaders from the United States 
were not as receptive.  
By the time spring had arrived, the Film Congress was already in jeopardy. Almost every 
invitee from the United States had declined to attend. According to the planning committee, the 
American delegates were all simply “too busy,” but summer was also the most popular season 
for the movie-going public, and industry leaders figured they could not travel to Europe and risk 
hampering the release of their latest films.14 As a result, the committee made the decision to 
postpone the Film Congress until October. “It is felt by all,” the committee explained, “that 
without a strong representative delegation from across the water the Congress would entirely 
lose its international character and the great purposes underlying the convocation would be 
entirely defeated.”15 Though Luchaire and his cohorts were certainly committed to maintaining 
the international character of the Film Congress, they also knew fully well that the United States 
controlled at least eighty percent of the world’s film business. If the Film Congress was going to 
have any chance of achieving its lofty ambitions, it needed at least some support from the 
American film industry. Without the presence of American delegates, many German film 
producers also lost interest because they had hoped the event would create an opportunity to 
discuss the flood of American films into German theaters. That issue, more than the ones 
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Luchaire had stated officially, was the chief concern of leading figures in the German film 
industry. Unfortunately for the League, the postponement was a sign of impending frustration. 
By October, Luchaire and his compatriots were forced once again to postpone the Film 
Congress. After much deliberation, they decided to reschedule for June 1926. Even with nearly a 
year to plan, Luchaire could not guarantee the presence of American delegates, and he postponed 
the event for yet a third time. Because of the ongoing planning issues, Luchaire decided to seek 
assistance from the French Chamber of Commerce of Films and let leaders from inside the 
French film industry develop the precise nature of the program. “Only in one respect,” a reporter 
noted, “will there be no alteration of the original program; the U.S.A. will be shown to a front 
seat.”16 After fifteen months of planning, Luchaire finally confirmed that the Film Congress 
would run without fail from September 27 to October 3. The weeklong proceedings would 
include formal sessions as well as a series of galas and banquets held at the finest Parisian 
establishments, including the Paris Opera House and Versailles.17 French, English, and German 
were chosen as the official languages of the Film Congress and hundreds of invitees had agreed 
to attend.18 For many others, however, these developments were too little too late.  
Coverage from leading film journals in the United States was only lukewarm to the Film 
Congress. According to The Film Daily, “What started off like a cyclone has developed into a 
delicate zephyr.” After mentioning Hollywood’s previous “hands off policy,” the report 
condescendingly quipped that the gathering would prove “interesting.”19 British and German 
newspapers similarly questioned whether the Film Congress was worth the time and effort. Many 
predicted that it would turn into an awkward convention of diplomats and educators pompously 
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discussing the features of an industry about which they knew little. The harshest criticism, 
however, came surprisingly from France. The enormously influential Jean Sapene openly 
mocked the event and claimed that “under the present conditions no practical results can 
develop.”20 Sapene was not only one of France’s most respected film directors and producers, 
but he was also the publisher of the widely read newspaper Le Matin. Without Sapene’s 
approval, reporters at The Film Daily honestly wondered if the Film Congress would be held at 
all.21 Despite the negative press coverage, the event proceeded as scheduled. 
The Film Congress brought together approximately 450 delegates from twenty-nine 
countries. France was by far the most represented with 211 delegates. Germany was second with 
forty-three, and Great Britain third with twenty-two. Japan, China, and India, the only Asian 
nation represented, had twelve, three, and two delegates respectively. The formal program laid 
out six broad panels that focused on the following issues: production and distribution; instruction 
and education; trade and legal problems; the relationship between cinema and other arts; the 
creation of a permanent film bureau in the League of Nations; and lastly the preparation for a 
future follow-up congress.22 In addition, one delegate from each nation was selected to 
participate in a commission that represented the interests of his national film industry. The 
commission then voted on a series of resolutions in which each delegate agreed to work. The 
most favored resolutions included technical requirements, such as standardizing the speed of 
projectors in theaters and ensuring that theater-owners always screened a film’s production 
credits. Other resolutions revolved around Luchaire’s original ambitions to create an 
international catalogue of films and an exchange program between national film archives. The 
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remaining resolutions echoed the central mission of the League: avoid producing films “which 
might breed hatred between peoples or perpetuate the idea of war” in favor of ones that “place in 
evidence the beauties and qualities of foreign people.”23 Though the Film Congress did promote 
cinema as a means of international understanding, the sentiment eluded leaders in the American 
film industry. 
The Film Congress proceeded without any official delegates from the United States, 
which diminished its prestige considerably. Ten Hollywood insiders did participate but only as 
unofficial guests, including William Sheafe Chase of the Federal Motion Picture Council and 
Guy Croswell Smith of United Artists. “Nevertheless,” one reporter noted, “the Americans were 
conspicuous by their absence during the week’s confab.”24 The Americans’ cold and distant 
attitude to the proceedings stemmed from the assertive decision by Will Hays, head of the 
MPPDA, to decline any involvement in the Film Congress. According to an official statement 
from Hays’ office, the event should have been postponed because “America undoubtedly leads 
the world in motion pictures, particularly in such branches as educational pictures, but if we 
attempted to tell other nations that, they would want our words backed up by proof … and that 
would take time.”25 Luchaire and the International Committee of International Cooperation 
(ICIC) were of course unwilling continuously to bend to Hays and Hollywood’s ongoing 
requests for postponements and became frustrated that Hays had framed himself and the industry 
he represented as a victim. “We felt,” the statement continued, “that the congress at this time 
might easily develop into an anti-American affair.”26 Resentment toward Hays’ decision 
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gradually mounted amongst the delegates and spilled over into the activities of the Film 
Congress.   
The United States’ domination of the world’s film business was not one of the official 
concerns of the engagement. However, the topic allegedly surfaced repeatedly throughout the 
proceedings. “Europe and the rest of the world,” one French delegate declared in front of a 
sympathetic audience, “will pay the stupendous tribute of 2,740,000,000 francs to the motion 
picture kings of America this year.”27 Using the panel on trade and censorship as an opportunity 
to rally support, the delegate continued, “We must put an end to this tribute to America.”28 
According to some reports, indiscriminate attacks on American producers were a staple of every 
official meeting.29 French, German, and English delegates were by most accounts the source of 
such vilification. “Camouflaging its motives with an altruistic program,” a dispatch to The New 
York Times noted, “the Congress is seeking to perfect a combination against the American film 
monopoly.”30 William Seabury, a leader within American film trade associations, tried to find 
common ground and alleviate some of the pressure by insisting that independent producers in the 
United States had the same concerns as European producers. They too, he argued, could not 
compete with the handful of Hollywood moguls who had control over the offerings in nearly 
ninety-five percent of the nation’s theaters.31 The plight of independent American producers was 
of little concern to the European delegates, many of whom called for the creation of various 
European cinema trusts to alleviate Hollywood’s control of film markets around the world.32 
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Other delegates took aim at what they considered Hollywood’s derogatory portrayal of 
foreigners. Those from Mexico, for example, criticized the various “Mexican bandit” films that 
flooded theaters every year. They believed that the United States had a dangerous and 
disproportionate control over how the world saw their country and its people. Their frustrations 
dovetailed into a larger discussion on how films produced in one nation should portray former 
adversaries from the war. Certain German delegates called for a complete ban on World War I 
films. Dutch delegates, on the other hand, wanted simply to suppress nationalistic films that were 
“susceptible of engendering hatred between nations.”33 The Belgian delegates, however, found 
the suggestion far too ambiguous. What of patriotic films, they asked? Was there to be an 
international ban on films “illustrating the heroism of soldiers and citizens in defense of their 
native country?”34 One reporter likened the heated debate to a movie “mob scene” and noted 
how wartime animosities had resurfaced.  
The internal bickering, coupled with the absence of American delegates, compelled most 
reporters to treat the Film Congress as a definite failure. “The laugh of the Congress,” one critic 
wrote, “came from the fact that American screen interests held aloof.”35 The Film Renter claimed 
that if the Film Congress had produced any results then they were “absurdly small.”36 For others, 
the entire event amounted to little more than a convenient excuse to embark on a weeklong 
Parisian getaway. French film icon Jean Sapene insisted that everything played out precisely as 
he had predicted. American involvement never came to fruition and the French and German 
delegates used it as an opportunity to complain about their own industry’s struggles. “The 
																																								 																				33	“Film	Congress	Row	Over	Pacific	Movies,”	The	New	York	Times,	September	30,	1926,	7.	34	Ibid.	35	“U.S.	Screen	Interests	Pass	Up	International	Film	Congress,”	Variety,	October	6,	1926,	39.		36	“Speaking	Editorially,”	Motion	Picture	News,	October	30,	1926,	1660.	
	 176	
resolutions adopted by the Congress,” Sapene reported in Le Matin, are “but so many platonic 
words.”37  
In the popular magazine L’Intransigeant, leading French film critic Boisyvon similarly 
dismissed the Film Congress as pointless banter. “You must never ask practical solutions of a 
Congress,” he asserted mockingly. “The people present had no power to make laws. If they had 
spoken of the beautiful summer and the park of Versailles the results would have been 
identical.”38 Boisyvon echoed the common frustrations that many individuals had with the ICIC 
and the League of Nations at large. Were massive intergovernmental organizations actually 
capable of delivering results, or were they simply mouthpieces for elite statesmen? A reporter for 
a British trade journal summarized the reception in London and channeled the attitude of League 
critics who had pegged it as the ultimate expression of pointless bureaucracy: 
Several millions of assorted words have been uttered. A lavish banquet has been 
consumed. Compliments on every possible subject have been paid to every possible 
person. In a word, this congress has passed off in exactly the same manner as most 
congresses do … And now that it is at an end, there still remains considerable difficulty 
in finding any very satisfactory excuse for its existence.39 
 
Though most attendees claimed they had garnered very little from the formal sessions, 
others found casual conversation between delegates useful for the sale of films across borders. 
According to one reporter, “nothing much happened on the floor of the convention, but a lot of 
real business was transacted in hotel lobbies.”40 The comment reflected how far the Film 
Congress had veered from its original ambitions. Luchaire’s primary focus was to expand the 
practical benefits of film in education, science, and diplomacy. Clandestine business deals were 
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the least of his concerns. Despite the negative press coverage and the ambivalent response from 
delegates, Luchaire still believed that he and the International Committee on International 
Cooperation (ICIC) had a responsibility to strengthen the role of cinema in the League’s 
activities. He was tenacious and at the closing ceremony announced formally that he would 
create a permanent film bureau within the League and hold a second International Film Congress 
the following year in Berlin. 
Unfortunately, the second Film Congress faced the same challenges as the first. Luchaire 
could not secure participation from Hollywood leaders and scrambled to meet necessary 
deadlines. Because the event was planned for Berlin, leaders of the German film industry took on 
a greater role in organizing the program. They made it clear to Luchaire that their primary goals 
had little to do with the educational capabilities of film or vague notions of international 
understanding and peace. The German hosts wanted to use the event as an opportunity to create a 
formal bulwark against American films saturating European theaters. Luchaire disagreed and 
pressured his German cohorts to reconsider the Congress’ aims. As tensions mounted, Luchaire 
resigned from the planning committee and withdrew the support of the ICIC in May 1927.41 The 
Film Congress was put on hold for another year. Luchaire went on to create a film bureau in the 
League of Nations and guaranteed that it would not harm American producers.42 However, 
Lucahire struggled to secure needed finances for the bureau or to steer it toward any concrete 
goals. The bureau was largely irrelevant to the activities of the ICIC and did little more than 
endorse Hollywood films with internationalist and pacifist themes, in addition to holding the 
occasional competition for amateur films that focused upon the League.43 These shortcomings 
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were just some of many issues that Lucahire’s colleagues had with his leadership. Faced with 
heated internal opposition, Luchaire ultimately decided to resign from his position as director. 
When the second International Film Congress finally commenced in August 1928, the League of 
Nations had no part in its proceedings. For many leaders in Europe’s film industries, the absence 
of the League was a blessing in disguise. 
The Film Congress in Berlin attracted over 600 delegates from every European country, 
including Russia, as well as ones from Asia and South America. The United States did not 
participate despite receiving multiple invitations.44 The German organizers worked closely with 
the German National Cinema Theater Owners Association and made no attempt to mask their 
priorities. “The present convention,” one German organizer explained, “is purely for business 
and does not touch on the intellectual and spiritual value of the movies.”45 Alfred Hugenberg, a 
German media mogul who controlled Universum Film AG and later helped Adolf Hitler become 
Chancellor, made it clear to the press that the Berlin Film Congress was a springboard for the 
“Pan-European campaign against American pictures.”46 Speaking on behalf of Hugenberg as 
well as the Berlin Chamber of Commerce, film producer Ludwig Klitzsch told the delegates in 
his opening speech, “we see in Europe the idea of cooperation in the film industry growing and 
in this manner the word ‘film-Europe’ came into being.”47 Though Klitszch stopped short of 
openly lambasting the American monopoly, his notion of “film-Europe” became the unofficial 
mantra of the Congress. “European films must be safeguarded now,” an English delegate 
followed up, “Europe has richer and more interesting stories and literature in which to base 
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film.”48 He and many others delegates wondered, how Europe, a bastion of alleged high art, 
could not compete with the works of the Hollywood dream factory. The ubiquity of American 
films, the Congress made clear, was not only a financial burden for European nations, but it was 
also a blow to longstanding cultural identities. Hollywood’s visibility in Europe was a 
manifestation of American, not European, hegemony over the global economy and exportation of 
culture. This was a hard reality for many European intellectuals, particularly German, French, 
and English, to accept.   
Unlike the Film Congress in Paris, no one questioned whether or not the Berlin Congress 
had produced any practical results. Reporters covered two developments in detail. First, 
delegates from seventeen European countries as well as Turkey and India created the 
International Federation of Exhibitors (IFF) “to protect European film interests against present 
dangers.”49 These “dangers,” the press understood, was an obvious reference to nothing other 
than American films. The IFF’s goal was to unite exhibitors and distributors across borders to 
reduce substantially the number of films imported from the United States. Though a recent 
conference in Geneva on trade guaranteed that restrictions on imported films would be abolished 
by 1930, many governments, primarily Germany’s, figured that protective tariffs were needed to 
safeguard domestic film industries. The goal was to curb American releases by at least thirty 
percent, which, the IFF figured, was possible only if European and select Asian film industries 
agreed to stand in solidarity against the Hollywood behemoth.50 The notion of a cohesive “film-
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Europe” was therefore rooted less in the humanitarian agenda of Luchaire and the League and 
more in the business agenda of German media moguls. The second development concerned the 
continued release of what Leopold Gutmann, President of the German National Cinema Theater 
Owners Association, called “hate films.”  
Gutmann brought attention to the recent release of Dawn (1928), a British World War I 
film that dramatized the life and death of Edith Cavell. Cavell was a nurse during the war who 
had decided to treat patients regardless of their national affiliation. However, after helping 
hundreds of soldiers escape from German-occupied Belgium, a German firing squad executed 
her after a speedy and highly publicized trial. Dawn was one of the most controversial films of 
the 1920s due to its derogatory depiction of Germans as sadistic warmongers. Gutmann knew 
that the line between propaganda and patriotism was thin, but he hoped exhibitors would agree to 
ban films, like Dawn, “which might arouse international hatred.”51 It was here that the Berlin 
Congress channeled many of the ambitions Luchaire had in Paris. Even though the Congress did 
not have the support of the League and was promoted strictly as a business operation, many 
noted how “international understanding was assuming greater importance as an economic 
question.”52 This was an important observation. 
On the surface, the Film Congresses at Paris and Berlin seemed like minor moments in 
the history of cinema. Upon closer inspection, however, it becomes apparent that they occurred 
at a time when the most pressing questions in economic policy and foreign policy had 
overlapped. Did free trade cultivate healthy competition and thereby improve the standard of 
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living for all? Or did it simply make it easier for monopolies, like Hollywood and the American 
film industry, to regulate markets to their own advantage? These and related questions were 
integral to common understandings of world peace, particularly among American businessmen 
and statesmen who believed that what benefited the economy of the United States inevitably 
benefitted the recuperating economies of Europe. Will Hays, who many European delegates 
blamed for undermining the international spirit of the Film Congresses by preventing prominent 
Americans from participating, adhered to such sentiment.  
Hays’ decision to steer Hollywood interests away from the Film Congresses mirrored his 
larger ambivalence to the League. When serving as Warren Harding’s campaign manager, Hays, 
of course, played an integral role in preventing the United States from becoming a League 
member. He agreed with its central tenets but did not want to undermine the authority of the 
United States federal government by bogging it down with European bureaucracy. The same 
could be said of his reaction to the Film Congresses. As head of the MPPDA, he welcomed 
notions of international understanding and cooperation but refused to engage in any activity that 
might compromise the interests of the American film industry. Only a few years earlier, Hays 
had actually visited Europe and celebrated “the importance of motion pictures as an instrument 
of international amity.”53 He spoke at great length about their diplomatic potential and believed 
that they would unite divergent nations and societies. Many of his statements appeared as if they 
had come directly from Luchaire and his initial report on the importance of cinema to the 
League. However, he concluded that intergovernmental organizations were incapable of 
maintaining peace. “The international understanding of the peoples of the world,” he argued, 
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“will be brought about by the right kind of American motion pictures.”54 By stressing the 
importance of American motion pictures, he made his purpose and worldview clear. 
Hays had little interest in creating relationships through the equal sharing of what the 
European delegates considered Pan-European or international films that championed only the 
best qualities of a given society. To him, the world needed distinctly American films in order for 
everyone, anywhere, to appreciate and ultimately accept the American way of life. According to 
one observer, Hays believed without a doubt that “America is the best of all places in the best of 
all possible worlds.”55 He was exceptionally proud of his nation and considered it his duty to 
share it with the rest of the world. “Every film that goes from America abroad,” Hays declared, 
“shall correctly portray to the world the purpose, the ideals, the accomplishments, the 
opportunities, and the life of America … We are going to sell America to the world with 
American motion pictures.” Hays did not want the United States to be part of a family of nations 
or Hollywood to be part of a family of film industries that shared a similar standing. He saw the 
United States and Hollywood as benevolent purveyors of liberal democracy that would lead the 
world by example.  
When many European delegates passionately criticized Hays and Hollywood business 
practices at the Film Congresses, they echoed the common confusion about and dissatisfaction 
many Europeans had with the United States’ powerful new position on the world stage. Were 
Europeans, they thought, expected simply to bow to the demands of American businesses? Was 
the American film industry the first appendage of American imperialism in Europe? Clearly, the 
Film Congresses represented far more than pedestrian chitchat. They were embedded within the 
larger geo-political shifts that placed the United States and its industries at the forefront of a new 
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international order that challenged the status quo of the previous century. The devastation caused 
by World War I created seemingly endless opportunities for American businesses to invest in 
rebuilding Europe in a manner that would benefit the American economy. Hays understood this 
fully and by rejecting the Congresses and by working to maintain the flow of American films 
into European theaters, he figured he was doing his part in the greater effort to Americanize the 
world and secure a lasting peace.  
To comprehend fully Hays’ attitudes towards the Film Congresses and their significance 
to the League, it is necessary to understand the origins of American foreign policy in the 
twentieth century. By the onset of World War I, the United States had already established itself 
as a regional power with considerable influence on world affairs. The administrations of William 
McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, and William Howard Taft, for example, championed American 
expansion into Oceania and Latin America. Steeped in notions of manifest destiny, their foreign 
policies placed the frontier far beyond the coast of California. In an effort to flex American 
might on the world stage, they mimicked the aggressive strategies of European imperial states, 
particularly Great Britain and France, and annexed formally Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the 
Philippines. Though American expansion was controversial and faced tremendous criticism from 
prominent liberals and evangelicals, it was firmly in sync with what would become one of the 
guiding principles of American statecraft and peacekeeping in the twentieth century: the Open 
Door. 
 Secretary of State John Hay insisted that America’s economic and political interests 
hinged on preserving an “open door” to the world’s markets. Taking specific interest in China, 
Hay assumed that American world hegemony would come from keeping foreign markets 
accessible to American investment and trade. Under the mantra of “free and open,” Hay 
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articulated what critics saw as the United States’ unique brand of empire-building. Equal access, 
Hay figured, would naturally translate to American dominance and, by dominating the global 
economy, the United States could wield soft power around the world, put an end to nationalist 
aggression, and prevent future wars. The idea was a pivot in American foreign policy.  
Instead of avoiding foreign entanglements, the Open Door policy allowed the United 
States to penetrate gradually the markets of imperial Europe, Russia, and Japan and diminish the 
control they had over the lucrative markets of their colonial dependencies. Moreover, proponents 
assumed that America’s intervention in foreign economies would provide foreign populations 
with the opportunity to embrace liberal democracy and thereby reach their greatest potential. 
Woodrow Wilson, for example, assumed that exposure to American notions of freedom and 
liberty would rub off on other countries and ultimately bring them peace and prosperity. The 
Open Door policy reflected the conception of a capitalist world-system that placed the United 
States as the arbitrator of global politics via the marketplace. When outlining his Fourteen Points 
and the Covenant of the League of Nations, Wilson championed the Open Door and framed the 
League as the vehicle for preserving it. 
Though historians often discuss Wilson’s Fourteen Points and the Covenant of the 
League as the seminal expressions of liberal idealism and internationalism after World War I, 
they surprisingly do not employ any of the terms typically associated with these ideologies. For 
example, the Fourteen Points and the Covenant never explicitly mention “democracy” or “self-
determination.” However, they do endlessly discuss the need for equal trade. A humanitarian 
agenda is implicit in these documents, but it is impossible to separate it from questions of 
economics. Without a hint of irony, Wilson, like many influential statesmen who succeeded him, 
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believed that what was in the long-term interest of foreign governments was also in the best 
interests of the American economy.  
By fixing American statecraft to global economic expansion, Wilson framed the Open 
Door as both an economic and humanitarian initiative without fully addressing how these two 
interests might conflict. Therefore, he and his supporters assumed the League was needed to 
serve as a mediator. However, Wilson’s opponents, like Will Hays, argued that the League might 
prove needlessly meddlesome to American businesses. Though Wilson and Hays had many 
political differences, they shared a belief in the necessity of the Open Door. It transcended party 
affiliations and personal disputes. They simply disagreed on the best means of implementing the 
policy. According to Hays, it was his responsibility to make the world accessible to American 
film releases:  
American films have not always entered other countries through the wide, unguarded 
“open door” by which the films of other nations have come to us. Too often we have had 
to knock at doors on which someone—usually a government film commission—had 
tacked up a sign reading “Not Welcome—Unless,” the warning usually being followed 
by various terms and taxes. It was one of my most interesting responsibilities to find out 
the reasons for those conditions, to carry on negotiations to lighten or remove them, and, 
with the active cooperation of our own State Department, to get new signs put up reading 
“Welcome, If”—with the “ifs” as few as possible.56 
 
Wilson and his supporters figured a League of Nations under the authority of the United States 
was the proper course to maintaining the Open Door. Hays and many of his Republican 
colleagues, however, stressed the need for American autonomy and laissez-faire economics. 
Still, the primary goal was the same: dominate the global marketplace and ensure a lasting peace.  
Hays’ rejection of the Film Congresses represented a striking display of his interpretation 
of the Open Door. Michael Gourland, an associate of Hays who served as President of the 
Affiliated European Producers, tried to champion the Open Door at the Film Congress in Berlin. 
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Instead of creating a coalition for the sole purpose of blocking American films from entering 
European theaters, he promoted a “Live and Let Live Policy.” Gourland’s organization 
represented fifteen major European film companies from Germany, Russia, and France, and it 
was responsible for selling their respective films to American theaters. 57 According to Gourland, 
the purported demands for restrictive measures were badly timed since they “come just when 
America is not only in a receptive mood toward foreign pictures but is even anxious to receive 
them.”58 Most European delegates at the Congresses, however, claimed to see the “Live and Let 
Live Policy,” and others like it, for what they truly were: thinly veiled opportunities for the 
United States to monopolize the world’s film market while flaunting notions of freedom and fair 
trade. William Seabury, one of the few Americans to attend both Congresses as an unofficial 
guest, published an assessment of the events in his book Motion Picture Problems: The Cinema 
and the League of Nations: 
The lesson which this international event, of such great possibilities, teaches is the  
lesson which the trade in America has consistently taught for many years. The industry’s 
only interest in discussion of ways and means of improving the service of the trade to the 
public, is to vitiate the discussion and by skillful publicity prevent the accomplishment of 
any substantial results … the industry in America demonstrated again, on this occasion 
internationally, that oil will not mix with water, that the industry will not affiliate or 
cooperate in any sincere effort with government, with moralists, publicists or with 
intellectuals.59 
 
Clearly, the Film Congresses failed to live up to their initial purpose of furthering international 
understanding through educational films. Ironically, they accomplished little besides fueling 
resentment against the United States. However, Seabury’s remarks were not entirely accurate. 
Hays and other leaders in the American film industry were willing to participate in the League’s 
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film projects so long as they fell under the patronage of the fascist Prime Minister of Italy, 
Benito Mussolini. 
Like most dictators, Mussolini was an avid cinephile.60 Before he had become Il Duce 
“The Leader,” Mussolini attended Roman movie theaters routinely. He enjoyed the works of 
America silent film comedians and by the late 1920s had developed an infatuation with Anita 
Page, an American starlet known for her brief but lucrative stint at MGM studios. For years he 
wrote her love letters and allegedly even proposed marriage. The stylish trappings of Hollywood 
enthralled the equally ostentatious Mussolini who understood the persuasive power of cinema 
and its significance in global commerce. As he tightened his grip over the hearts and minds of 
the Italian public, he relied heavily on films to propagate his authoritarian agenda. He famously 
commissioned the construction of Cinecitta, Europe’s largest film studio, and gave it the slogan: 
“l cinema e la’arma piu forte” (“Cinema is the most powerful weapon”). Though Mussolini’s 
role in developing state propaganda films is widely known, few have tackled his immense 
contributions to the League’s film pursuits.  
Mussolini did not attend the Film Congresses but he did agree with Luchaire and the 
ICIC’s initial plan to position film as an aid to international education. “[Film] can bring the 
world together,” Mussolini exclaimed sincerely, “it can settle all differences, it can become the 
international medium, educator, and adjuster; it can prevent war.”61 Coming from a man who 
built a police state by taking control of his nation’s media, these words appear painfully ironic. 
However, between 1928 and 1935, Mussolini worked tirelessly to present Italian fascism as a 
modern ideology firmly in sync with the League and popular notions of internationalism. 
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Cultivating the exchange and diffusion of educational films was one means of broadcasting 
fascist Italy’s humanitarian work to the world. Mussolini recognized that the League needed a 
permanent institution dedicated entirely to film and noticed that an occasional congress was not 
producing enough practical results. Moreover, he realized, such gatherings all too easily 
descended into fruitless bickering. As a result, he made an agreement with the ICIC to finance 
and develop the International Educational Cinematographic Institute (IECI).  
The IECI was an official appendage of the League tasked with cultivating educational 
cinema’s power as “an ambassador of a better international understanding and universal 
peace.”62 Several months after the Film Congress in Berlin, Mussolini held an inauguration 
celebration for the opening of the IECI on November 5, 1928, at its initial headquarters in the 
magnificent Villa Falconieri, a mansion located several miles outside of Rome. Built in the mid-
sixteenth century, the Villa Falconieri had housed many influential figures, including Pope Paul 
III and German Emperor Wilhelm II. It was also within walking distance to Mussolini’s private 
residence, making it easy for him to oversee the IECI’s affairs. Though he did not serve on the 
board of directors, his presence was felt everywhere. He made regular visits to the Villa and had 
a personal relationship with many of its staff members.  
At the inauguration, Mussolini gave another one of his characteristic speeches in front of 
Victor Emmanuel III, the King of Italy, and dozens of League officials. Speaking in French to 
appease the predominantly French directors of the ICIC, Mussolini exclaimed how he granted 
the Villa to the League so that film could further the development of world civilization and 
“facilitate and enhance the cultural relations between peoples.”63 The French participants, 
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however, knew that he had additional intentions. “Mussolini is persuaded,” purported an official 
report from the League, “that Cine performances of all kinds … will uplift the human mind and 
produce a more intelligent conception of Fascism.”64 Because the League rather than Mussolini 
had the authority to appoint the members of the IECI’s governing body, few assumed that the 
organization would become an explicit advertisement for fascism. Adherents were confident that 
the League was in control, not Mussolini.65 The initial governing body consisted of sixteen 
individuals from ten countries.66 Notable members included French film pioneer Louis Lumiere 
and Japanese statesmen and author Nitobe Inazo. Most officials were simply thrilled Mussolini 
had taken it upon himself to cover all the needed operating costs. Funding was a looming issue 
for League affairs, particularly those that fell under the auspices of the ICIC. Many governments 
were unsurprisingly apprehensive about footing the bill for what were promoted as purely 
intellectual pursuits. Mussolini’s involvement, however, was a point of contention. According to 
trade journals, his proposition did not receive a positive reception among the delegates at the 
ICIC’s educational conference at The Hague.67 Several League officials expressed their hope that 
France would fund and base the organization instead. Will Hays, on the other hand, spotted an 
opportunity and wanted to involve the American film industry immediately. 
Hays believed in the central objective of the IECI and worked with Mussolini and the 
IECI’s director Luciano de Feo to ensure that his right-hand man Carl Milliken, Secretary 
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General of the MPPDA, was one of the sixteen individuals who made up the organization’s 
governing body. This ensured that Hays had direct access to all of the IECI’s proceedings and 
could involve the American film industry in any manner he saw fit. On the surface, his eagerness 
to get involved in the organization seemed to contradict his detachment from the League and his 
cold denouncement of the Film Congresses in Paris and Berlin, which in theory echoed the 
mission of the IECI. Though Hays did genuinely appreciate the organization’s altruistic 
ambitions for world peace, he also treated it as a business venture and wanted to ensure that it 
never became a threat to the interests of the American film industry.  
Hays suspected correctly that Mussolini had other motives for the organization than the 
ones he had outlined at the inauguration ceremony. “It looked pretty much as if the whole idea of 
the institute was based on Mussolini’s ambition to move the European motion picture center 
from Paris to Rome,” Hays later remarked in his memoirs.68 Mussolini wanted Italian cinema to 
be the preeminent cinema of Europe. He knew it could not surpass Hollywood, but he did think it 
could surpass the French film industry. Film played an integral role in his geo-political 
worldview. Mussolini wanted to eliminate the French presence in the Balkans and North Africa 
in order to “reclaim” territory he considered fundamentally Italian. This meant he had to loosen 
France’s grip over popular media outlets and rally the public’s support.  
By situating Rome as the bastion of educational and intellectual film, he reasoned he 
could strengthen Italy’s reputation for cinema and distinguish it from its larger neighbors. Hays 
had no problem with this since it created new opportunities for American films to enter European 
theaters. “I took pains to visit the institute,” Hays exclaimed, “which was practically in his back 
yard—and in pleading with him for freer admission of American films emphasized Rome’s 
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historic role as a world center of art.”69 The flattery, coupled with a discussion of the MPPDA’s 
ongoing support of the IECI, was enough to convince Mussolini to ease restrictions on American 
films entering Italian theaters. In addition, Hays knew the American film industry would profit 
from the IECI’s plan to remove customs duties and fees on films that were deemed educational. 
Hays’ relationship with Mussolini and the IECI seemed to go against his lofty ambition to use 
American films to spread democracy and peace around the world. In reality, however, Hays’ 
involvement reflected a continuous pattern in American foreign relations. Policymakers and the 
public were willing both to champion the United States as a tireless advocate for human rights 
and world peace and at the same time to accommodate dictators when it proved beneficial to the 
American economy. This demonstrated one of the many paradoxes that came with the Open 
Door policy.  
In his numerous reports to the governing body of the IECI, Hays pondered the 
implications of film for world peace. He wrestled delicately with the growing tension between 
the Italian and French film industries and their varying relationships to their respective 
governments. After insisting that film was “one of the best instruments for the pacification of 
people,” Hays made a rather ominous decree: 
Among modern statesmen Benito Mussolini and Georges Clemenceau have recognized 
the tremendous propagandistic power of the movie. … State control for the cinema is 
vigilant, no matter what the policy of the country. … For the masses and their conception 
of unity, the screen can be the source of the greatest good or the greatest evil. … Only 
one thing is necessary, that the propaganda be used exclusively for the highest social 
good.70 
 
Hays understood the risks of working with Mussolini and knew that his propaganda did not 
always serve the highest social good. This was all the more reason, he assumed, to seize the 
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opportunity to increase the number of American films allowed to screen in Italian theaters. Not 
only would it benefit the American film industry, but it would also provide the Italian public 
with more opportunities to view films that implicitly expressed the benefits of the American way 
of life. After World War II, Hays was more open about his criticism of Mussolini, and he noted 
bluntly, “partly because of [his] nationalistic bias, the institute achieved little importance as an 
international force.”71 Statements such as this were common at that time. Like many influential 
Americans, Hays wanted to distance himself from the horrendous legacy wrought by the Axis 
powers by downplaying his previously cozy relationship with Mussolini. Though in reality his 
statement was far from the truth. The IECI, despite its connection with Italian fascism, left an 
enduring footprint on the Pax Cinemana and made enormous strides in developing film as a 
means of international understanding. Largely because of its affiliation with Mussolini, the 
organization has not received the scholarly attention it rightfully deserves.   
The governing body of the IECI recognized that its organization had to produce tangible 
results. It had to be more than a space for exchanging ideas and pleasantries. Naturally, it was a 
convenient cheerleader for the League and played a role in parroting the League’s calls for world 
peace. According to one League official, the IECI and its films were leading all people “slowly 
but surely, through the exterior diversities of fashion, of tendencies and of customs proper to 
each country, to the formation of a kind of Common thought.”72 The IECI propagated such 
cosmopolitan interpretations of world citizenship frequently and actually followed them up with 
practical results. Simply discussing the abstract benefits of film was not enough.  
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Luciano de Feo, the IECI’s primary director and overseer, was quick to implement most 
of the ideas Luchaire had for the original Film Congress in Paris. He made thousands of contacts 
with national film archives around the world and made it easier for them to connect and share 
their holdings with one another. By working diligently with numerous governments, de Feo 
eliminated or eased administrative fees that came with shipping films across borders. He 
acquired prints of thousands of educational films from dozens of countries and assembled them 
in a massive library in Rome. At that time, it was probably the largest collection of educational 
films in the world. Though the library contained films on various topics, those related to 
medicine and surgery received the greatest care. By 1930, films had become a standard in 
medical research facilities and de Feo helped hospitals and universities throughout Europe access 
one another’s works.  
In order to ensure that the public was aware of these accomplishments, he created the 
International Review of Educational Cinematography, the official journal of the IECI. Printed on 
the cover of nearly every issue of the International Review was an image of Trajan’s Column, a 
monument built in the second century CE to celebrate the Roman Empire’s victory in the Dacian 
Wars (Fig. 25). The actual Column stood over one hundred feet tall and contained a spiral relief 
depicting dramatic moments from the wars. “From the artistic and historic view,” de Feo wrote, 
“[the scenes] have a tremendous value and which visualized in rapid succession, give an almost 
absolutely talkful impression of movement.”73 The Column was a perfect emblem for the IECI 
because it represented how its nationalist and internationalist objectives functioned in tandem. 
As was customary with most Roman relics, Mussolini promoted the Column as an enduring 
national symbol that reflected Italy’s glorious history and unmatched military prowess. 
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Mussolini romanticized the Roman Empire routinely in his speeches and used its history to 
validate his own military ambitions in North Africa and the Balkans. As a result, he surely 
appreciated seeing the Column, a tribute to the strength of Rome, re-imagined as a precursor to 
cinema.  
By selecting Trajan’s Column as the IECI’s emblem, de Feo was doing more than simply 
appeasing Mussolini’s desire to bolster the status of Italian film on the world stage. The Column 
also contained an implicit cosmopolitan message relevant to the IECI’s mission. Rome’s victory 
in the Dacian wars allowed Emperor Trajan to expand Rome’s borders to their greatest extent 
and provide Roman citizenship to millions of new people. A prolonged period of peace and 
prosperity followed the wars as the Empire became increasingly more diverse and inclusive. De 
Feo echoed this sentiment when he decided to include an image of the Column on the cover of 
the IECI’s journal. Published once a month in English, Italian, German, Spanish, and French, the 
International Review became an important publication for promoting educational cinema and for 
articulating precisely what it was and how it would benefit daily society and life. 
The IECI framed itself as a shining example of the greater institutionalization of 
international education throughout the world. Its primary focus of course was to foster world 
peace via educational film. In the late 1920s, however, there was no consensus as to what that 
actually meant. In order to distinguish educational films from those of professional entertainment 
industries, the IECI defined them as non-fiction and non-commercial works. This essentially 
translated to non-profit documentaries that were made to screen in primarily non-theatrical 
settings, such as classrooms. The IECI worked with a diverse array of educators from rural 
public schools to elite universities to incorporate film into pedagogy and measure its effects on 
students. Every issue of the International Review contained updates on how instructors were 
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using films to enliven their classrooms and connect with students. One of the most pressing 
issues was the influence of war films on children. 
The IECI conducted a number of studies to gauge how depictions of war in films shaped 
students’ attitudes towards it. Many of these studies were joint efforts between the IECI and 
women’s pacifist organizations, such as the International Council of Women (ICW). The ICW 
was one of the most influential antiwar groups of the twentieth century and had thousands of 
members from dozens of countries. Its goal was to empower women in all facets of life in order 
to secure a lasting peace. Many leaders in the ICW, such as Rosika Schwimmer and Jane 
Addams, were architects of Henry Ford’s Peace Ship and heavily involved in the affairs of the 
League. The ICW created an official Cinema Commission in 1926 to expand its media presence 
and study media’s role in peacekeeping. Laura Dreyfus-Barney was the director of the 
Commission and worked tirelessly to build productive relationships with the IECI and other 
League organizations.  
Dreyfus-Barney was an American activist best known for her work promoting the Bahá'í 
Faith, a universal religion that teaches the unity of all people and the benefits of all religions. She 
was the author of Some Answered Questions, one of the seminal works in Bahá'í literature, which 
detailed her conversations with one of the religion’s founders. After the creation of the IECI, she 
contributed articles regularly to the International Review and maintained regular correspondence 
with de Feo, who praised her as someone “who truly personifies the highest conception of 
spiritual life.”74 De Feo helped her and the ICW hold regular educational film congresses in 
Rome to explore the role of women in promoting peace. The sheer volume of stylish war films 
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produced between 1914 and 1918 disturbed Dreyfus-Barney, who made them a focal point of 
these meetings and developed programs to study their psychological impact on students.  
Dreyfus-Barney argued that as mothers and teachers, women “were more qualified than 
anyone else to understand the effects of the film on youth.”75 She was an ardent feminist and 
usually championed the equality of the sexes, but occasionally felt compelled to highlight what 
she considered women’s exceptional commitment to nonviolence. Her rhetoric resonated not 
only with progressive liberals in the United States, but also with fascists in Italy, who upheld the 
cult of motherhood, a belief that society needed strong women to raise strong children and tame 
the inherent hedonism of men. One of her studies argued that “girls do not like war films,” 
concluding that the films appealed to a uniquely male obsession with guns and bravado.76 She 
did not, however, endorse an overarching censorship of war films like some of her colleagues 
had done. Opting instead for the need to develop an ongoing dialogue with students, particularly 
male students, she promoted studies that measured how films that detailed the harsh realities of 
war, such as All Quiet on the Western Front (1930) and The Man I Killed (1932), “naturally lead 
to a desire that such things should not be repeated and in this way there is a gain for the idea of 
peace.”77 She also detailed the effectiveness of following up screenings of war films with ones 
that demonstrated the work of the League and other postwar peacekeeping organizations. The 
Star of Hope (1925) and The World War and After (1926) were two such works that generated 
considerable attention within the ICW and the IECI.   
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Created by the League of Nations Union, Britain’s largest pacifist organization, these two 
documentaries detailed the operations of the League in a way that elementary school students 
could comprehend. The IECI published a series of articles detailing how the films convinced 
students that “that war is contagious and is horrible” and that “the League is a peacemaker.”78 
Star of Hope was a thirty-five minute, two-reel film produced entirely by dedicated amateurs 
with a budget of approximately two hundred dollars. The film was an amalgamation of newsreel 
footage, still photographs from the Imperial War Museum, and a handful of original maps and 
diagrams. The film was presented in Geneva to League officials who distributed it to interested 
parties in Europe, South Asia, and South Africa. The success of the film encouraged the amateur 
crew to invest in a lengthier sequel, The World War and After (1926).  
This film contained far more original footage and demonstrated how League operations 
could make for engaging viewing. Beginning inside a London slum, the story revolved around a 
group of combative neighbors who gradually build secret coalitions with one another. In an 
analogy to World War I, each neighbor personified a respective nation. The film’s second act 
detailed the brutality of the war while the third act depicted the rise of the League. By connecting 
the local with the global, the film showed how negotiation and diplomacy were relevant to daily 
life. The film was an enormous success and screened in hundreds of schools in multiple countries 
and even in a handful of theaters. Dreyfus-Barney and the ICW supported the film and praised its 
entertainment value. Naturally, one of the greatest problems for filmmakers interested in 
depicting the League was making its activities compelling to watch. “It is intrinsically more 
difficult,” one IECI official wrote, “to show a peace conference dramatically on the screen than a 
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cavalry charge or to present examples of friendly international cooperation as episodes of box-
office value.”79  
Dreyfus-Barney argued that these limitations could be overcome if more women were 
involved in the filmmaking process. Fresh female perspectives, she figured, were essential to 
ensuring that films could serve world peace. “I appeal to mothers of families,” she declared, “to 
teachers, to all women in fact who can contribute to a work which will be a great help for 
happiness in our houses, for social tranquility, and a coming closer together of the people.”80 Her 
work with the IECI demonstrated how Americans were still integral to League activities despite 
the fact that the United States was not officially a member. Dreyfus-Barney’s efforts helped 
introduce peace films into thousands of classrooms and raise the prestige of the IECI. However, 
de Feo did not want to hinder the IECI by limiting its scope only to films that were intended for 
classroom use.  
De Feo did want to advance the role of film in teaching and instruction, but he also 
wanted to contribute to other areas that he believed were integral to improving international 
education. Within the IECI’s literature, de Feo and others were skilled at promoting their agenda 
not as a vague idea, but rather as a service for several key facets of society, specifically labor, 
religion, agriculture, science, and public health. It was within these areas that the IECI leadership 
focused its energies. Within discussions of world peace, the IECI treated public health and labor 
as the most paramount. World peace, they assumed, hinged at least in part on film’s ability to 
serve these two areas in a practical manner.  
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The International Review contained more articles on film’s benefit to public health and 
hygiene than any other topic. Films were an integral part of the global crusade against infectious 
disease. The IECI’s leaders worked regularly with members of the United States Department of 
Agriculture and the National Institutes of Health to produce films that actually treated disease as 
a unifying force that would bring distant societies together on account of a common enemy. De 
Feo suggested routinely how diseases, not people, were the main sources of suffering and death 
in the world. His attitude was quite common and stemmed from the memory of the Spanish 
influenza pandemic of 1918. The unprecedented mobilization of humans and resources during 
World War I created new avenues for an aggressive flu virus to spread. Over the course of only 
two years, it infected approximately 500 million people and claimed the lives of upwards of 50 
million. In fact, more people died from the influenza outbreak than the war itself. The 
globalization of the world, which the IECI insisted was inevitable, would continue to create new 
opportunities for disease outbreaks.  
Over the course of nearly a decade, the IECI spearheaded a number of campaigns to 
produce and screen films in schools, churches, YMCAs, and other community centers that 
demonstrated how to minimize the risk of spreading disease. Some films were quite simple and 
did little more than showcase the value of mosquito nets and hand soap. Others, however, were 
elaborate productions that explored the origins of rare and deadly viruses. Non-human agents, 
such as mosquitoes, vermin, and germs, were usually the villains of such works and represented 
what one anti-malaria film called the true “scourge of mankind.”81 Only by putting aside petty 
differences could governments wield the resources necessary to eliminate the world’s true 
killers, which, the IECI argued, had no concern for national borders and politics.  
																																								 																				
81	“The	Cinema	in	the	Campaign	against	Malaria,”	International	Review	of	Educational	Cinematography,	May	1930,	
619.	
	 200	
The IECI similarly treated exploitative labor conditions as another immediate threat to 
world peace. The IECI worked closely with the International Labour Organization (ILO), one the 
League’s most influential bodies, to incorporate films into their social justice and workplace 
safety campaigns. The ILO emerged in 1919 to compensate trade unions and the working class 
for their critical role in the war effort. Unions and social reformers worked with government 
officials to ensure that the postwar peace recognized the importance of humane working 
conditions and sufficient wages. The formation of the organization was outlined in Part XIII of 
the Treaty of Versailles, which states clearly that world peace can be established only if it is 
based upon the fair and dignified treatment of the world’s workers. Samuel Gompers, President 
of the American Federation of Labor, wrote much of the ILO’s constitution and bylaws. Though 
the United States played a key role in establishing the organization, it did not initially become a 
member since it never joined the League. Nevertheless, a common interest in using films to 
uphold the Treaty of Versailles’ commitment to workers pulled American leaders in government 
and business into the joint efforts of the ILO and the IECI.  
Labor leaders had a keen interest in cinema and participated heavily in the League’s first 
Film Congress in Paris. The ILO’s headquarters contained an extensive film library and 
published an annual catalogue of films relevant to the ongoing needs of labor. Because the 
organization did not initially have its own official film department, de Feo reached out and 
offered the services of the IECI. By 1934, it had become the ILO’s primary resource for anything 
film-related and championed its commitment to regulating hours and pay, protecting workers 
against injury and sickness, preventing unemployment, and eliminating poverty.82 The IECI 
expanded the ILO’s relationship with the US Department of Commerce and US Department of 
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Labor to develop films that improved workplace safety and efficiency. Many American 
businesses, such as Ford Motor Company and US Steel, worked with the IECI to publish studies 
on how they had incorporated film into the workplace. Those related to examining film and 
scientific management generated the most interest and supported the popular interpretation of 
world peace as the inevitable result of maximum productivity. These opportunities benefited the 
companies’ public relations and helped market their products and services overseas. It also 
relieved pressure from the federal government to prove that their facilities met necessary safety 
standards. Evidently, the IECI had the ability to work effectively with American statesmen and 
businessmen.  
In June 1934, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt recognized that the United States and 
the ILO already had a symbiotic relationship and were working closely on a variety of labor 
issues. Roosevelt convinced Congress to accept a resolution that would allow the United States 
to join the organization without having to become a member of the League of Nations. This 
seemingly created an endless array of new opportunities for the IECI to work directly with the 
United States government. The optimism was short lived. One year later, Mussolini mobilized 
approximately 100,000 troops to invade and conquer the Ethiopian Empire without the consent 
of the League. Despite pleas from Emperor Haile Selassie for the League to act, the organization 
did little to prevent Italy’s violent incursion into Africa. The event marked the beginning of the 
end for the IECI and the League itself.  
The invasion drove a wedge between the members of the IECI’s governing body as many 
found it increasingly difficult to collaborate with a government clearly preparing for war. De Feo 
began politicizing the IECI’s literature and made his Italian patriotism known. After learning of 
the use of chemical weapons in Ethiopia, the League publically condemned Mussolini and 
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imposed a number of economic sanctions on Italy. Mussolini refused to abandon his African 
campaign and officially withdrew Italy from the League on December 11, 1937. The decision 
forced all operations of the IECI to cease immediately. Standing before approximately 100,000 
people and dozens of film cameras in Rome, Mussolini framed himself and Italy as victims of 
the tyrannical ambitions of the League. “We shall not forget,” he declared passionately, “the 
shameful attempt at the strangulation of the Italian people that was perpetrated at Geneva … and 
leave without regret, the tottering temple in which men do not work for peace, but prepare for 
war.”83 Given the context, his words were painfully ironic and demonstrated how easy it had 
become for dictators to vilify the League in order mask their own shortcomings. 
 The League was never a singular body but rather a vast network of semi-autonomous 
parts all operating under the broad parameters of the Covenant. It was a complex bureaucracy 
designed to maintain a dialogue between member states in order to avoid acts of war. It was not a 
world government or a world police. Unfortunately, by 1937, the League had not done enough to 
validate that it was solving the troubles of the Great Depression. Many people questioned its 
worth and turned to economic nationalists promising unprecedented prosperity. The League had 
become such a massive entity that many of its appendages were embedded deeply within the 
daily workings of national institutions. Fascist dictators recognized this and used the League as a 
scapegoat. Despite his earlier commitment to the League and its mission, Mussolini began 
portraying it as a power-hungry puppet master trying to manipulate sovereign governments. 
What did diplomats in Geneva, Mussolini suggested, know of Italy’s true greatness? As Italy 
drifted closer to an alliance with Nazi Germany, long-standing critics of the League in the United 
States seized the chance to flaunt its ineffectiveness. For many congressmen who had repeatedly 
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questioned the League’s priorities, such as its commitment to building international education 
rather than an international military, it was an unabashed “I told you so” moment. However, all 
of these criticisms failed to address the fact that many of the League’s organizations, like the 
IECI, had produced tangible results, despite their ambivalent relationship with the United States.
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Chapter Six 
Leave Peace to the Amateurs: Hiram Percy Maxim and the Amateur Cinema League 
After World War I, amateur cinema thrived as an international avocation due to the invention of 
various small-gauge film cameras, particularly Eastman Kodak’s 16mm model. The 16mm 
camera was a fraction of the price of a professional 35mm camera and was easily transportable, 
making the individual production of film relatively egalitarian for the first time since the birth of 
the cinema. By the close of the 1920s, tens of thousands of amateur filmmakers around the 
world, particularly in the United States, Europe, Australasia, East Asia, and Russia, had 
organized themselves within film clubs, societies, and organizations. These amateur institutions 
varied in size and often had conflicting interests and activities. However, they represented a new 
discursive and collaborative arena that thrived outside the hegemony of states and professional 
film industries. This chapter moves beyond the parameters of government and Hollywood in 
order to explore the relationship between amateur filmmakers and the Pax Cinemana. 
Organized amateur filmmaking in many respects embodied the democratization of 
cinema. The miracle of motion pictures had finally come into the hands of ordinary citizens. 
Many amateur filmmakers embraced this notion and insisted that their work could serve as 
convenient means of person-to-person, citizen diplomacy. The act of watching foreign peoples’ 
everyday habits and encounters, they believed, would concurrently humanize them for the 
viewer; thus, notions of their “otherness” would dissolve. One dedicated amateur filmmaker 
elaborated on this in an article titled “Can we hate?” Tracing a correlation between empathy and 
amateur films, the author stated plainly, “movie makers are special messengers of civilization, 
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because we report the every day facts of one part of the world to another. We are not hunting 
sensations for newsreels. We are picturing the nations of the earth as they are.”1 
By and large, amateur films and filmmakers have received little scholarly attention. The 
scholarly neglect of amateur cinema stems mainly from the fact that it has long carried the 
inappropriate and unfitting stigma of a “home movie.” However, the term home movie does not 
adequately reflect the work and ambitions of the subjects considered in this chapter. The aim of 
this chapter is not to dissect casual records of family and domestic life created by those with little 
to no concern for production value or narrative craft. The subjects of this chapter represented a 
culture of organized amateur filmmakers who mastered the technical aspects of cinematography 
and wanted to participate in a “little” cinema that existed beyond the demands of states and 
professional entertainment industries. Many amateurs ultimately hoped to merge the production 
value of professional cinema with the intimacy of ethnography. “Here, there, and everywhere,” 
one amateur exclaimed confidently in 1926, “sixteen thousand amateurs are creating their own 
Hollywoods, Hollywoods of real people.”2  
In terms of technology, most amateurs distinguished amateur films from those of 
Hollywood or entertainment industries because they were created with small-gauge film formats 
(16mm, 8mm, 9.5mm), whereas professionals primarily used large-gauge formats (35mm, 
70mm). However, the distinction between amateur and professional had less to do with 
equipment and more to do with intent. For many amateurs, Hollywood represented a vertically 
integrated industry with a distinct division of labor. Hollywood and industry professionals 
embodied a world of rampant consumerism and marketing. Amateur filmmakers often aligned 
the production mode of Hollywood with that of an assembly line in one of Ford’s factories. 
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Films were products or consumer items more than works of creative expression and 
peacekeeping.3 Hollywood’s ultimate goal was to maximize profits and in order to do so the 
studio system needed to produce films that appealed to mass interests.  
In many respects, amateur cinema represented a cinema free from commercial, political, 
and financial restraints. The commercial interests that ran against Ravished Armenia’s 
humanitarian push for international law, as well as the political bickering that plagued the 
League of Nations’ film pursuits, had no bearing on amateurs and their work. For most amateurs, 
a sense of independence, rather than expensive equipment, separated the professional from the 
amateur. Many amateur film organizations associated the notion of amateur with “practicality,” 
“passion,” “authenticity,” “genuineness,” and “total liberty.”4 These filmmakers embraced small-
gauge or “home movie” film formats, but were not content keeping their work within the 
domestic sphere. Many wanted their films to move both within and across borders, encouraging 
the international production, exhibition, and discussion of films in an earnest endeavor to 
promote world peace. In order to understand the role of amateur filmmaking in the pursuit of an 
enduring peace, it is useful to explore the influence of the “Auerbach Incident” on Hiram Percy 
Maxim, the amateur filmmaking’s most outspoken activist. 
…………………………………………. 
In the early 1900s, noise pollution plagued America’s urban centers. With technological 
advancement came the boisterous sounds of automobiles, trains, engines, and factories. New 
York, teeming with disparate sounds of crowds and machinery, was void of any legislation to 
regulate what one resident described as “a pandemonium of rumbling trucks, shrieking brakes, 
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and roaring drills.” “On reading this cacophonous list,” the commentator continued, “I am struck 
with its resemblance to what might pass for a symphony in the modern manner portraying 
civilization as a monster, a destroying Frankenstein.”5 In short, modern life was noisy and the 
federal government did not recognize the health and environmental concerns of noise emissions 
until the late 1960s, and only in 1972 did Congress implement the Noise Pollution and 
Abatement Act to reshape the urban soundscape. For decades beforehand, New Yorkers and 
other urban dwellers managed to cope with the burden as entrepreneurs invented, patented, and 
sold various noise suppressing products. 
On Thursday, January 28,1915, Herman Auerbach acquired a curious, new device from 
one of the world’s leading manufacturers of noise reduction technology: the Maxim Silencer 
Company. The company designed the Maxim silencer to suppress the sound blast of firearms 
between .22 and .44 calibers. The inventor of the instrument patented it in 1908 and perfected it 
in 1909. The United States military simultaneously used and tested the product as it entered the 
marketplace. Auerbach likely purchased the Maxim silencer from a local hardware store in 
Manhattan, where it sold for between $3.25 and $5.00. He quickly fastened it to the barrel of a 
.44 Winchester repeating rifle loaded with steel jacket bullets designed for big-game hunting. He 
then proceeded home to his apartment on Central Park West, where his wife greeted him. She 
asked about the rifle and the peculiar metal cylinder attached to it. Auerbach explained that he 
was in the process of acquiring investors for a company to manufacture rifles equipped with 
Maxim silencers, a likely explanation given the growing reputation of the Maxim brand. The 
Maxim Silencer Company specialized not only in firearm silencers but also in noise suppressors 
for engines, exhaust pipes, ventilating systems, air conditioning units, and an array of industrial 
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machinery. Auerbach placed the modified Winchester out of sight in his home and nothing came 
of it again for several days.  
Auerbach was seemingly a happy and healthy individual. He had three children and 
owned Auerbach Realty Company, a real estate business catering to well-to-do Manhattanites. 
His father was the director of the business and his wife was the secretary. His father, David 
Auerbach, had emigrated from Germany and owned and operated a profitable candy factory in 
New York, which had provided Herman Auerbach and his siblings with a secure and reasonably 
affluent upbringing. On Saturday, January 30, 1915, Auerbach, as he had countless times in the 
past, went for a long walk to Union Square. There, he met with relative David Levy and 
proceeded uptown. According to Levy, there was no indication that anything was out of the 
ordinary. Auerbach then took the trolley back to Central Park West and returned home around 
7:00 p.m. “When he arrived,” reported The New York Times, “he gave each of his children a 
quarter and told them to go to a moving picture show.”6  
The cinema captivated Auerbach’s children, like it did most Americans. In 1915, every 
week, over thirty million Americans flocked to one of America’s 21,000 movie theaters. In the 
1910s, new theaters designed for middle and upper-class Americans had sprouted up throughout 
Manhattan. Hailed as “dream palaces” given their ostentatious designs, these cinemas enchanted 
the well-to-do far more than the ramshackle, turn-of-the-century movie houses and nickelodeons 
that catered to the working class.7 The Auerbach children, Beatrice, 18, Daisy, 16, and Lester, 
14, probably saw one of the month’s most popular films: The Birth of a Nation, Les Vampires, 
Regeneration, The Cheat, or Alice in Wonderland. As they watched the film it is unlikely that 
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they mulled over the world war and its crippling effects on nearly every film industry outside 
Southern California.   
After the screening, the Auerbachs returned home, around 10:30 p.m., and they spoke 
briefly with their stepmother, Clair Auerbach, 34, who had just returned from spending the 
evening at her brother’s. Noticing that their father was already asleep, they too proceeded to go 
to bed. Beatrice and Daisy made their way to their respective twin beds in the room they shared. 
Lester proceeded to his room while Clair joined her husband, careful not to wake him. 
Eventually, the Auerbachs drifted off to sleep.  
The exact time of their murders remains a mystery. Yet at some point in the night, 
Herman Auerbach awoke, grabbed the Winchester repeating rifle equipped with the Maxim 
silencer, and entered his daughters’ room. He stood between the two girls as they slept and fired 
one round each into the backs of their heads. He then returned to his room and did the same to 
his sleeping wife before turning the gun on himself.8 
Around 9:00 a.m. the following morning, Herman Auerbach’s nephew called to inquire if 
Beatrice would like to go skating. Lattie Schliep, a maid employed by Herman Auerbach, 
answered the telephone, a fairly new means of communication in the apartment complex, and 
responded that the family had yet to awake. The nephew in turn asked for Lester, and the maid 
agreed to wake him. Lester acknowledged his cousin’s invitation and asked him to call back in a 
few hours. As time passed, Lester decided to awaken his sister and give her the message. 
According to The New York Times, “He walked down the corridor, knocked at the door, and 
receiving no response, opened the door and looked in. The two girls lay motionless, with their 
pillows stained crimson.”9 Lester was shocked but managed to keep his composure. He turned to 
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his father’s room and frantically pounded on the door. After getting no response, he opened the 
door to find his father and stepmother dead, with large bullet wounds in their heads. He noticed 
the Winchester repeating rifle and the unusual cylinder attached to the barrel. Lester immediately 
informed the maid who notified the authorities. As he passed the doorway of his own room he 
found a note in his father’s handwriting. “When you wake up,” it read, “telephone to Uncle Joe 
and Leo and grandpa.”10 The boy followed his deceased father’s instructions and contacted the 
only family he had left. 
After questioning Herman Auerbach’s close friends and relatives, the police concluded 
that recent business failings and a series of losses in real estate holdings drove Auerbach into a 
deep depression with catastrophic consequences. Literally overnight, the Auerbach tragedy 
brought the Maxim Silencer Company national attention and triggered public debate. “Four 
killings in a few minutes,” one reporter for The Pittsburgh Press noted, “and not a sound to warn 
either those outside or in the apartment itself! The presumption seems fairly to be, therefore, that 
it was the silencer and the silencer alone that enabled Auerbach to accomplish his purpose.”11 
Journalists wrote extensively about the certainty that such a crime would reoccur and about the 
infinite potential the silencer created for new criminal activity. Furthermore, after the shootings, 
a wave of crime novels, detective stories, and pulp fiction comics emerged, featuring the Maxim 
silencer as an indispensable plot device. After the invention of sound films, Hollywood also 
embraced the Maxim silencer in a vast array of crime, gangster, and film noir pictures, which 
romanticized murder and urban violence.       
Since its invention, the Maxim silencer has been embroiled in controversy. However, it 
never received much public attention until the Auerbach tragedy. Various news outlets lambasted 
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the “disastrous,” “sinister,” and “deadly” instrument and called for state and federal legislation to 
prohibit further manufacture and sale of the device.12 One journalist claimed the Maxim 
Company’s president “did humanity no service when he invented this devilish tool.”13 For over a 
decade, the Maxim silencer continued to make headlines as critics claimed it boosted theft, 
sustained organized crime syndicates, and encouraged murder. In 1926, when reflecting on the 
alleged ubiquity of silencers, The New York Times asked, “Why even one was ever publicly 
sold? Is there any conceivable use, except criminal concealment and the facilitation of murder, to 
which such a device can be put outside of the battlefield?”14 The Auerbach incident reignited the 
seemingly never-ending debate regarding gun control in the United States, but this debate also 
embroiled the inventor of the silencer in this critical discourse on crime and technology. Many 
media outlets, including The Pittsburgh Press, The New York Times, and The Detroit Free Press, 
insisted that the inventor of the silencer was indirectly responsible for the death of the Auerbach 
family. The man whose invention “caused” such criminality was Hiram Percy Maxim. 
 Hiram Percy Maxim was born in New York City and raised in New England during the 
last half of the nineteenth century. In 1884, at fourteen years of age, Maxim began studying 
engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Two years later, Maxim 
graduated not only as the youngest in his class but also as the youngest at MIT. This perhaps 
came as no surprise given that Maxim stemmed from a long line of influential independent 
inventors.15  
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Hiram Stevens Maxim, his father, invented the Maxim gun, the world’s first practical, 
self-powered machine gun. The Maxim machine gun revolutionized modern warfare and evolved 
into a symbol of European imperialism. The adoption of the Maxim gun in World War I resulted 
in the deaths of millions. Variations of the weapon were ubiquitous throughout the trenches as 
belligerents from each side volleyed waves of bullets back and forth for months, leading to many 
instances of deadly stalemate. Historians credit much of the staggering death tolls at Verdun and 
Somme, for example, to the use of the machine gun. After the war, several camera companies 
actually appropriated Maxim’s design and created the camera machine-gun, a camera that 
operated precisely like a machine gun in order to train troops for aerial and ground combat.16 The 
camera machine-gun was yet another testament to the unlikely marriage between the motion 
picture industry and munitions manufacturers. Similarly, Maxim’s uncle, Hudson Maxim, a 
talented chemist, has been credited with inventing smokeless gunpowder and an array of 
explosives used extensively throughout the war. He was also an avid writer and provided the 
inspiration and story for The Battle Cry of Peace (1915), the infamous Hollywood propaganda 
film that Henry Ford had publicly condemned and later challenged in his own educational film 
series. The war blurred what were once seemingly self-evident lines between combat, peace, and 
cinema. 
Historians often link World War I and a new and deadly stock of weapons, which forced 
millions of people, mostly Europeans, to recognize that modern technology was both a means to 
a plausible utopia and a catalyst for catastrophe. Fortunately for the United States, Americans 
had represented only a small fraction of the war’s casualties. By and large, the trauma of the war 
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had worn much heavier on Europe than the United States. As a result, the war’s violence was not 
enough to completely overturn Americans’ faith in technological innovation.17 Seemingly, 
Maxim’s silencer fit nicely within a larger family genealogy of successful war devices. However, 
unlike his father and uncle, Hiram Percy Maxim had virtually no interest in producing guns and 
heavy artillery.  
Hiram Stevens Maxim spent endless hours experimenting with various parts of his 
Maxim gun and consequently raised his son in a home filled with noise. As a child, Hiram Percy 
Maxim became accustomed to the sounds of explosions and gunfire, forcing him to recognize the 
damaging physical and psychological effects of unwarranted noise. As an adult, Maxim 
published several articles demonstrating the negative health consequences of noise pollution. 
Maxim perceived noise as one of the principal hurdles of modern life and in reference to his 
company exclaimed, “we believe we have spent more money and more effort in the study of 
noise reduction than anyone else in the world.”18  
Soon after the invention of the automobile muffler, Maxim thought to apply the device to 
other instruments. Originally, he had two specific intentions for his silencer: military use and 
recreational use. Ideally, the silencer would aid the instruction of new recruits by reducing the 
physical strain stemming from recoil and provide tactical advantages since enemies could not 
detect locations from blast noise or muzzle flash.19 Moreover, gun enthusiasts with backyard 
ranges could employ the silencer and no longer disturb their neighbors. Advertisements for the 
silencer did not reflect any form of clandestine, illicit activity, insisting primarily that “girls like 
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it when there’s no nerve-ripping report.”20 Though the silencer sold fairly well as a leisure 
product, it never became as ubiquitous within the United States military as Maxim had predicted, 
despite having sold 1,100 silencers to the United States army in 1910.21 The enormous and 
explicit nature of World War I demonstrated clearly that modern militaries had little need for 
personal stealth equipment. War in the twentieth century was destined to be big, loud, and 
messy—a deadly spectacle to be played out in front of a camera lens.  
Ironically, for a man critiqued by the press as a co-conspirator in crimes such as 
“silenced” theft and murder, Hiram Percy Maxim was widely recognized for his nonviolent 
character. Maxim committed himself to his family and had no run-ins with the law; his 
colleagues frequently described him as “a man of peace.”22 Maxim considered himself 
diplomatic by nature, and his business associates revered his conflict-resolution skills. Unlike his 
uncle and father, who were slightly crass and outspoken, Maxim was tactful, calculating, and 
patient. His characteristic calmness and approachability in business and finance earned him 
recognition as “the beloved gentleman,” a title that followed him until death.23 According to 
Maxim, he encouraged his favorite avocation, filmmaking, because he thought it could usher in 
an era of global peace and understanding. 
Maxim never intended to aid organized crime or mass murder with his invention of the 
silencer. He wanted to eliminate unnecessary noise, whatever its source. A device built to 
ameliorate the noisy, frustrating facets of modernity in actuality fueled urban violence, one of its 
most heinous consequences. Apparently as a result, Maxim decided to cease the sale and 
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manufacture of his silencers in 1930.24 “We stopped,” Maxim stated, “before crime and street 
shootings became so frequent.”25 For years afterward, Maxim continued to adapt his silencer 
apparatus to hospital rooms, automobiles, diesel engines, boat engines, steam engines, and an 
array of industrial machinery. Despite his quest for silence, Maxim’s greatest passion rested in 
tools of communication.  
In 1921, Maxim purchased an Eastman Kodak 16mm motion picture camera. He loved 
the device and it quickly became one of his most prized possessions. He committed himself to 
mastering the mechanical and technical aspects of the camera and eventually matured into a 
skilled cinematographer. He even began shooting his own photoplays with the aid of his family 
and friends, an unusual activity for a man of his affluence. Enamored with the possibilities of the 
small-gauge film camera, Maxim championed it as a revolutionary piece of technology with 
potential that surpassed radio and telephones for its ability to allow ordinary individuals to 
communicate, albeit visually in this case. Maxim predicted that by 1925, there would be over ten 
thousand amateur film enthusiasts who would benefit from collective learning. Maxim saw fit to 
create an association that would link amateur filmmakers across local and national borders. 
 On July 28, 1926, Maxim held a luncheon at the New York Hotel Biltmore in Manhattan 
to establish formally and celebrate the birth of the Amateur Cinema League, or the ACL. At the 
meeting, Maxim announced the directors of the league, explained the goals and structure of the 
organization, and read salutations from John H. Trumbull, the governor of Connecticut, Amelita 
Galli-Curci, the famous Italian singer, and George Ade, the world-renowned playwright. It was 
truly a bourgeois affair. Participating parties selected Maxim as the first ACL president and 
several prominent businessmen as directors, such as Roy D. Chapman of the Hudson Motor 
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Company, C.R. Dooley of Standard Oil, and W.E. Cotter of Union Carbide.26  Unmistakably, the 
leadership of the ACL reflected the larger pro-business, anti-statist culture that thrived 
throughout the 1920s. Maxim, like most of his directors, was a proud Republican and only had to 
look to his family’s experience during the war to understand that governments had misused the 
power of motion pictures. Maxim believed earnestly that motion pictures belonged first and 
foremost in the hands of “ordinary” citizens. Though the ACL leadership was particularly 
wealthy, they insisted that the goal was to create a mainstream institution designed for the 
interests of the middle class, or “everyday people” as Maxim phrased it. 
Within the bourgeoning culture of organized amateur filmmaking, the ACL was 
responsible for the medium’s most ambitious activity. Maxim knew the deadly consequences of 
technological innovation all too well and founded the ACL specifically as a community of 
interest designated to promoting peace and international understanding after the turmoil of the 
war. The ACL quickly grew into the world’s largest and most globally active amateur cinema 
organization with over 10,000 official members scattered between sixty countries. The ACL 
registered over two hundred and fifty regional clubs and its service department, which managed 
communication between the ACL and its members, made tens of thousands of contacts per year. 
The monthly readers of Movie Makers, the ACL’s official journal, had reached 100,000 by the 
mid 1930s. Boasting that its members were everywhere, from “Tampa to Timbuktu,” the ACL 
was unmatched in its international scope.27 The ACL, from its beginnings, was a vehicle to 
promote cross-cultural interaction, understanding, and dialogue. The ACL was not the only 
organization dedicated to popularizing amateur cinema but it was the only organization that 
																																								 																				
26 The other ACL directors included Stephen F. Voorhes, a celebrated architect, and Colonel Roy W. Winton, 
formerly of the United States Army.  
27 Editorial, Movie Makers, January 1931, 7.  
	 217	
strongly supported transnational dialogue and international cooperation among its members. It 
was by no means representative of the entire culture of organized amateur cinema, but did help 
unite many of the world’s most influential and popular amateur filmmaking bodies under the 
lofty promise of world peace.  
Officially, the central purpose of the ACL was to advance the “sport” of amateur 
filmmaking by encouraging the production of amateur films, the formation of local amateur film 
clubs, the national and international exchange of amateur films, and fraternalism between 
amateur filmmakers. Maxim, though, had far greater ambitions for the new activity than were 
represented in the stated goals and services: 
 Amateur cinematography has a future that the most imaginative of us would  
be totally incapable of estimating. When we analyze amateur cinematography we find it a 
very much broader affair than appears upon the surface. Instead of its being a form of 
light amusement, it is really an entirely new method of communication. Our civilization 
offers us today, only the spoken word or the written word, as a means of communicating 
with each other. This word may be spoken to those within sound of our voice, telephoned 
over a hired wire, mailed in a letter or telegraphed in dots and dashes. But no matter how 
transmitted it is still the spoken or written word. We are dumb as far as movement, 
action, grace, beauty, and all that depends on these things. The motion picture 
communicates all of these. We are able to transmit what our eyes see, and it is the next 
thing to actually being present ourselves. And so instead of amateur cinematography 
being merely a means of individual amusement, we have in it a means of communicating 
a new form of knowledge to our fellow human beings, be where they may upon the 
earth’s surface.28 
 
Evidently, Maxim viewed the small-gauge film camera as the next great step in the evolution of 
communication systems, which included written letters, telegrams, and telephones. Therefore, 
Maxim considered the emergence of the 16mm camera not as the birth of a new toy, as many 
Hollywood professionals contended, but as a landmark moment in human interaction. For 
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Maxim, amateur cinema was as much about the diffusion of knowledge as it was about personal 
recreation and leisure. In 1929, Roy Winton, ACL Managing Director, expanded on Maxim’s 
thoughts by comparing the potential impact of small-gauge film cameras to the influence of the 
printing press on “the molding of public opinion.”29 
Maxim and the directors of the ACL, like many technological enthusiasts in the twentieth 
century, embraced a utopian image of technology and frequently described their activity as 
humanitarian and of the utmost importance: “It may not be too much to say that the organizing of 
amateur cinematography marks one of the greatest advancements in general human education 
that has been made in modern times.”30 For the ACL, amateur cinema was not only advancing 
technology but also “bringing men and women generally to a better knowledge of each other.” 31 
For Maxim, amateur cinema was “not merely a means for individual amusement,” but was also a 
powerful tool for intercommunication. “An amateur cinematographer in the tropics,” Maxim 
boasted, “may convey to an amateur in a cold country precisely what life in the tropics is.” For 
Maxim, this was impossible with any other form of existing technology because such sources 
“provided only the spoken word or the written word.” With motion pictures, Maxim exclaimed, 
“Interesting customs in one country which are indescribable in words may be made known to 
peoples of other countries.”32 The directors of the ACL were proud of their multinational breadth 
and boasted that amateur cinema was “an international language, and a bond between nations.”33 
Maxim and many of the ACL leaders were idealists and operated under the assumption 
that universal principles bind all people regardless of nationality, race, class, gender, and 
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political affiliation. Maxim and the ACL leaders believed that the efficient exchange of amateur 
cinema would help minimize conflicts between distant peoples. Maxim hoped to cultivate an 
international spirit because he was certain that modern transportation and communication 
systems would very soon bring all of humanity together into a cohesive whole. “The races of the 
world,” he argued, “are interbreeding for the first time … soon complete infusion will have 
occurred, and there will be an absence of sharply defined races.”34 Though Maxim and the ACL 
leadership were idealists, they insisted that American democracy would naturally shape the 
political landscape of the postwar era.  
Maxim often echoed an earlier speech that Woodrow Wilson had made to the United 
States Congress. If the world’s “free peoples” did not unite, Wilson averred, then “there can be 
no assured security for the democratic governments of the world” or for “ultimate peace.”35 
Maxim and the directors of the ACL hoped that the exchange of amateur cinema between 
democratic nations would help strengthen democratic institutions therein. In addition, they hoped 
that the exchange of amateur cinema between democratic nations and non-democratic nations 
would gradually persuade the latter to conform to democracy. Contemporary, liberal idealists see 
cultural pluralism as the key to the common good and would certainly disparage the ACL’s 
agenda. However, it would be ahistorical to criticize the directors of the ACL for not adhering to 
current standards of tolerance and liberalism. Given the conditions of the era, it would be 
misleading to consider the ACL leadership anything but progressive. “Amateur movies can never 
be predominantly nationalistic,” one league director wrote, “they must always trend towards 
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internationalism and must progress toward that tolerance and that understanding of other peoples 
and of other viewpoints which mark the true citizens of the world.”36  
Perhaps the ACL leaders were naive, but their attempts to cultivate such notions of 
internationalism were certainly not disingenuous. In order to achieve their global vision, ACL 
leaders had made available to their members several international services. In the first issue of 
Movie Makers, Maxim and the directors of the league wrote extensively about their commitment 
to encouraging and connecting with amateur film activity overseas. According to the ACL 
constitution, “Any person interested in amateur motion pictures shall be eligible for 
membership.”37 Therefore, besides an interest in amateur cinematography, nothing prohibits any 
individual from applying, “be where they may,” said Maxim, “upon the Earth’s surface.”38 The 
ACL further positioned the organization within a global context by adopting the slogan, “The 
World-Wide Organization of Amateur Movie Makers.”  
By 1929, the slogan was printed regularly in the journal and also appeared on every film 
leader provided to members. A film leader is a short strip of film attached to the start of a reel to 
simplify the process of threading a projector. The leaders ran before the opening credits and 
provided members an opportunity to show off their adherence to the ACL. They depicted an 
animated image of Earth spinning in the vastness of space as the title “Member-Amateur Cinema 
League-The World-Wide Organization of Amateur Movie Makers” faded in. The decision to use 
an image of the planet as a league symbol may appear somewhat clichéd. But, in the late 1920s, 
the image of a fragile planet floating in cosmic emptiness cemented the idea that all humans were 
destined to share a single celestial body. As a result, the image of the planet implied a sense of 
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interconnectedness, fraternity, and communion among members, a central aim of the league. 
Therefore, the decision was an effective if obvious means to express the international scope of 
the ACL. 
The ACL’s worldview was internationalist in the truest sense of the word. Maxim and his 
cohorts interpreted the world as a single whole comprised of cohesive nation states. Many ACL 
publications reduced humanity’s complexity to “one world” or a “single community.” This 
cosmopolitan impulse permeated most amateur film publications and posed a philosophical 
challenge to the legitimacy of national citizenship. However, it also undermined the nuances of 
human communities and ignored those without a state or formal international recognition. For 
example, an invitation for membership in the ACL stated, “Are YOU on the Amateur Cinema 
League Map? The League has invaded 31 countries on this map. Have you invaded the 
League?”39 The ACL’s map served as an inventory of the nations “represented” by its 
membership. When an individual from Ceylon joined the league, which only a handful ever did, 
the ACL leadership, using the language of colonialism, checked Ceylon off its list of countries 
the organization had “invaded.” The ACL positioned those few Ceylonese members as stand-ins 
for the nation’s entire population, and the leadership boasted that Ceylon was now part of the 
global village of amateur filmmakers. In turn, this encouraged many amateurs to produce and 
exchange films that expressed what they viewed as uniquely “Japanese,” “American,” or 
“Austrian,” which helped enforce national identities. However, the league directors regularly 
warned of the dangers of extreme nationalism and claimed they were dedicated to keeping Movie 
Makers free from such sentiment. 
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Maxim elaborated on his aspiration to imbue members with a sense of international 
camaraderie in a number of editorials. He provided an overview of the ACL’s general 
philosophy and commitment to divergent nations and peoples. He stressed the importance for 
members to avoid “drum beating and flag waving.”40 Even though the ACL headquarters resided 
in New York City, the directors of the league frequently denounced the idea that the organization 
was a national body of the United States. “The ACL,” a 1934 editorial declared, “has been no 
more Japanese than French, no more American than British, not interested in a Western point of 
view as opposed to an Eastern, or a Northern as superior to a Southern.” The editorial was 
neither interested in international theory nor “pointing out an object lesson to diplomats.” Even 
though the ACL was not officially a body of the United States, it was certainly a product of the 
United States, and traces of its national origin permeated all of ACL discourse. But, the directors 
of the league celebrated international service before formal international politics, whose 
“formula seems to demand an agreement upon a concept, an abstraction, before anything 
practical may be attempted.” 41 The ACL always championed pragmatism before anything else. 
ACL leaders focused on the technique of international service because, for them, it was 
forthright and immediately operative, unlike lofty economic or political theories.  
The ACL leadership embraced the tenets of idealism but figured that international non-
governmental organizations (INGOs), like the ACL, were better equipped than the federal 
government to open initially the path toward international understanding on the world stage. 
INGOs, the leaders argued, offered a simple, practical service, which contributed to an 
international community before any direct intervention from national governments. In other 
words, according to the ACL, governments should consider trailing INGOs rather than leading 
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them because they offered immediate results without the confusion of complicated politics. 
These assertions were in sync the policies of the Republican establishment at that time. One 
conservative ACL member from Massachusett, elaborated on this point by promoting the ACL’s 
independent system of international service as being more effective than the League of Nations: 
“If those chaps across the water were dyed in the wool of movie fans there wouldn’t be any 
war.”42 The ACL was an open reservoir of cinematic information and, as the directors of the 
league frequently repeated, an INGO based upon mutual exchange and fair bargaining.  
Maxim envisioned an amateur consciousness free from financial concerns helping to tear 
down popular ethnic misconceptions because members from all over the world were engaged 
solely in a fraternal system of exchange, collaboration, and critique. In the early years of the 
ACL, the system manifested itself in several forms. First, the ACL provided personalized, yellow 
cards to all members. The cards were a playful way to express loyalty and foster a sense of 
fraternity between members. The ACL encouraged and provided information for members and 
local film clubs from different areas to meet and assemble. “Close Up” and “Amateur Clubs,” 
two articles that appeared in nearly every issue of Movie Makers, consisted largely of news 
concerning cooperation between divergent cine clubs or instances of members meeting. In the 
beginning years, connections between clubs and members were limited to nearby cities and 
states. Originally, most clubs were concentrated in the New England and New York areas, thus, 
most early instances of assembly revolved around the East Coast region. In Canada, members of 
the Toronto Amateur Movie Club frequently traveled to New York as guests of the Buffalo 
Cinema Club. At every meeting, Canada’s national anthem was blared to welcome the visiting 
Canadians.43 In September 1934, officers of the Hungarian Amateur Film Club, ACL, in 
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Budapest, Hungary, hosted for five days Jaspar More, ACL, and his fiancée, both of Glasgow, 
Scotland. In a letter to league headquarters, More stated: “If all movie making clubs were as 
wiling to help and such good fellows generally, many more people would make movies—if only 
for the sake of being in the club.”44 Encounters across boundaries and borders were common, 
and members of cine clubs in Denmark, Australia, Germany, New Zealand, France, South 
Africa, and England regularly treated foreign ACL members as guests. However, cine clubs did 
not conduct all transnational meetings. Many individuals expressed their desire to meet other 
members, and Movie Makers published offers of hospitality. 
In 1934, A.D. Frischmann, an ACL member in London, England, planned to visit 
Switzerland and wrote ACL headquarters asking if there were any members in Lugano interested 
in meeting. The league sent him the contact information for Harry Schraemli, a Swiss ACL 
member and owner of the elegant Hotel Beau Rivage. Later, when Frischmann arrived, 
Schraemli presented him with the best suite of the hotel, with the joking comment, “Now, you 
see what league membership does for you.”45 Similarly, J.R.E. Wuthrich, an ACL member from 
the Netherlands, encouraged any league members visiting Utrecht to contact him if they needed 
assistance or hoped to socialize and talk shop.46 Noel Pearson, another ACL member from 
Sydney, Australia, wrote “If any members are visiting this country at any time, I shall be only 
too pleased to introduce them to other movie enthusiasts and to take them along to an Australian 
Amateur Cine Society meeting.”47 Furthermore, T.J.A. Hunter, ACL member in Quebec, 
Canada, warmly invited any member passing through Old Quebec to visit his home.48 These 
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communications illustrated how the ACL was a social service and how filmmaking was a simple 
yet valuable tool for solidifying friendships across borders. Local filmmakers offered simple 
travel advice, food and lodging, invitations as an honorary guest to local film clubs, and even 
offers of collaboration. Publicizing hospitable acts among members enforced the organization’s 
sense of fraternity and camaraderie, a central aim of the ACL.  
 The ACL contributed informally to international relations by encouraging sustained 
relationships between groups and individuals who shared a common interest in cinema. In 1935, 
the league directors created the Extraordinary Membership status reserved strictly for national 
groups of amateur cinematographers. They created the status as an instrument to express the 
league’s esteem for the many distinguished national bodies of cine amateurs with which it was 
working. They offered membership only to amateur societies believed to be representative of the 
entire film movement in their countries. In October, the ACL announced the acceptance of 
Extraordinary Membership in the league by the Hungarian Amateur Film Club of Budapest, 
Hungary; the Institute of Amateur Cinematographers of London, England; and the Klub der 
Kino-Amateure Osterreichs of Vienna, Austria.49 Cine enthusiasts in America, Hungary, Austria, 
and England openly celebrated their joint commitment to advancing the medium. Maxim pegged 
partnerships such as these as “a milestone in the rapid international development of amateur 
movies” that “will greatly contribute to the friendship between nations.”50 In an act of 
appreciation, the Institute of Amateur Cinematographers conferred upon Maxim the 
distinguished position of Patron of the Institute, “a gesture,” Movie Makers described, “of 
international friendship which will be highly valued by league members the world over.”51 These 
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unofficial exchanges clearly modeled those of the League of Nations and official statecraft, but 
provided an excellent example of how international organizations served as representative bodies 
for average citizens. The ACL stated frequently that it was not an agent of the American 
government but did provide a space for film enthusiasts to accentuate the political affairs of their 
respective homelands. However, the ACL was not always engaged solely in informal diplomacy. 
Several influential world leaders, policy makers, ambassadors, and diplomats joined the ACL or 
were influenced by its members. 
Throughout its nearly three-decade lifespan, the ACL had members of nobility from at 
least nine countries. The first ruler to join the ranks of the ACL was Rajah Pratapgirji 
Narasingirji, the prince of a province in southern India. Little is known of the prince’s film work, 
and the league received little notice from him after he requested membership. Throughout the 
late 1920s, amateur cinema steadily grew in popularity and the ACL confirmed members from 
British, Spanish, French, German, Dutch, Italian, and even Cuban nobility. However, the first 
and only head of state to join the league was Prajadhipok, the King of Siam, who ruled from 
1925 to 1935. King Prajadhipok became an active amateur filmmaker soon after Eastman Kodak 
released the 16mm camera that used reversible film stock. Prajadhipok took to the device quickly 
and was aware of its potential for communication and influencing public opinion.  
At the time, Prajadhipok was still a prince and he was frequently photographed proudly 
holding his camera or in the act of filming. Prajadhipok was interested in technology and 
amenable to western ideals. He was curious about American cinema and Hollywood, and he 
visited Southern California in the summer of 1924 with his wife. Several years later, after he was 
appointed absolute monarch, Prajadhipok returned to the United States and visited Paramount’s 
massive New York studios. On his first trip, he purchased a wide variety of filmmaking 
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equipment and also managed to socialize with the unofficial king and queen of Hollywood, 
Douglas Fairbanks and Mary Pickford.52 Hollywood stars intrigued Prajadhipok but the 
mechanical aspects of motion pictures fascinated him even more. When Prajadhipok returned to 
the United States in the early 1930s, Adolph Zukor, President of Paramount Pictures, gave the 
monarch and his wife Rambaibarni a guided tour of the studio and explained the mechanical 
functions of the 35mm sound camera (a new invention at the time). Prajadhipok eagerly brought 
his new knowledge of the studio-system back to Siam. 
It is likely that Prajadhipok represented Maxim’s ideal candidate to exemplify the 
potential impact of the ACL. Prajadhipok ruled an ancient society representing a vastly different 
history and culture than the United States and the western world, but he fully understood that the 
authority of his ancien regime was waning. Prajadhipok never intended to uphold his absolute 
authority permanently, and he believed that a constitutional monarchy or democratic Siam was 
inevitable and in the best interests of his people. Prajadhipok was fully prepared to implement 
drastic constitutional and democratic reforms, but for years he abstained due to suggestions from 
his top advisors that many Siamese people were still ill prepared for political participation and 
that an overall drift toward democracy was premature. It is likely that Maxim considered 
Prajadhipok—an ardent cinephile and absolute monarch pushing for democracy—as the 
confirmation of his worldview. Maxim considered the adoption of democracy a natural 
development after World War I, and cinema as an indispensable component in the process. 
Maxim applauded Prajadhipok’s politics and relished the fact that a ruler of such a notable yet 
unfamiliar society was on the ACL roster.   
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Prajadhipok first became interested in the ACL through another ACL member, his Royal 
Highness, Prince Purachatra of Siam, uncle of the King and Minister of Railways of the Siamese 
Kingdom. On receiving an invitation from the league, Prajadhipok expressed his eager desire to 
affiliate with an international organization for amateur filmmakers. In fact, Prajadhipok was so 
enthusiastic that he not only accepted membership on behalf of himself but also encouraged a 
number of nobles and younger members of the Royal House to enlist. By 1930, approximately 
one dozen royal courtiers of the Kingdom of Siam were members of the ACL.53  
Prajadhipok’s relationship with the ACL reflected the league’s ability to sustain friendly, 
long-term bonds with influential heads of state. It is worth noting that in the late 1920s and early 
1930s, formal relations between policy makers in United States and the Kingdom of Siam were 
quite limited. A decade had passed since a Siam royal had established diplomatic arrangements 
with United States representatives. Prajadhipok’s healthy friendship with the ACL may have 
helped to generate positive Siamese perceptions of the United States.54 Moreover, Prajadhipok 
was not the only official emissary of a nation that maintained constructive connections with the 
league.  
 In October 1938, the ACL welcomed Wilbur J. Carr, American Minister to 
Czechoslovakia, in Prague, “into the family of Movie Makers.”55 Carr’s involvement with the 
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ACL suggested how actively placed amateur filmmakers and members of the ACL were in the 
midst of important world diplomacy. ACL members not directly involved in state affairs still 
regularly met with policymakers to provide intimate visual representations of global peoples and 
places. In April 1935, John V. Hansen, ACL member in Washington, D.C., was guest of honor at 
a dinner given by Ambassador and Madame Troyanovsky at the embassy of the U.S.S.R in 
Washington. Nearly a year before, Hansen had completed a series of documentary films while 
traveling in the Soviet Union. In fact, Soviet police had arrested him for “alleged picture taking 
in Moscow’s forbidden Red Square.”56 However, his films were so impressive that Soviet 
officials eventually contacted him for viewing purposes. At the embassy, the evening’s main 
event was a screening of the films for which Hansen had been arrested. Certainly, the confusion 
was discussed with humor and good cheer. The incident is one of many accounts of ACL 
members being asked to screen films for government officials, which demonstrated how policy 
makers both misunderstood—and understood—amateur works as providing insights into society, 
culture, and life.  
 Ralph E. Gray, ACL member in Mexico, was well known for his stunning films of old 
Mexico. In September 1938, Gray screened his latest work of Mexican fiestas before the 
Mexican Ambassador and his staff in Washington, D.C. The hour-long program was so popular 
that Ambassador Castillo Najara requested that Gray screen the same film before a meeting of 
the Pan American Union (PAU, now known as the Organization of American States), an offer he 
dutifully accepted.57 The PAU constituted an international organization representing thirty-five 
independent nations in the Americas. The central goal of the member nations in creating the 
PAU was to “strengthen the peace and security of the continent.” Najara thought Gray’s 
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documentary film reflected that commitment. In a similar case, P.H. Sitter, a member of the ACL 
from Yugoslavia and a director of the national Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), 
completed a film that tells a story about youth in both urban and rural settings. The production 
was so successful that by royal command of the King and Queen of Yugoslavia, the film was 
presented at Dedinje, the Royal Palace, before members of the royal family, the Yugoslav 
cabinet, and the British and American ministers to Yugoslavia.58  
  All of these events demonstrated how the ACL helped nurture sustainable relationships 
between filmmakers, film clubs, and politicians. Amateur filmmaking inspired friendships and 
hospitable communication between ordinary citizens from dozens of countries. In addition, it 
functioned as a conduit for interactions between the public and influential ambassadors, 
politicians, and world leaders. These developments nicely documented how an organization of 
simple avocations could become an informal means of unofficial, international diplomacy. 
However, the ACL considered its film exchange programs the organization’s seminal 
contribution to global peacekeeping.  
SWAPS, created by Maxim, was the ACL’s first attempt to establish an efficient lending 
service that “insured,” Maxim wrote, “the absolutely safe transportation and return of valuable 
films.”59 SWAPS required the league to mail record cards to all members on which they were 
requested to list their films and whether or not they were willing to exchange them. Members 
provided a description of the films along with their address and contact information. A master 
list would then be assembled at headquarters and provided to members who wished to partake. 
Because assembling a complete record of existing amateur films was time sensitive, Movie 
Makers printed the submitted lists so members could directly contact the films’ owners. Maxim 
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started the list by providing descriptions of his personal films: Fishing Trip, Miscellaneous 
Family Scenes, European Trip, and Development of an Old Farm House into a Country Home. 
The list is comprised primarily of simple recordings of quotidian activities. According to Maxim 
and the ACL, interesting films could stem from even the most habitual components of everyday 
life. Others, however, loaned photoplays, dramatic narratives, and practical films for medicine 
and science, showing how amateur cinema encompassed an incredibly diverse, and often 
complicated, collections of genres and production modes.   
The ACL also provided printing space in Movie Makers to any member asking for 
specific footage. For example, in January 1929, Movie Makers published a blurb for league 
member Lim Kean Chuan of Penang, Malaysia, who hoped to exchange his films of “ceremonies 
and tribal customs for sports subjects, such as the tennis matches at Wimbledon.”60 Chuan was 
likely creating a comparative film by experimenting with juxtaposition and montage, a technique 
widely promoted by the ACL and dutifully attributed to Russia. The ACL encouraged members 
to splice footage of different national hobbies together to create a comparative medley of 
memorable imagery. Furthermore, Chuan’s request reflected the broad geographic spread of the 
ACL and an early example of collaborative, international filmmaking—another intended 
characteristic of SWAPS.  
Ideally, SWAPS not only allowed members to lend films for screening but also provided 
an arena for collaborative filmmaking. Members could create duplicates of borrowed films and 
then use them to fill in and complete their own pictures. “Suddenly,” Movie Makers reported, “to 
headquarters, comes a rash of requests from filmers in some parts of the world to filmers in many 
others for cooperation in getting desired footage on this subject of either general interest or 
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special interest.”61 Sometimes, requests were simple, like that of A.G. Hawker, ACL member in 
New Britain, Connecticut, who needed footage of pheasants in order to complete his narrative on 
hunters in New England.62 Similarly, F.H. Holman, ACL member in Euclid, Ohio, requested 
footage of midwest nature scenes because his camera jammed while recording Tahquamenon 
Falls in Northern Michigan for a travel film.63 Others, however, required the assistance of 
members overseas. Henry A. Nerison, ACL member of Westby, Wisconsin, needed footage of 
cityscapes in Berlin, Paris, and London to complete his pictorial depiction of Western Europe.64 
Dr. D. Olof of the Swedish Mission Hospital in India needed help from other active filmmakers 
in India to complete his “story of a Hindu boy who grows up to be the leader of his people.”65 
The ACL moderated this form of interaction and hoped members could use SWAPS to help 
complete one another’s projects, even if the invested individuals never personally met. Requests 
such as this were common in early editions of Movie Makers and illustrated how the ACL 
connected amateur filmmakers from divergent societies. The SWAPS system nonetheless proved 
costly and inefficient, and ultimately became the permanent Club Film Library and the Film 
Exchange.  
The Film Exchange was in all practicality the same system as SWAPS, except it did not 
waste printing space in Movie Makers and relied on sending a comprehensive list of all films 
available for exchange, complete with mailing addresses, directly to participating members. 
However, separate listings for medical and dental films were created and provided only to ACL 
members who were in fact practicing dentists and doctors. The Club Film Library was one of the 
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ACL’s principal services and was provided free to members. The Club Film Library was a 
functioning archive of films completed by cine clubs and ACL members throughout the world. 
The ACL offered the films on loan to film clubs and was instrumental in the wide circulation of 
amateur cinema from 1929 to 1954. Occasionally, amateur filmmaking organizations agreed 
systematically to contribute films to the library. In 1930, the Amateur Cinema League of 
Shanghai, which had a membership of one hundred and thirty individuals, offered the Club Film 
Library a print of the prize-winning film from every contest it held. The Shanghai Club, like 
most large cine clubs, was interested in the international aspects of amateur filmmaking and even 
published a monthly magazine in Chinese, English, and Japanese.66  
Due to the Club Film Library, ACL cine clubs were able regularly to screen foreign films 
and champion them as a means of international understanding. In October 1936, for example, the 
Klub der Kino Amateure Oesterreichs in Vienna, Austria, screened amateur films from six 
countries to over six hundred people.67 The event reflected the diversity of screenings in ACL 
cine clubs and the potential scope of the presentation. Some films screened at hundreds of 
amateur film events in dozens of countries. George Sewell’s The Gaiety of Nations (1929), 
heralded by the ACL as one of the greatest achievements in amateur cinematography, was 
exceptionally popular. Cine clubs and societies exchanged prints of the film and discussed it 
frequently at meetings and events. It garnered universal acclaim from amateur film publications 
and won numerous awards at international film competitions. The short film is just under twelve 
minutes long and depicts masterfully World War I, global food shortages, corrupt banking, the 
stock market crash, and immigration restrictions in the United States, subjects professional film 
industries could not afford to address explicitly. The title, The Gaiety of Nations, is ironic, as the 
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film is a vehement critique of nationalism and a timely commentary on World War I and the Age 
of Anxiety. Because the film champions the benefits of pacifism and challenges the nature of 
American world hegemony, it merits a detailed analysis. 
The film opens with a title card, stating: “With the exception of one shot the whole of this 
film was made in a room 15 feet by 11.” Like many amateurs, George Sewell shot the film in his 
own domestic space. Consequently, the title card served two functions: first, it allowed the 
viewer to embrace the film’s “amateur” status, a designation Sewell wore proudly; second, it 
reflected the total nature of World War I itself, which forced its way directly and indirectly into 
the private homes of millions. The title card then quickly dissolves into another, “A City in 
Europe,” a statement that universalizes the film’s setting and anti-war message to all of Europe, 
and therefore the West at large. After a series of cityscape shots, created through some fine 
miniature model work, the camera reveals two men playing chess inside a bar. Their game is 
intercut with dancing feet and a newspaper, which states, “All the Winners.” The scene evokes 
the sense of confidence and progress those of the Western world held and promoted in Africa, 
Asia, South America, and the Pacific before the reality of world war tore down their convictions 
of superiority. The chess match is an obvious symbol foreshadowing the game-like qualities of 
the impending conflict, a motif used frequently in films concerning the World War I, particularly 
All Quiet on the Western Front (1930). Suddenly, however, a gun emerges from darkness and an 
unknown man is shot in the head, destroying the aura of celebration. A small crowd gathers 
around a newsboy, the front-page headline is clear: “Grand Duke Assassinated.”  
The film is highly impressionistic, relying on montage to move across time and space. 
Obviously, Sewell intended viewers to understand that war is imminent, but instead of showing 
scenes of soldiers assembling, the camera reveals shadowed figures making hasty stock market 
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decisions. The word “Sell!” flashes multiple times across the screen as a man repeatedly lowers 
unidentified numbers and figures on a chalkboard. Suddenly, the fast paced cutting stops on a 
close-up of a megaphone and a series of titles spring forward: “Rubber … Down … Textiles … 
Down … Oil … Down … Everything … Down … War.” By highlighting commodities essential 
to European colonial regimes, Sewell was criticizing the economic system that had pulled Africa 
and Asia into the emerging conflict. Images of newspapers reading “War” then overlap with 
close-ups of waving flags, an obvious reference to the initial enthusiasm many Europeans had 
held to fight for their nation. The sentiment, however, is short-lived, as Sewell immediately cuts 
to machine guns, tanks, and trenches lined with barbed wire, the deadly stock of weapons 
characteristic of the war. Close-ups of falling bodies rapidly intersect with shot of explosions 
until the violence eventually stops and the viewer is left to linger on a wide-shot of a hill covered 
in a mangled barbed wire fence. The center post forms a cross of crucifixion with a soldier’s 
helmet resting on top. The camera slowly fades to black. 
The film’s third act depicts economic inflation and food shortages intercut with images of 
graveyards. A close-up of a map of Europe eventually fills the frame. The map slowly flips over 
and reveals a map of the United States followed by a few quick images of monolithic New York 
City skyscrapers. A silhouette of the Statue of Liberty appears before slowly dissolving into a 
dollar sign with a dagger penetrating its center. An image of a massive wall comes into focus 
with a sign clearly stating, “Ellis Island, House Full.” A hulking man donning in an expensive 
suit and dark glasses emerges from behind a copy of The New York Herald. He puffs a cigar in 
front of an American flag and a sign reading “Business First.” The man chuckles deviously to 
himself as he reads about Europe’s crippled financial system. The sequence is somewhat ham-
fisted, and loaded with unsubtle political and economic commentary, criticizing the 
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consequences of the global marketplace and the United States’ economic upturn after the war. It 
suggests the replacement of European world hegemony with American, and vilifies American 
bankers and businessmen as corrupt officials upholding the true values of the United States, not 
freedom and personal liberty, but the pursuit of money and power.  
The Gaiety of Nations is a testament to the radical nature of many amateur works, 
especially compared to those of major studios. Few professional filmmakers could afford to 
tackle such controversial subject matter for fear of alienating key markets and demographics. 
Free from financial and business constrictions, however, an amateur like Sewell was able to use 
amateur organizations for distribution, exhibition, and feedback. Yet overall, The Gaiety of 
Nations is exceptional in regard to its ambition, style, and substance. Most amateur films were 
not overtly politicized, and a content-based reading of them, such as this, provide only cursory 
understandings. For historians, an empiricist reading of amateur films is not always the most 
fruitful avenue for examination. Often, amateur films are simple, cinematic records of various 
facets of daily society and life. Consequently, questions like “what is the film about?” or “what 
does it mean or say?” can raise an inappropriate standard of critique, one that lends itself more to 
studying films of professional industries. Amateurs had never intended to receive the same 
treatment. To appreciate fully the merit of many amateur films, it is important to keep in mind 
that it was the ACL’s Film Exchange, a trailblazing social network, that was moving them 
efficiently across borders and cultures. Here it helps to acknowledge the famous reasoning of the 
renowned media theorist Marshall McLuhan, for the medium was the message.  
One such film, Transport (1933), created by J.B. Thubron, actually focuses entirely upon 
“world-wide methods of moving men and merchandise.” Transport is a perfect example of how 
many amateur filmmakers preferred to focus on broad issues and themes that anyone, anywhere 
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could appreciate. While traveling around the world, Thubron spent months filming the different 
modes of transportation used in South Africa, India, Kashmir, Java, Singapore, Ceylon, Egypt, 
Malta, and Great Britain. Each location contains a title card before cutting between several 
simple images of various forms of transportation, including steamships, boats, cable cars, horses, 
rickshaws, bulls, camels, elephants, mule-drawn carriages, sampans, push carts, litters, shoulder 
poles, canoes, airplanes, parachutes, bicycles, automobiles, and trains. His topic, “transport,” 
appropriately reflected the growing systems of transportation and communication, in which 
amateur film was deeply embedded, and that allowed well-to-do individuals like Thubron to 
travel throughout Africa and Asia. More importantly, however, Thubron shot the film in pictorial 
fashion, favoring well-composed frames with a wide-depth of field. His subjects, positioned at 
eye-level, never appear anxious or uncomfortable from the camera’s possessive gaze. Besides the 
obvious benefits that come from seeing aspects of urban and rural life around the world in the 
early 1930s, the film is important in how it renders its subjects as equals. The film does not favor 
one people, place, or mode of transportation over another, but rather places them all on the same 
photographic plane. Images of colonial activities are present on the periphery, such as an 
indigenous man pulling a European expatriate in a rickshaw, yet Thubron does not focus on 
them. Instead, Thubron honed in on a simple theme, “transport,” demonstrating how all people, 
regardless of culture and place, possessed the same need and ability to move both people and 
goods. Ultimately, Thubron universalized his “world-wide” subjects.  
During the 1920s and 1930s, filmmakers and critics were still defining the specifications 
of various genres. Consequently, an amateur publication might label Thubron’s Transport as any 
or all of the following: documentary, ethnography, educational film, record film, and travel film. 
The travel film genre was particularly fluid and popular among amateurs. It was a designation 
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given to any work, regardless of intent, that displayed a culture or place that was foreign to the 
filmmaker. The ACL embraced travel films and considered them extraordinarily valuable to 
nurturing world peace since they “allowed one to globetrot in the comfort of their own home.”68 
They were incredibly popular within the Film Exchange and Club Film Library and embodied 
the ACL’s commitment to familiarizing amateurs with different cultures. These “virtual 
voyages,” however, ranged dramatically in regards to content and production value. Sometimes 
ACL members produced serious, anthropological films in an effort to understand foreign 
communities and places. Movie Makers contained dozens of articles on ACL members creating 
intimate portraits of indigenous peoples in Africa, Asia, South America, and the American West. 
But more often than not, ACL members unintentionally created exoticized representations of 
unfamiliar peoples, thus ironically enforcing their “otherness.” Moreover, most advanced 
amateurs were aware that “nothing can be more dull or uninteresting” than a poorly made travel 
film, therefore their goal was to assemble compelling and original travel narratives, which 
displayed high production value and technical proficiency.69 Thorough and meticulous planning 
consequently became the mantra for most serious amateurs. “With forethought,” P.W. West, an 
expert travel filmmaker, wrote, “travel pictures can be made truly artistic, interesting, and far 
superior to the usual stereotyped, disconnected recording of each place. The idea is not merely to 
expose hundreds of feet of film, but to seek to record the true atmosphere of a place in a few 
simple touches.”70 Since the ACL equated world peace with the ability of distant individuals to 
see foreign cultures, one must ask, what did amateur filmmakers consider “the true atmosphere 
of a place”? The films of ACL member Tad Nichols provide some understanding. 
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Nichols considered Hollywood depictions of the American West grossly inaccurate since 
they downplayed or omitted entirely the presence of indigenous peoples. Nichols was an active 
amateur and determined that his films could give a presence to marginalized indigenous groups, 
complicating the tired myth of the Wild West as a hostile environment in need of Anglo 
civilization. Nichols produced true amateur ethnographies made possible through healthy 
friendships with American Indian groups that actively contributed to his filmmaking process. 
Nichols produced dozens of films while living with nomadic Navajo and Apache families in the 
southwestern United States. In 1937, Nichols graduated from the University of Arizona with 
degrees in anthropology and geology. After studying under some of America’s most influential 
photographers, such as Ansel Adams and Edward Weston, Nichols dedicated himself fulltime to 
cinematographic pursuits. He became a noted filmmaker and photographer while shooting the 
expeditions of the famous geologist and naturalist Edwin McKee. Soon after, the United States 
Indian Service hired Nichols to produce instructional films for American Indians. Eventually, 
Walt Disney Productions and the Sierra Club employed Nichols in their film and photography 
divisions.  
Nichols crafted produced his most interesting works independently during his stays with 
several Navajo families. In amateur film circles, Nichols’ film Navajo Rug Weaving (1939) 
garnered significant praise and a place in several “Ten Best” amateur competitions. In the short 
eighteen-minute film, Nichols documented several Navajo women’s laborious process for 
making rugs. The film is genuine ethnography and beautifully humanizes, for what was likely the 
first time, a Navajo community in gorgeous 16mm color Kodachrome. The simple premise 
makes for compelling viewing as Nichols artfully captures the character and contours of a way of 
life shaped by the deserts of the southwestern United States. Nichols screened and lectured about 
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the film in popular museums across the country. The Navajo families spoke highly of Nichols 
who “came to know them as fine people and true friends.”71 The relationship between Nichols 
and the Peshlakai family, his primary actors/subjects, epitomized amateur cinema’s cross-
cultural capabilities and complicated the typical American origin story popularized by influential 
figures, such as Fredrick Jackson Turner and Theodore Roosevelt. Nichols’ film showcases the 
lived experiences of a minority family in the 1930s, a decade of heated debate between the 
Navajo Nation and the United States over property and livestock regulations. The family lived 
only a few miles from Monument Valley, which Hollywood had already popularized as the 
quintessential landscape of the American West. Tad Nichols’ films, however, offered the 
Peshlaki family, among several others, a new platform for cultural expression, curbing the 
popular ‘whitewashing’ of nineteenth-century American history. 
Unfortunately, most amateur filmmakers were not as perceptive as Nichols and did not 
consider complexity or nuance in their work. Producing a travel film simply meant 
photographing what they, prior to their arrival, imagined would represent the culture of their 
destination. “Formerly,” an article in Movie Makers reported, “Americans went abroad to ‘see’ 
Europe or ‘do’ the Continent, but today they travel to see themselves abroad.”72 This aura of 
narcissism often underscored amateur travel filmmaking. For many amateurs, travel filming 
provided the opportunity not to experience a different culture, but rather to “see themselves” 
interacting with the signs and symbols they considered emblematic of their host nation’s identity. 
The insistence of amateur organizations on thorough planning enforced this mentality because 
unless filmmakers already knew a great deal about the place they were going, then the process of 
meticulously planning a film before arrival, which many amateurs did, destroyed any opportunity 
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for the filmmaker to learn anything contrary to their preconceived perception of their destination. 
Often, this led many amateurs to focus their attention on clichéd scenarios characteristic of the 
status quo, like trying to “catch the spirit of old Europe in film.”73 Many American and Canadian 
amateurs, for example, went to great lengths to photograph cathedrals, castles, and monuments—
all popular symbols of nationhood—without “tourists stamped all over it” to enforce a 
romanticized representation of a bygone chapter in European history.  
Likewise, many ACL publications encouraged amateurs traveling to the non-western 
world, particularly in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, to avoid shooting anything reminiscent of 
modernity, including automobiles, factories, power plants, and anything else related to 
technological systems.74 This allowed them to uphold the Orientalist fantasy of the developing 
world as eternally exotic and primitive. Occasionally, many ACL members even adopted an 
attitude reminiscent of the nineteenth-century ethos of the white man’s burden. For example, in a 
remote part of Umuahia, Nigeria, Dr. LL Thomas, an ACL member from the United States, 
reported in Movie Makers his challenges while making films intended to inform indigenous 
Nigerians about the habits and dangers of disease-carrying insects. Thomas condescendingly 
expressed his frustrations while trying to educate “the natives who cannot read and have a very 
limited understanding of the relationship between cause and effect.” A portion of the film, 
Thomas explained, “must contrast the unsanitary, dirty native village with the clean one in an 
effort to improve living conditions.”75 The exploits of Marvin Breckinridge, an American ACL 
member who traveled to southern Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, in “primitive Africa,” revealed a 
similarly racist impulse. After filming several golf courses catering to wealthy tourists, 
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Breckinridge decided to make a cinematographic account of “an important influence of the white 
man on the black” by filming the Lovedale Institute, one of the region’s prominent missionary 
schools. With the help of his three “black caddies,” he nicknamed Whiskey, Sixpence, and 
Jumbo, Breckinridge managed to photograph several scenes of daily life. However, Breckinridge 
found the task more challenging than he had expected. “My native boys,” he claimed, “would 
sometimes get absent minded.” Breckinridge, who spoke no Mashona, the local language, 
learned the words for “wait” and “come here” to keep his assistants focused on their tasks. 
“Luckily,” Breckinridge wrote, “the Africans are not beggars. … However, among themselves, 
an exchange of presents is considered courtesy.” Breckinridge thanked his assistants by giving 
them lemon drops and often spoke to them as if they were animals in a petting zoo. “They adore 
sugar,” Breckinridge wrote, completely unaware of his patronizing demeanor; “I can assure 
anybody who plans to go to photograph natives that if he is always cheerful and shows a friendly 
interest in the African, he will not lack cooperation.”76  
Written accounts of Breckinridge’s travels in Africa detail many instances of him subtly 
verifying his confidence in white superiority. Besides his condescending conduct toward the 
locals, Breckinridge frequently chuckled at the “natives who were afraid of being photographed.” 
In fact, many ACL members lampooned “that instinctive fear of the camera common to all 
primitive people.”77 Since amateurs typically considered candid shots more desirable, Movie 
Makers frequently listed strategies on how to photograph subjects inconspicuously. For many 
amateur filmmakers shooting in the developing world, distinct power relations emerged between 
those who operated the 16mm camera and those they had photographed. To the “primitive 
subject,” the camera represented a source for “magic” that might “work evil,” “cast a spell,” or 
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“burn eyes out.”78 To the filmmakers, the camera reflected their sophistication and ascendance 
into modernity. The technological divide between the two parties enforced the amateur 
filmmaker’s sense of dominance, which often hindered the possibility for true cross-cultural 
dialogue.  
One ACL publication even outlined how to photograph the different women of the world. 
“Each man to his fancy,” the author wrote, “and no two nations alike . . . Asia, Africa, Siam, and 
Tahiti—the world is full of feminine beauty with which you can fill your movie album.” The 
author detailed how to best capture the “slight and sloe eyed women of the Orient,” the “buxom” 
women of Germany, or the “heft” of women of the Arctic Circle, stressing to “win them over” so 
they could “pose for you in their native costumes.”79 The article functioned as little more than a 
how-to manual for men to exoticize and fetishize women. The widespread exchange of amateur 
travel films such as this gave individuals, predominantly white men, an opportunity to 
conceptualize and possess others. The goal was too often to highlight the differences of each 
location, thus accentuating its “otherness.” Amateur travel films were far from homogenous, and 
many amateurs clearly never sacrificed their goal to capture the true atmosphere of a place in 
favor of exoticized pretty pictures.  
As much as the ACL promoted thorough planning, they also encouraged filmmakers to 
embrace the spontaneity and drama of everyday life. ACL publications provided many strategies 
on how amateurs could prepare themselves and their camera to capture those rare but exciting 
moments when amateur cinema would confirm its status as the “Hollywood of real people.”80 
Those cinematic moments might include the filming of a “train wreck,” a “sudden uprising or 
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native rioting,” “a Chinese cop beating a rickshaw driver,” or “soldiers driving off the coolies 
with whips, gun butts and bayonettes.”81 Amateurs at times involved themselves in dangerous 
situations, risking injury and bodily harm for the sake of their film. Most amateur filmmakers 
ultimately recognized that “while we are ‘all brothers under the skin,’ each country, like each 
human, has its unique characteristics,” and if the goal of travel filming was to capture the reality 
of a place, then the filmmaker should strive to photograph everything, warts and all.82 Some 
amateurs created little more than simple point-and-shoot records of the signs, symbols, and 
activities that states and tourist industries had designated as representative of the nation. Others 
captured intimate moments that professional industries never could due to the extensive nature of 
their equipment and crew. Nevertheless, amateur cinema was always an instrument of 
commoditization, reducing nations, peoples, and cultures to canisters of celluloid that could be 
shipped and consumed around the globe. 
The Film Exchange and the Club Film Library represented an entirely new avenue for 
screening films. It was an alternative to professional film industries and provided members an 
intimate window into the personal lives of others, many of whom hailed from distant countries. 
The Film Exchange and the Club Film Library were early forms of social networking, which, 
among other functions, aimed to alleviate some of the quarrels stemming from politics and 
Hollywood. In September 1934, the ACL envisioned the creation of a “yearly world’s history,” 
compiled under the leadership of Maxim, aided by historians, and comprised entirely of amateur 
film.83 Ideally, the massive hodgepodge would project records, from across the globe, of events 
that commercial movie producers could not afford to attempt. This bold idea never came to 
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fruition but remained a testament to the ACL’s association of amateur film with “real” and 
“authentic” images of society, culture, and life, as opposed to Hollywood, which was 
“synthetic,” “artificial,” and “profit driven.” 84 
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the ACL helped to position the 16mm camera in the 
vanguard of documenting the increasing integration of the world after World War I. Maxim 
hoped that the spread of organized amateur filmmaking would allow individuals, without 
government intervention, to exhibit honest representations of themselves and others in a 
collective effort to humanize foreign cultures. Until his death in 1936, Maxim upheld his belief 
in amateur film as a “world peace agent” that fostered friendships across borders: 
I know that if I could send my home-made film, called ‘Winter in Connecticut,’ to some 
other amateur in Timbuktu or Nikolajewskoje or Caraguatatuba and get back one 
showing conditions in those places, the two of us would not only be closer together, but 
we would both understand and appreciate the problems and advantages of our respective 
countries better than we could in any other way; we wouldn’t be in such a hurry to cut 
each other to pieces in the name of Mars.85 
For decades, the ACL fostered various means of informal and formal diplomacy. Examining how 
the ACL directly and indirectly united divergent film clubs, members, and policy makers, 
including ambassadors and heads of state, it is possible to understand amateur film as more than 
simple recreation and leisure. It was a legitimate peacekeeping force.
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Conclusion 
On September 1, 1939, German forces marched into the Republic of Poland. Under the authority 
of Adolf Hitler, over one million troops stormed over Poland’s western border and almost 
obliterated Poland’s standing army. The aggression provoked outrage throughout Europe, and 
statesmen in the United Kingdom and France called for an immediate ceasefire. When Hitler 
ignored their demands, the United Kingdom and France quickly declared war against Germany. 
However, the Allies were slow to mobilize a counter-offensive and could not deter Joseph Stalin 
from also invading Poland with a half million Soviet troops. Poland’s government had no other 
choice but to flee into exile. Two months later, after Poland was partitioned into German and 
Soviet occupied zones, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer studios released the powerful anti-war cartoon 
Peace on Earth (1939). 
 Peace on Earth is a nine-minute short film that foreshadowed the onset of World War II 
by depicting a dystopian world where humans have gone extinct because of their perpetual 
violence. In their absence, anthropomorphic animals have inherited the earth and constructed a 
prosperous society from the ruins of what was once human civilization. Helmets, engines, guns, 
and bullet shells have all been transformed into charming homes and villages that make up the 
city of “Peaceville.” Many of the film’s animators were veterans of World War I, who drew 
inspiration from their personal experiences in the trenches. The film was a departure from the 
earlier works of director Hugh Harmon, an animator best known for creating the character Bosko 
for Warner Bros.’ Looney Tunes series. Until Peace on Earth, most of Harmon’s cartoons were 
whimsical tales revolving around the exploits of the loveable “Bosko.” He was not an overtly 
political man and never incorporated war or social commentary into any of his other works. 
According to Harmon, despite the fact it “was seriously themed [and] had nothing funny in it,” 
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Peace on Earth was one of his greatest accomplishments.1 Fred Quimby, one of MGM’s 
animation producers, claimed the studio had to release the film given the events in Europe. 
“With conditions as they are,” he claimed, “this Christmas was the logical time to offer in place 
of the usual light and frothy cartoon a subject dramatically imparting the full significance of 
Peace On Earth, Good Will to Men.”2 The film’s timely release ironically signaled the end of the 
Pax Cinemana and a shift in popular understandings of world peace. A historical and textual 
analysis of this underappreciated work helps explain why films were unable to prevent another 
global catastrophe and how internationalism ironically contributed to the emergence of World 
War II.  
 The film begins with the title card “Peace on Earth” featured in front of a bombed out 
church. A large fire looms in the background as the silhouettes of marching soldiers pass across 
the screen. As the image disappears, the audience begins to hear the sound of children singing a 
rendition of “Hark! The Herald Angels Sing.” Snow falls heavily as the camera pans slowly 
across the remnants of a war zone, revealing a stained glass image of a faceless Jesus Christ as 
well as rusting firearms, tangles of barbed wire, and bullet-riddled helmets. The source of the 
singing slowly comes into view: three adolescent squirrels dressed in human clothes. It only now 
becomes apparent that this is a children’s Christmas cartoon. An elderly squirrel voiced by Mel 
Blanc, the famous voice actor most known for playing Bugs Bunny, passes by the children and 
offers words of encouragement, “That’s the spirit sonnies, peace on earth!”3 The older squirrel 
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strolls into his cozy home and is greeted by his wife and two grandchildren. As he makes his way 
to sit by the open fire, he declares cheerfully, “Peace on earth, goodwill to men.” The little 
squirrels leap into his arms and ask an unusual question, “What are men, Grandpa?” As the elder 
squirrel describes the peculiar two-legged “varmints,” a nightmarish image of a soldier wearing a 
gas mask marches eerily towards the screen and stares directly at the viewer. “They was like 
monsters,” the Grandpa exclaims, “they wore great big iron pots on their heads and they carried 
terrible lookin’ shootin’ irons with knives on the end of ‘em.” The grim description startles the 
children who are now mesmerized by the musings. “Oh Grandpa,” a little squirrel chirps, “I’m 
glad there ain’t no more men around.” The film’s second act cuts back and forth between the 
elderly squirrel telling a story and the alleged last years of humankind. The juxtaposition 
between scenes of talking woodland critters and realistic World War I-inspired imagery 
distinguish Peace on Earth from typical holiday specials. Harmon understood clearly the power 
of irony and his story has much in common with the works of seminal World War I authors Erich 
Remarque and Wilfred Owen.  
 The film makes it clear that human nature is inherently violent and constantly provoking 
warfare. “Why they was always a-fightin’ and a-feudin’ at one another,” the Grandpa squirrel 
claims, “They’d no sooner get one argument settled then they’d find something else to fuss 
about.” As he speaks, hordes of faceless soldiers march across the screen and tanks steamroll 
through what were once prosperous villages. The images evoke photographs from the infamous 
Rape of Belgium. What was once an idyllic countryside is now an apocalyptic wasteland. The 
sky is stormy and conjures a sense of impending doom. Reminiscent of the paintings of Paul 
Nash and Christopher Nevinson, the war sequences adhere to a dark monochromatic palette and 
only use splashes of color to accentuate explosions and sporadic muzzle flashes. Some of the 
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tension is broken when the Grandpa squirrel states sincerely, “When they couldn’t think of 
nothing else to wrangle over, the vegetarians began to fight the meat-eating people.” To satirize 
the folly of blind nationalism, a flag donning a carrot moves toward an opposite flag picturing a 
whole roasted pig. This bit of comic relief, however, is quickly shattered by images of roaring 
munitions and crashing planes. The sounds of heavy artillery escalate to an unnerving silence. 
Suddenly, the sound of a single drum and a dissonant violin builds as the Grandpa squirrel 
declares somberly, “they fought until there was only two of them left.” The minimalist score, 
arranged by the legendary composer Scott Bradley, creates an unnerving sense of suspense. 
Slowly emerging from their foxholes, the remaining two men point their rifles at one another and 
fire. The sequence ends with one of the soldiers sinking slowly into a pool of mud and blood. He 
reaches his hand above the surface for one last grasp at life before finally succumbing to his 
dismal fate. “And that was the end of the last man on earth,” the Grandpa squirrel states as if he 
had just finished reading a lighthearted fairy tale.  
Without any humans, the natural world is able to thrive once again. Rays of sunlight 
break through the clouds and fall upon the ruins of a church. It is here in the third act that the 
film’s Judeo-Christian themes become apparent. The animals gradually emerge from the forest 
and find a perfectly preserved Bible with the Ten Commandments clearly legible. It is the dawn 
of a new era. “Though shalt not kill,” an owl says while reading the Commandments to a crowd 
of curious onlookers. “Looks like a mighty good book of rules,” the Grandpa squirrel interjects, 
“but I guess them men didn’t pay much attention to it.” As the owl continues to flip through the 
pages of the Bible, he comes across a relevant passage, “Ye shall rebuild the old wastes.” These 
words inspire the animals to join together and merrily construct the society of “Peaceville” under 
the guiding hand of God. While the animals frolic about their new home, the scene cuts back to 
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the Grandpa’s house where the two young squirrels now sleep soundly in a wooden crib, evoking 
the innocence and hope of a nativity scene. The song “Silent Night” fades in as the Grandma 
squirrel leans over her loved ones and croons, “Sleep in heavenly peace.” There are a number of 
ways to interpret the film’s moral lesson, which sheds light on how the rise of fascist aggression 
changed popular notions of world peace. 
Peace on Earth is an effective protest film that took aim at the looming specter of another 
world war and channeled many Americans’ reluctance to engage in what seemed like a European 
conflict. Pacifist sentiment was ubiquitous in the United States before the attack on Pearl Harbor 
and most American statesmen wanted to keep the country out of war, despite Nazi Germany’s 
invasion of Poland. In this context, one can see how the film was a product of those fleeting 
years before 1941 when many Americans had clung to the belief that neutrality was more 
important than actively restraining the threat of fascism. In addition, the film tapped into the 
United States’ evangelical Christian heritage. For decades, many prominent religious groups 
considered war a symptom of moral decay. It was an indication that society had drifted away 
from God and his teachings. A Gallup poll conducted several months before the release of the 
film indicated that the majority of Americans had not read the Bible in any capacity within the 
last month.4 The secularization of daily life concerned many influential figures in the anti-war 
movements who promoted Jesus Christ as the definitive symbol of non-violence and peace. The 
Great Depression rejuvenated the activities of a handful of vocal evangelical preachers who had 
claimed that the world’s current financial and national struggles were God’s way of punishing 
people for putting money and power before spirituality. Only by returning to the principles of the 
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Bible, they argued, could Armageddon be avoided. The film shared this sentiment but offered a 
glimmer of hope to its largely child audience. 
   World peace, the film made clear, was possible only if succeeding generations adhere 
to basic Judeo-Christian morality and heed the lessons of the past. The children of 1939 needed 
to recognize that war brought about nothing but chaos and death. They had to be different than 
their parents and grandparents. They had to be better. Because it empowered the agency of 
children in the midst of impending war, critics and parents unsurprisingly praised the film. “This 
is a Christmas offering,” one reviewer stated, “which is so significant in subject matter that it 
should be shown throughout the world to touch the hearts of mankind in a war mad world.”5 
Critics specifically celebrated the film’s unique animation, script, sound design, and ability to 
blend elements of fantasy with a message that one critic considered “as timely as a current 
newsreel.”6 Many scoffed at the notion that it was even a Christmas film. “Here is the best 
cartoon of the year,” the Motion Picture Herald reported, “Don’t wait for next Christmas; play it 
now. The war angle is more dominant than the Christmas.”7 The film was one of MGM’s highest 
grossing cartoons and was released theatrically with the blockbuster Gone With the Wind (1939). 
It was nominated for an Academy Award and screened in an array of theaters every December 
for years after its initial release.8 However, it raised most of its profits not in movie theaters but 
in classrooms, churches, and civic centers. “Because it represents useful ammunition for the 
cause of Peace,” a distribution advertisement declared, “a special advance screening for your 
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local ministerial association, newspaper editorial writers, heads of school and womens club 
groups will return box office dividends.”9  
Peace on Earth was an enormous hit with Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs). They 
worked diligently to incorporate the film into school curriculum to provide students with the 
opportunity to discuss world peace and what was developing in Europe. The California Congress 
of Parents and Teachers, one of the largest and most active PTAs in the United States, gave the 
film a special award that acknowledged its wholesome benefit to American youth.10 Various 
publications, such as Life Magazine, Good Housekeeping Magazine, and Parents’ Magazine, 
also endorsed the film and celebrated it as a profound yet family-friendly adventure. In the 
1930s, it was not uncommon for lifestyle and home economics magazines to work with local 
PTA chapters to develop film advisory boards. Studios like MGM and Warner Bros. took the 
opinions of such associations seriously when developing films for children. Receiving their 
approval helped the studios strengthen their reputation as purveyors of healthy and constructive 
entertainment, countering the heated criticism that usually surrounded the release of their 
lucrative crime dramas. If the studios received any positive comments from these advisory 
boards, they usually incorporated them into their marketing campaigns. Peace on Earth received 
an award from Good Housekeeping Magazine and was selected by Parents’ Magazine as the 
“Movie of the Month” for December 1939.11 MGM included these accolades on a number of its 
advertisements. In addition, the film was the first cartoon to receive a citation from the 
commission of the Nobel Peace Prize. The acknowledgment legitimated the cartoon as a serious 
commentary on world peace and brought it to the attention of academics and politicians. In 
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January 1940, Dr. Frederic Thrasher, a sociologist at New York University, invited officials from 
the Italian, Japanese, French, and Chinese consulates to attend a screening of Peace on Earth in 
one of his trailblazing courses on cinema and society.12  
Peace on Earth clearly generated a great deal of attention. However, what was missing 
from these discussions was a nuanced explanation of its inherent pessimism. Though the film is a 
satire, its depiction of a world without war demands critical assessment. The underlying tragedy 
of the story is the fact that world peace comes only when humans no longer exist. Humans, not 
technology, disease, or natural disasters, are shown as the biggest threat to themselves and the 
planet. Their weapons wreak havoc on natural resources, namely air and water, and their 
incessant fighting forces all of animal life to watch in terror from the sidelines. Once humans kill 
themselves off, the anthropomorphic woodland creatures are able to create an inherently better 
world. This scenario does not provide a typical happy ending. The absence of humans reveals 
how the idealism that had flourished throughout the 1920s and survived though the hardships of 
the Great Depression was largely irrelevant in a world teeming with fascist expansion. World 
peace, the film made perfectly clear, was not a reality for the current generation. After Nazi 
Germany’s invasion of Poland, most Americans were confident that another world war was 
inevitable and that it would prove more destructive than the last. Policymakers and the public 
began to mock Woodrow Wilson’s once famous declaration that World War I was “the war to 
end all wars” and treated the Peace at Versailles as little more than a naive delusion. By targeting 
children, the film demonstrated how world peace was their responsibility. The future hinged on 
their ambitions. It simply could not be achieved in the present in light of current events. This 
cynical treatment of world peace was a radical departure from the sentiment of the preceding two 
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decades. As discussions of world peace became relegated predominantly to children, the term 
quickly lost its currency both in Hollywood and in matters of statecraft.  
Though public opinion polls did not exist until the mid-1930s, the historical record 
indicates that a large share of Americans genuinely believed that world peace was the natural 
result of World War I. Many assumed the immense violence that characterized the war would 
deter future conflicts. In addition, many believed the League of Nations would put an end to 
European nationalist aggression and that the United States would ensure that liberal democracy 
flourished around the world. In 1939, most Americans detested the idea of war and embraced 
pacifism or neutrality. Gallup and Roper polls indicated that ninety percent of Americans 
believed that the United States should not declare war on Germany nor send troops to support 
Poland, the United Kingdom, and France. Similarly, when asked, “If another war like the World 
War develops in Europe, should America take part again?” Ninety-five percent of respondents 
said “no.” However, eighty-four percent also claimed that if another world war erupted, the 
United States would not be able to stay out.13 These polls implied that most Americans had 
accepted war as inevitable and world peace as beyond reach. The geo-political order established 
after World War I seemed incapable of preventing another global catastrophe. The basic tenets of 
internationalism looked unrealistic.  
For nearly two decades, liberal idealists had argued repeatedly that peace would come 
from strengthening international organizations and laws. Idealists worked to dismantle 
isolationist politics and champion democratic institutions. Filmmakers, activists, policymakers, 
and businessmen used film to advance those interests in a genuine pursuit of world peace. The 
language and paradigms of the nineteenth century still thrived in the United States, ensuring that 
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even the most benevolent peace advocates would face conflict and opposition. Americans 
generally interpreted the world as a series of contrasts: civilized and savage; Western and 
Eastern; developed and underdeveloped; and national and international. As seen, the efforts of 
the Pax Cinemana were embedded in this discourse and its supporters were by and large unable 
to transcend these shallow notions in any meaningful way. As a result, it was nearly impossible 
to create a cohesive action plan for peace that effectively addressed the needs of all peoples and 
places. The nationalist aggression that fueled World War II demonstrated clearly that 
internationalist sentiment did not inherently cultivate non-violence. The wartime activities of the 
International Educational Cinematographic Institute (IECI) and the Amateur Cinema League 
(ACL) made it clear that internationalism and nationalism were not opposites, but rather 
complementary forces that operated under the same basic ideology. 
When Mussolini withdrew Italy from the League of Nations, he brought the infrastructure 
of the IECI with him. He cleared the institute of all non-Italian personnel and ceased the 
publication of the multi-lingual International Review of Educational Cinema. The state-owned 
L’Unione Cinematografica Educativa (“The Educational Film Union,” or LUCE), absorbed most 
of the IECI’s resources and reformatted them to advance Mussolini’s propaganda campaign. 
Newsreels and documentaries highlighting the benefits of the fascist order replaced the diverse 
body of works the IECI had only a few years earlier promoted as educational cinema. The new 
goal was to expand “the outreaching of Italian culture to the Friends of Italy.”14 The remark was 
a clear rebuke of the former partnership with the United Kingdom and France, as well as the 
informal pact with the United States and its film industry. The new “Friends of Italy” were of 
course Nazi Germany and the Empire of Japan, demonstrating how the Axis alliance had 
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established itself not only in political treaties, but in film organizations as well. Celebratory 
toasts to the Italian military supplanted the IECI’s idealistic calls for world peace and 
international brotherhood. Mussolini even hired his son, Vittorio Mussolini, to edit a new journal 
dedicated to the benefits of educational film. The journal published numerous articles defending 
the moral necessity of authoritarian fascism and the threat that the League of Nations posed to 
peace in Europe. 
The nationalizing of the IECI’s resources troubled many in the League of Nations. The 
leadership of the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC) was particularly 
disturbed and struggled to find a way for France to fund and base a new version of the 
organization. Others looked to Switzerland as a potential host and hoped that its long history of 
holding disarmament conferences might reinvigorate its activities at this critical juncture.15 A 
large number of cynical critics, however, insisted that Mussolini’s initial involvement had 
doomed the organization since day one. “Dictatorship and academic liberalism mix like oil and 
water,” one reporter noted.16 For the harshest critics, the transformation of the IECI proved that 
the League of Nations was irrelevant and could not manage even the most marginal of tasks. An 
altruistic, educational body transitioned almost seamlessly into a mouthpiece for Mussolini. A 
reporter for the journal Cinema Progress best summed up the seemingly ironic demise of the 
IECI: “A highly self-conscious and calculating nationalism had taken the place of the 
international; a League of Nations function had given way to a Ministry of Propaganda.”17 Such 
actions were not limited solely to fascists, however.  
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When the United States entered World War II in 1941, the Amateur Cinema League 
(ACL) transformed into an unofficial appendage of the state and actively contributed to the war 
effort. The pages of Movie Makers detailed how members could create their own propaganda 
films that encouraged a call-to-arms by promoting hyper-patriotic notions of “what the flag 
means to you.”18 Movie Makers also published several editorials describing how amateur 
filmmakers could contribute to “setting the key for national thinking.”19 The statement seemed to 
challenge directly the international vision and purpose that the ACL’s founder Hiram Percy 
Maxim vehemently tried to promote. According to the ACL leadership during the war, the first 
step to prepare amateur filmmakers for the national armament effort was to encourage the 
production of nationalist films that detailed “what the United States meant to its citizens.” James 
Moore, an ACL executive director, provided a template for how ACL members could construct 
their own propaganda films. His template, titled “These We Defend,” called for using images 
like the American flag, bald eagles, and children playing baseball, “free people who are free to 
go and come as they choose in the pursuit of happiness.”20 The clichéd scenarios demonstrated 
how the ACL leadership was willing to bend its paramount philosophy. But, the strongest 
example of the ACL’s ideological duality during the war came in April 1942, at the request of 
the United States federal government.  
Government officials called upon the ACL to help assemble an enormous index of films 
and photographs of areas outside the United States. They realized that amateur travel films could 
provide a window into Axis and Allied territories, which might prove invaluable to strategic 
military planning and intelligence. “Our government,” Movie Makers reported, “recognizes our 
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hobby as a national weapon, and it calls upon us to use that weapon intelligently and actively, 
under its direction, to win the war.”21 The ACL leadership drafted a notice for all members to 
send films or photographs of places outside the United States to league headquarters for 
government review. Dubbing the task “a patriotic duty,” the ACL instructed participants to 
complete a brief survey documenting exactly when and where the footage was taken and whether 
the government could produce duplicates.22 Apparently, amateur travel films, originally intended 
as instruments for diplomacy and international understanding, had become instruments of war. 
Echoing Karl Marx’s famous description of modern life, "everything was pregnant with its 
contrary.” 
 The nationalist activities of the International Educational Cinematographic Institute 
(IECI) and the Amateur Cinema League (ACL) during World War II demonstrated how the 
relationship between cinema and the nation was varied and complex. Between 1914 and 1939, 
most Americans accepted the nation as the apex of human organization. They considered nations 
natural communities and consequently the rightful political unit for each and every culture in the 
world. Adherents of the Pax Cinemana professed that the opportunity to see how “other” peoples 
lived was the basis for international understanding. Films that nurtured a sense of familiarity 
with different customs, attitudes, languages, and races would humanize potential enemies thus 
eliminating any catalyst for war. Therefore, this vision for peace rested on producing allegedly 
accurate depictions of all communities, particularly nations. Though this sounded appealing in 
theory, it meant that filmmakers had to address how these ambiguous notions actually appeared, 
which raised some important questions: What did a nation look like? Was there any such 
construct as national or cultural authenticity? How could one photograph a people’s “true” 
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nature? Films like Ravished Armenia and Whom the Gods Would Destroy made clear how 
Americans hotly debated the politics of picturing societies and cultures. By depicting Turks and 
Germans as violent barbarians, they exposed the limits of internationalist thought after World 
War I—a time when increasing global integration made national borders more fluid and created 
new communities that challenged the permanence of the nation-state.  
In the pursuit of international understanding, adherents to the Pax Cinemana struggled to 
promote the global village while simultaneously reaffirming what it meant to be American, 
Italian, French, German, or English. Internationalism acknowledged the world’s diversity but 
still operated under the assumption that all peoples were entitled to self-determination and the 
ability to shape the destiny of their own cohesive nation-state. The formation of the Axis and 
Allied powers, however, demonstrated how popular understandings of national survival hinged 
on the belief that the other side must be defeated. All belligerent states framed themselves as 
warriors for self-determination but also insisted that their vision for the international order was 
inherently incompatible with that of the enemy. Popular peacekeeping efforts did little to 
navigate the pitfalls of this assumption and therefore could not prevent the outbreak of war.  
 The widespread questioning of international institutions and ideals also forced many to 
reconsider the benefits of technology, including cinema. World War II was a demonstration of 
technological might, and victory belonged to the most militarized, mobilized nation. As the 
global arms race intensified, governments turned to their respective film industries for support. 
In the United States, Hollywood manufactured dozens of propaganda films that championed the 
Allies and vilified the Axis powers. Blockbusters like Casablanca (1942) and Thirty Seconds 
Over Tokyo (1944), directly and indirectly encouraged enlistment in the armed forces. 
Approximately ninety million Americans attended movie theaters every week and watched films 
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that celebrated the United States’ unparalleled war machines. The State Department 
acknowledged cinema as powerful tool to build morale and showcase the military to the public. 
Many leading newspapers recognized that films were as significant to the war effort as munitions 
manufacturers.  
For most Americans, the technological advancements that had occurred between the late 
nineteenth century and World War II represented sources for peace and prosperity. Proponents 
spoke of technological development as part of the “progress” of civilization. The Pax Cinemana 
emerged when America’s obsession for technological innovation was at its apex. Adherents, like 
Woodrow Wilson, saw new technology as part of an emerging democratic and moral world. It 
thus created momentum for technological enthusiasm and innovation. World War II evolved into 
an opportunity for the United States once again to showcase its technological prowess and assure 
the triumph of democracy and liberalism over the forces of fascism and chauvinism. 
 The history of the Pax Cinemana offers excellent examples of how Americans coupled 
technology with international idealism. Seemingly, the Allied victory in World War II should 
have represented the triumph of this ideology and its restoration to the forefront of the foreign 
policy of the United States federal government. The Allied powers had crippled fascist 
aggression and the United States had enthusiastically solidified the United Nations as an 
international body for peace, a resurrection and improvement upon Wilson’s League of Nations. 
Polls taken immediately after the war indicated that the majority of Americans embraced the 
United Nations and believed it should have greater responsibilities than those outlined in its 
covenant. Many even argued that it should serve as a formal world government. These trends 
reflected the fact that most Americans identified as “internationalist” and opposed any form of 
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isolation from Europe and Asia.23 Ostensibly, the United States did indeed make “the world safe 
for democracy.” However, the cost of victory was immense.  
World War II proved far more destructive than its predecessor, largely due to advances in 
military technologies. The conflict raged for six years and claimed the lives of over sixty million 
people. Most historians today consider it the deadliest war in human history. Technological 
enthusiasm and international idealism waned considerably after the war. The optimism harbored 
by Wilson and many peace activists about the “natural” course of the future did not seem to 
apply to the conditions of the era after World War II. New anxieties emerged that challenged the 
notion that cinema was an unprecedented instrument for world peace.  
Ironically, it was the use of new technologies to end the war that brought this discussion 
to the forefront. On August 6, 1945, Americans dropped the first atomic bomb, Little Boy, on the 
Japanese city of Hiroshima, followed three days later on August 9, 1945, by the explosion of the 
second atomic bomb, Fat Man, over Nagasaki. In Hiroshima, around 70,000 to 80,000 people, 
approximately thirty percent of the entire city’s population, perished in the initial blast and 
ensuing firestorm. In Nagasaki, around 40,000 to 70,000 people died immediately, 
approximately twenty-three percent of the entire city’s population. In addition, the bomb 
destroyed almost seventy percent of the buildings in each city. Within several months, upward of 
another 110,000 people died from radiation sickness, burns, and other injuries sustained during 
the attack. In both cities, the overwhelming majority of victims were civilians.24 
The horrific bombing directly challenged the philosophical foundation of all idealists 
who had long professed that a better and more just world was within reach. For the supporters of 
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the Pax Cinemana, as well as millions of others, the most pressing issue after the bombing was 
how to integrate old ways of thinking about international understanding with a weapon capable 
of bringing about such unprecedented levels of destruction. The optimism of American peace 
activists and filmmakers rested in their unyielding faith in their nation’s moral management of 
technology. If the zenith of American innovation had manifested itself in the creation of an 
instrument literally capable of bringing about world destruction, then the line between good and 
evil, which had seemed so obvious in the 1920s and 1930s, demanded reevaluation. The United 
States had won the war, but the bomb had reduced the utopia envisioned by the liberal idealists 
to little more than a pipedream of a bygone era. William Lydgate, an editor for the Gallup Poll, 
described the national mood only one year after the dropping of the atomic bombs as “gloomy,” 
insisting that “instead of idealistically supposing, as many did after 1918, that the world was safe 
for democracy, the nation today soberly realizes that you have to work to keep peace.”25 
In a public speech defending his decision to drop the bomb, President Harry Truman 
stated, “We tell ourselves that we have emerged from this war the most powerful nation in the 
world--the most powerful nation, perhaps, in all history. That is true, but not in the sense some of 
us believe it to be true.”26 The statement echoed the feelings of idealists following the war. 
Woodrow Wilson had predicted that it was only a matter of time before the United Sates, due to 
its cosmopolitan legacy and mechanical know-how, would emerge as the world’s predominant 
moral compass and missionary for international understanding, which he had instilled with 
notions of democracy, free markets, and non-isolationist governments. However, it was the 
atomic bomb, the deadliest device ever assembled, which solidified the United States as the 
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world’s primary superpower; these were not exactly the conditions he and other liberal peace 
activists had envisioned.  
The devastating effects of the atomic bomb brought the debate regarding the ethical use 
of technology to the forefront of global politics and shattered any remaining confidence in the 
idea that technological development inherently meant social progress. The atomic bomb made 
atomic diplomacy one of the most important issues of the twentieth century and still, to this day, 
the United Nations continues to wrestle with the politics of nuclear testing. In regard to the use of 
the bomb, most Americans initially sided with the views of Henry Truman, who stated: 
I realize the tragic significance of the atomic bomb. Its production and its use were not 
lightly undertaken by this Government. But we knew that our enemies were on the search 
for it. We know now how close they were to finding it. And we knew the disaster which 
would come to this Nation, and to all peace-loving nations, to all civilization, if they had 
found it first.27 
Most Americans agreed that if any nation was to possess nuclear weapons they were glad it was 
the United States. But how long could the United States monopolize such a force? One of the 
principal questions in modern foreign relations revolves around the nuclear capabilities of 
nations. After World War II, many Americans continued to think that technology divided the 
future into irreconcilable trajectories of good and evil, and that the world needed the United 
States to ensure peace. However, after the introduction of atomic weapons into the global arms 
race, the possibility for world destruction seemed far more probable than the materialization of 
the Pax Cinemana’s promise of international understanding and peace. 
 By midcentury, when the Soviet Union attained nuclear capabilities, the potential for 
global destruction seemed ever more certain. Anxiety about new technology eclipsed the 
optimism and enthusiasm so embraced by peacekeeping filmmakers in earlier times. As anxieties 
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about the future increased, new movements emerged challenging the status quo. Realpolitik 
replaced idealism as the dominant form of statecraft, spurring the White House and the Kremlin 
to articulate the central tenets of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Presidents and 
policymakers in the Cold War spoke of containment and deterrence far more than world peace.  
Though some optimistic Americans bought into the State Department’s “Atoms for Peace” 
propaganda, most found the looming threat of nuclear holocaust troublesome and were certain 
that proxy wars between the United States and the Soviet Union were inevitable.28 When the 
Korean War erupted in 1950, for example, eighty percent of Americans expected another world 
war within the next five years.29 Ten years later, when Americans were asked if the threat of 
nuclear war had any impact on their outlook on life, approximately one third of Americans 
claimed they felt a “general dread or fear.” Eleven percent claimed they were struggling to plan 
for the future, while ten percent were not certain if they would even live to see the next day.30  
These Cold War fears also inspired large-scale counter-culture movements that criticized 
“the system” and re-examined the roles of humans and machinery in pursuit of organic values as 
opposed to those of industrial society. Sigmund Freud’s writings permeated the American 
mainstream and epitomized a new trend. They reduced the universal morality of man to animal 
instincts steered by subconscious, sexual desires. Freud’s work had been popular among 
American intellectuals since the 1910s, but they found new audiences after World War II, 
distorting and undermining the idealists’ notion that humans were inherently rational beings. 
Accordingly, as Americans lost faith in their technology and its implication for world peace, the 
																																								 																				
28	The	“Atoms	for	Peace”	campaign	stemmed	from	President	Dwight	Eisenhower’s	plan	to	educate	Americans	
about	the	benefits	and	threats	posed	by	nuclear	energy,			
29	John	Mueller,	“Expectations	of	War	During	the	Cold	War,”	American	Journal	of	Political	Science,	Vol.	23,	No.	2,	
May,	1979,	304-305.	
30	Linda	Lyons,	“The	Gallup	Brain:	Facing	Fear	in	America,”	March	4,	2003.	Available	at:	Gallup.com	(accessed	July	
9,	2017).	
	 265	
status of cinema declined. In a climate infused with imminent destruction and Freudian ideals, 
the vision of building international empathy through filmmaking no longer seemed so 
respectable.  
In the second half of the twentieth century, one would be hard pressed to find a leading 
figure in the film industry or in politics who genuinely believed that films could permanently end 
war. This is not to suggest, however, that Americans turned away from cinema. The movie 
screen remained a permanent staple of daily society and life, despite the advent of television. 
Hollywood worked routinely with the United Nations (UN), which shared the League of 
Nations’ faith in cinema as a valuable tool, and developed an array of important diplomatic and 
educational programs. Unlike the League, however, the UN was never the subject of blockbuster 
releases designed to rally public support. Even though the UN continued the effort to champion 
international organization, education, and law, these subjects were no longer at the forefront of 
filmmaking. Peace films, by and large, had lost their appeal.  
Audiences and activists favored works that reflected current realities. Heroic films about 
World War II became a standard for Hollywood studios and played a crucial role in securing the 
conflict’s legacy as “the good war.” Moreover, audiences acquired a taste for the uniquely 
cynical and dark features of film noir. Emerging as a distinct genre and style in the late 1940s, 
film noirs garnered widespread attention for their shadowy urban settings and stylized black-and-
white imagery. They drew inspiration from the hard-boiled fiction of Dashiell Hammett and 
Raymond Chandler, and usually focused upon disillusioned men struggling to find meaning in a 
cruel and indifferent world. Seminal film noirs, such as The Big Sleep (1946) and Kiss Me 
Deadly (1955), depict the lives of nihilist private investigators who tangle with dangerous femme 
fatales and double-crossing cops. The reoccurring themes of anxiety and suspicion in such works 
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encouraged film historian Wheeler Winston Dixon to dub film noir as the “cinema of paranoia.” 
One could apply the designation to most films of that era, including those intended for non-
theatrical settings.  
Paranoia and pessimism were natural extensions of the prevailing climate of opinion. The 
possibility of nuclear annihilation was a legitimate concern and played a significant role in 
shaping the tastes and expectations of the movie-going public. Will Hays acknowledged these 
developments when he decided to retire as the head of the Motion Picture Producers and 
Distributors of America (MPPDA) in 1945:  
The fast-moving years since 1945 have continued to bring home the fact that the motion 
picture is always the child of its own generation. Though it helps to shape popular 
thought, it is itself a storm center for the interplay of forces, mechanisms, and demands 
that are constantly changing.31 
After leaving his official position, Hays worked as an affiliate of the MPPDA and helped his 
close friend J. Edgar Hoover, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, purge the film 
industry of alleged communist influence. Hays and Hoover were certain that if cinema was to 
continue to serve the moral interests of the United States and the world, then it had to be free of 
communists and communist sympathizers. Anti-communist hysteria swept throughout 
Hollywood and heavily influenced for the educational film business, which ballooned 
considerably after World War II. Inspired by the surge in McCarthyism, production houses 
released hundreds of educational films highlighting the dangers of communism and the benefits 
of American capitalism. By 1950, nearly every school in the country had access to an 8mm or 
16mm projector, making it easier than ever to integrate films into the curriculum. In addition, the 
federal government sponsored dozens of civilian defense films to teach schoolchildren how to 
respond in case of a nuclear attack. Preparedness films like Our Cities Must Fight (1951) and 
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Duck and Cover (1952) became ubiquitous throughout schools and workplaces, and incidentally 
fueled feelings of unease and anxiety. Even the silly exploits of Bert the Turtle, the animated 
protagonist in Duck and Cover, were not enough to mask the harsh reality of a Soviet strike. 
 Approximately one year after the death of Will Hays in 1954, MGM studios released a 
remake of Peace on Earth. Renamed Goodwill to Men (1955), this new version, directed by 
William Hanna and Joseph Barbera, was nearly identical to its predecessor. Instead of squirrels, 
however, the main characters are mice and the story takes place inside a church rather than a 
private dwelling. After a choir of young mice sing a rendition of “Hark! The Herald Angels 
Sing,” one of them asks the wise old choir director, “What are men?” The elderly mouse then 
details the last years of humankind, a race of creatures who were “always thinking up new ways 
to kill each other.” The World War I-inspired imagery of Peace on Earth is replaced with scenes 
more reminiscent of World War II. Jet aircraft, grenade launchers, and missiles are included to 
demonstrate recent developments in military weaponry. “They built the bombs bigger and 
bigger,” the old mouse tells his captivated audience, “and pretty soon they were blowing up 
whole cities.” As the mouse speaks, the camera pans slowly across a blazing inferno that 
overwhelms a nameless metropolis. After conjuring the memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he 
eerily addresses the escalating tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union: “Then 
each one of them built the biggest, most awfulest bomb ever.” The image dissolves slowly into a 
single plane soaring casually over a blood red sky. The suspense builds while the mouse 
explains, “one of them was dropping the bomb over here, the other one was dropping the bomb 
over there.” The silhouettes of two large cities flash quickly across the screen before being 
incinerated in an instant. The shockwave from each explosion grows and ultimately spreads 
across the entire planet. A dissonant orchestral drone reaches a crescendo before going 
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uncomfortably silent. The viewer is left with nothing but images of a gray, lunar-like landscape. 
“And that was the end of the last man on earth,” the old mouse declares as if his words were a 
real-life premonition. 
As a result of the emergence of Cold War nuclear anxieties, it is tempting to dismiss the 
peacekeeping efforts explored in this work as little more than naïve activism that accomplished 
nothing of long-term consequence. On the surface, this study seems to detail one failure after 
another: the Peace Ship did not bring an end to World War I, Ravished Armenia did not establish 
a precedent for prosecuting genocide, Whom the Gods Would Destroy did not secure the United 
States’ membership in the League of Nations, and the IECI and the ACL did not uphold their 
commitment to pacifism. However, such a cynical reading of these efforts would support a 
shallow and counterproductive interpretation of peace as a fixed status, rather than a process that 
requires continuous negotiation. The pessimism of the Cold War era has shrouded the tangible 
contributions cinema made to the establishment of international business, law, education, and 
organization between 1914 and 1939. Acknowledging these attempts sheds new light on the 
practical benefits of idealism and the respectable notion that a warless world is worth pursuing.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1. Will H. Hays, circa 1919.  
 
Figure 2. Photograph of the Oscar II (i.e. the Peace Ship), circa 1915. Captain G.W. Hempel is 
on the left and Henry Ford is on the right. 
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Figure 3. Political cartoon mocking Ford and the Peace Ship. Note the two newsreel 
cinematographers pictured on the right. Source: Raven Hill, “Tug of Peace,” Punch magazine, 
December 15, 1915. 
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Figure 4. Left: Aurora Mardiganian, circa 1919. Right: Aurora Mardiganian wearing a Turkish 
yashmak, circa 1919. On more than one occasion, Mardiganian used the veil to conceal her 
identity from Ottoman officials.  
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Figure 5. Magazine advertisement for Ravished Armenia, 1919.  
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Figure 6. Illustration on the left appeared on the Ravished Armenia film poster. The inspiration 
from Emmanuel Fremiet’s 1887 “Gorilla Carrying off a Woman” sculpture is clear. Photo 
source: Krannert Art Museum, available at: frenchsculpture.org, a project by Laure de Margerie, 
funded by the University of Texas at Dallas, the Nasher Sculpture Center, the Insitut national 
d’histoire de l’art, the Musee d’Orsay, the Musee Rodin, and the Ecole du Louvre. 
 
Figure 7. Advertisement stressing the “CHRISTIAN WOMEN” found in slave markets. 
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Figure 8. Poster made by Douglas Volk in 1918 for the American Committee for Relief in the 
Near East. 
Figure 9. Promotional using the film’s alternate title, “Auction of Souls.” The illustration reflects 
the film’s capacity to combine torture and sex appeal. 
  
Figure 10. On the outskirts of Guelik, Kurds crucify a dozen young Armenian women. 
Figure 11. Before succumbing to death, a young woman’s lips move quietly in prayer.  
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Figure 12. Disarmed Armenian soldiers dig their own graves. 
Figure 13. A wide-shot crowded with refugees reveals the death marches through the desert. 
  
Figure 14. A blade penetrates an Armenian woman during the vicious “game of swords.” 
Figure 15. A priest is burned alive with many others inside a local church. 
  
Figure 16. The official deportation notice is read and posted. 
Figure 17. A gendarme shouts at a crowd before stabbing a religious leader to death. 
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Figure 18. Promotional flyer for Whom the Gods Would Destroy, 1919.  
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Figure 19. Promotional flyer for Whom the Gods Would Destroy, 1919.  
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Figure 20. Promotional flyer for Whom the Gods Would Destroy, 1919.  
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Figure 21. Advertisement for Whom the Gods Would Destroy, 1919.  
 
Figure 22. Advertisement for Whom the Gods Would Destroy, 1919.  
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Figure 23. Production still from Whom the Gods Would Destroy, 1919.  
 
Figure 24. Production still from Whom the Gods Would Destroy, 1919. 
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Figure 25. Trajan’s Column featured on the cover of the International Educational 
Cinematographic Institute’s official publication, June 1931.  
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Figure 26. Luncheon celebrating the birth of the Amateur Cinema League, July 28, 1926, New 
York Hotel Biltmore, Manhattan.  
	
 
Figure 27. Hiram Percy Maxim, official ACL photograph, circa 1927. 
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Figure 28. Official ACL film leader. Still from Manhattan and Picnic (Philip Medicus, c. 1929). 
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